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SRI RAMANUJA'S
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
A STUDY



BY

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
SRI VENKATESVARA ORIENTAL INSTITUTE,
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WITH A FOREWORD BY

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FOREWORD

My friend Dr. K. C. VARADACHARI asked me to write a foreword to his book "*Rāmānuja's Theory of Knowledge*." I gladly comply with his request on account of my interest in the subject and my desire to express my appreciation of the scholarly contribution made by the author to the Philosophy of Rāmānuja.

Dr. Varadachari rightly begins his study with the thesis that Rāmānuja is a synthetic thinker who reconciles all conflicts in the *pramāṇas* and seeks to do justice to the facts of physical, moral and spiritual experience. He expounds Rāmānuja's Theory of Knowledge in a succinct way by repudiating all rival theories and removes the misconception that Viśiṣṭādvaita is qualified monism. Realism and Idealism are only partial views and their defects are removed by the Organic theory of Rāmānuja. In the sections dealing with Perception he clearly brings out the truth that the physical object is a real entity and is not constructed by thought. Whatever is presented in perception is a differenced object and an undifferenced consciousness is unthinkable. The Veda is free from all defects as it deals with eternal truths intuited by the Ṛṣis and forms a single organic unity. Consciousness is an attribute or function of a subject or self and every cognition is of a real thing and even appearances are real. There are degrees of perfection and not degrees of reality. The theory of *apṛthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa* is an eternal and intrinsic relation and not external and it is misleading to say that Rāmānuja's theory is an adjectival theory of the Absolute.

Epistemology is based on Ontology and the central concept used by Rāmānuja to explain it is *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva* or the relation of body and soul which is called by the author Organistic and personalistic. It harmonises the physical

moral and spiritual orders of Reality. The physical order is ever changing and it serves as the common field of all our activity. The selves undergo changes only in their consciousness and not in their nature. The unifying principle is the indwelling presence or Person that is the source, controller and goal of all beings. Thus physics is related to metaphysics and metaphysics has its basis in religion. The self is not God, but belongs to God who is the supreme Subject of Knowledge and Object of love. In *Mukti*, the self regains its universal knowledge and attains fulness and freedom.

Dr. Varadachari has thus clearly brought out the central truths of Epistemology of Viśiṣṭādvaita and shown its integral relation to metaphysics and religion and it is fervently hoped that the author will soon publish the other aspects of Viśiṣṭādvaita and complete the work which he has so well begun.

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Congress, Lahore, 1943.*

INTRODUCTION

IN my earlier work on the *Metaphysics of Śrī Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāṣya* (1928) I dealt among other topics with the nature of the soul and incidentally with the nature of Consciousness. The soul is a sentience-point or an intelligence that is utterly finite, that is capable of being aware of itself without the mediation or functional activity of its consciousness, as is seen to be the case in states other than the waking and the dreaming. The soul's consciousness is inevitably used when it knows objects other than its own soul-nature. This is true even in relation to the soul knowing its own body. This indeed is the reason for considering the body to be other than the soul which possesses it and utilises it for its own purposes. This consciousness is to the soul what the rays of the sun are to the Sun, which reveals at any moment the objects to its own substrate and reveals itself along with them. Anubhūtitvam nāma vartamānadaśāyām svasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam. Svasattayaiva svaviśayasādhanatvam vā. Thus it is svayam-prakāśa but not svasmai-prakāśa. As a function of the soul or knower it is known as jñāna. It is unlike a quality for it is deemed to be a *dravya* for it is capable of expansion and contraction or in other words capable of modification (*avasthāvad dravyam*) even as the rays of the Sun. But it is not a substance in the sense in which the soul or Ātman is a substance.

The consciousness as a function is incapable of being considered as a body (*śarīra*) of the soul, since even though a *dravya* in so far as it undergoes modification, it does not fulfil the conditions laid down for its being called a *śarīra*, since it is an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the sentient soul through which alone a body is utilised, controlled and enjoyed by its substrate. Śrī Venkaṭanātha writes on this point most clearly : "Yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam yaccheṣataikasvarūpam ca tat tasya

śarīram : atra.....cetanasyeti caitanya-viśiṣṭatayā pratisaii-bandhitayā nirdeśāt *dharma-bhūta-jñānasya śarīratvam niras-yate*. Na hi jñānam jñāna-viśiṣṭasyādheyavidheyaśeṣabhūtam.” (*Tattva-muktā-kalāpa*, p. 531.)

The other doctrine which is more important than the doctrine of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* and is unique to Rāmānuja's system and is the cardinal principle of his system, is the *śarīra-śarīri bhāva*. Throughout this thesis I have sought clarification of all the diverse problems implicit in his Theory of Knowledge with its help. What is essential in a constructive exposition and criticism of any school, is not so much the ability to refute other systems and the presentation of the thesis as emerging from these discussions but the necessity to show the synthetic Organic or integral theory in its largest development. I have in this thesis attempted to do it in respect of his epistemology and have shown how it is closely inter-related with the metaphysical and religious issues which confront us almost every minute. This is the first time such an attempt has been made.

This work was accepted for the *Doctor of Philosophy* degree by the University of Madras in 1932. It is substantially the same, though certain parts have been considerably expanded and appendixes have been added.

I am deeply thankful to the authorities of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute and the T. T. D. Committee for having included it in their Sri Venkateswara Oriental Series. To my Professor P. N. Srinivasacharya who kindly wrote the Foreword to this work, I offer my heartfelt thanks. To Sri P. V. Ramanujasvami, M.A., Director of the S. V. O. I. and General Editor of this Series, I wish to express my gratitude for his special interest. To Sri D. T. Tatacharya, M.O.L., Curator of the S. V. O. I. who helped me in correction of the proofs I owe sincerest obligations. A word of thanks is due to the Manager of the T. T. D. Press, for having supervised the work and seen to its publication early despite many difficulties.

K. C. VARADACHARI.

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CHAPTER I

THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION

I

The Philosophy of Sri Rāmānuja, like most other systems of thought in India, is based more on Religious Experience, metaphysics and ethics rather than on epistemology. Epistemology came in to substantiate the conclusions of metaphysics arrived at through psychology. It is undoubted that at a later critical period as evidenced in Buddhistic schools and Advaita, the psychological approach had more and more yielded ground to transcendental *a priori* thought-construction. This transcendental approach is considered by some to be well-grounded, and it is claimed that our experience must yield its place to the transcendental deductions of *a priori* philosophers. That logic should legislate for our experience, is certainly an important thing and cannot be denied. But logic itself should find its feet on the ground and cannot and should not soar in the sky without any let or hindrance or control of fact. Thus the viciousness of the *a priori* usually consists in its consistent rebuttal of the evidence of experience.¹ Nor could experience be considered to be only of a particular kind. Experience is manifold, and the truth about experience must embrace all facts falling within experience. The doctrine of nihilism will result if any particular segment of experience alone is accepted and the rest denied. Universal propositions founded on the basis of partial applications will find logical collapse. The critical method is all for the best, but with the best of intentions the critical methods of early Buddhists and of Kant have foundered hopelessly in the ocean of fact. There is no other alternative to the criticist except to end in that

1. The Revelational *a priori* is different from the Kantian *a priori*.

wonderful 'night wherein all cows are black,' or else simulate a phantom dialectic and claim reality to a non-existent Spirit.

A hard-headed or rather 'tough-minded' policy of discrimination of experience in all its manifold expressions, and even when they refuse to fall into a scheme, to seek to discover that unity which is their reality, is the first and foremost need of a philosopher. A realistic outlook, a scientific bias, a matter-of-fact attitude, so to speak, an intention to know things as they are ere they are reduced to forms which they are not, and a definition of the limitations or condition under which any proposition can apply with validity, constitute the fundamental approach of the common-sense realist. Yathārtha-jñāna is the main aim of all philosophizings, and if we know things as they are in themselves, and as they are for others, then we may be said to know reality. All propositions avail within limits. Does this mean that there are no universal propositions? As in science, we say, that given the conditions or the limits so to speak, the proposition enunciated is universally applicable. No one will deny the truth of this. A universal panacea for all troubles, despite the claims made for its existence, for example, the philosopher's stone, which will disclose all truth, under all conditions, and at all times, is an imaginary thing, a fiction, necessary as Nietzsche will say, for making man strive to attain the impossible. The impossible, even if it be a monster, a non-existent impossible, will have to be considered to be a possible, if life is to be bearable on this planet of revolutionary ardour.

All metaphysical search, then, is after the concept of the real, the total. Knowledge of real is possible; and this total reality is not self-contradictory and discrete. It is a comprehensive explanation of this reality that is being sought. Knowledge about reality turns out to be a real knowledge of itself. Reality is the source and substance. The causal and the teleological, and the cosmological factors about it have been examined in an earlier work.¹ Epistemology deals with the *how*,

1. *The Metaphysics of Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāṣya*, 1928.

that is, as to how we apprehend the real. It investigates the apparatus of knowing and the structure of thought. It is psychological in approach as well as logical. The criterion of reality has to be formulated. The subject-object relation, the nature of the subject, and the nature of the object, the nature of their compresence have to be understood. There are several theories of knowledge. They all depend on these three factors. Philosophy seeks to reduce the natures of these three to one homogeneous existence. Some retain only two, and dispense with the third. Even if all are retained, the natures of the three terms are altered. A self-evidency test is applied by some; an extraneous test is applied by others in regard to the truth of the cognition. Some combine the extraneous and the intrinsic tests into one.

These theories as already remarked are results of metaphysical assumptions of certain utilitarian and scientific variety. Thus usually epistemology which is said to be the creator of metaphysics, is really a hand-maid finding reasons for the systems adopted. External reality, which is the objective world of transient phenomena, apparently reveals *no dependence upon the mind* perceiving it. This is what has led to the assumptions of realism which takes Consciousness to be a factor in reality but by no means the only factor about it. Reality is more than consciousness or the cognitive relation. Consciousness further is the function of the subject who perceives the outer objects. The momentariness of outer objects, which is certainly not the truth about them, does not vitiate their existence outside the perceiving mind and does not make them unreal in any sense. Such being the case, epistemology, if it is not to be speculative but scientific, has to accept the dictates of the system of metaphysics of realism and science, or in other words, of Common-sense which is the admitted and tested evidence of trained experimenters and observers of experience.

In Pragmatism epistemology has a higher function. It becomes the interpreter of facts given in experience, that have been tested and verified. It seeks to explain the facts

presented to consciousness and affirms a relativistic truth, a truth that is progressively being amplified and enlarged by growing experience, and incidentally capable of being modified by future experiences.

In Idealism, consciousness or knowledge seeks to become all important and absorbs or at least seeks to absorb entire reality within itself.

The question for us is, how far idealism is justified in claiming supremacy for Consciousness over the object and the subject. Does idealism prove that truth and being or knowledge and existence are identical? If this question is objected to on the ground that we never know anything apart from knowing and therefore that they are identical, then, what is the process of knowing or of being? An idealism that takes for granted that reality and truth are identical on the basis that consciousness is reality and truth, such as that of Yogācāra Buddhism and Subjective Idealism of Berkeley, and to a certain extent of Absolute idealism, surreptitiously misuses epistemology to prove reality to be consciousness only. It tries to prove that reality is consciousness only, that reality is psychological stuff, is mere consciousness not either a consciousness of anything or belonging to any subject. Nowhere do we in reality or in experience come across this kind of experience, except in the sophisticated Experience of Absolute Idealism. It is therefore important that we should criticize epistemological idealism as something fundamentally unsound because it pleads for subjectivism and an absurd unreal objectivity which it cannot dissolve, much less explain. Likewise, there is another kind of epistemological idealism which claims that One undifferentiated Consciousness (Experience) under the stress of illusion of diversity fulgurates or differentiates, or appears to do so in an *unreal* manner, into subjects and objects.¹ This is epistemology that has ascended to metaphysical substance.

1. avibhāgopi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaīh !
grāhya-grāhakasavittibhedavāniva lakṣyate.

Dharmakīrti: quoted by Yāmunācārya: *Ātma-Siddhi*.

This also therefore is what we have to criticize if we would save true metaphysics. Śrī Rāmānuja undertakes to point out the defects of the epistemological absolutists. Epistemology must be realistic, founded on the tested experience of the ordinary man, enabling him to understand the true nature of knowledge as well as truth in order to be able to function in the ordinary universe of action and to struggle for realization of the highest values of life, *paramaṣpuruṣārtha*.

Epistemology determines the validity of the system of metaphysics accepted, but on that account it should not be construed to be fit to override the facts of the metaphysical order. All facts fall within experience in one sense, and all have to be known in order to be accepted as real. That there may exist other things than what we experience, and that a higher consciousness may know more than ourselves, and that the highest consciousness might apprehend all things at once, too might be agreed to, on the basis of inference and ordinary experience of relative knowledge. To go beyond these limits and to affirm that Experience is something over and above, and other than all that we in ordinary cognition introspectively as well as observationally find to be the fact, is to construct an epistemological metaphysics, as spurious, if not worse, as the naive affirmations of the materialist. That is to say, in the construction of metaphysics it is necessary to take into account all types of experience, all types of cognitive relationships and not merely the more abstract relationships subsisting between the knower and the known in the act of cognition by the knower, which is dialectically made to yield an abstract Cognition or Consciousness or Experience.

Science taking its start from *perceptual* experience, undoubtedly the only type of experience that we can have of reality, arrives through the laws of self-consistency, and methods of inductive inference at the conception of the whole reality on a realistic basis. Undoubtedly an idealistic interpretation of reality is possible as evidenced by Mach's efforts, and even necessitated in certain respects. The mass of evidence, on the other hand has not been able to get rid of contradictions with

idealistic interpretations of experience. Whilst materialism has sought to affirm merely perceptual reality and ended in a solipsism which is the characteristic feature of subjective idealism also, the realist has been trying to arrive at approaches to reality through the twin-concepts of unity and difference, subjective and objective, permanence and change, perception and hearsay evidence, memory and inference. In thus trying to seek guidance from these twin-concepts and in granting them fundamental solutions, realism has emerged as a type of organismic view. It is true that mere organism can never explain reality. Nevertheless between the several types of organismic explanation we can select that which is at once non-self-contradictory and which converges into one focus, so to speak, the partial views due to one-sided interest and experience.

Organistic Theory is typically the common-sense view but with a difference. The ordinary type of Common-sense view of Reality that has been expounded by Reid, Hamilton and others, and in modern times by Prof. Joad and Dr. Stout have not culminated in the Organistic view. Whereas the realistic view of Prof. A. N. Whitehead has definitely taken the organismic explanation. We might even concede that the Holistic and other evolutionary and emergent theories cannot but accept the organismic theory, though, as far as we know, they have not made up their minds on the issue. The common-sense view is definitely not what the plain man in the street—that peculiarly unavailable creature made classical by Berkeley—thinks. It is what an expert in observation of reality finds to be the most acceptable, not what a speculative and adventuresome philosopher or scientist schematises or geometrizes. There is enough scope for a fundamentally correct view of reality without the sophisticated idealistic arguments which have sought to reduce experience to nullity and vacuum and illusion on the basis of principles of abstract non-self-contradiction, infinite regress and invalidity of memory and testimony. There are varieties of the above and in the above; there are apparent self-contradictions in the abstract which turn out to be perfectly compatible; there is an infinite regress which does not vitiate

the conclusions; and there is testimony which is unvitiated. These can be perfectly explained in accordance with facts of experience.

Experience itself needs a definition. Epistemology must investigate the conditions and limits of each principle and criticize the sources of knowledge and understanding, and all the facts of every order must be considered so as to make them fall into a view that is fundamentally self-consistent, efficient and all-embracing.

Śrī Rāmānuja starts from a metaphysical view and seeks to make out that his is a metaphysics that reconciles all conflicts according to every *pramāṇa* (source of knowledge).¹ The Cognitive relation is inquired into in all its manifold phases, such as cognition of objects, cognitive-cognitive functions in conduct, cognitive religious functions in regard to the Supreme Cause, Being, Reality, Self, Destiny (*parama-puruṣārtha*). In arriving at the central and basic concept of organism, Rāmānuja traces the tenets of the several schools of thought and shows their weaknesses and their untenability. Rāmānuja thus first and foremost, is a samanvaya (synthetic) thinker who seeks to do justice to the facts of spiritual, moral and physical orders as well as to the facts of realism and idealism. Undoubtedly this tendency to syncretise or synthesize is traceable to the period of the Upaniṣads themselves, and to the Vedānta Sūtras. The intention of the author of the Vedānta Sūtras was to give a synthetic presentation of the views of the Upaniṣads and Brāhmanas and the Veda about Brahman's Nature, and attainment. Rāmānuja accordingly claims to interpret the Vedānta Sūtras on the lines laid down by earlier commentators.

1. Trividham pramāṇam. pratyaksānumānaśābdabhedāt *Nyāyapariśuddhi*. p. 36. cf. *Prajñāparīṭhāna*: quoted by *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*. p. 38 (mem. ed.)

Śvayam siddhis tathā divyam pratyaksamanumāgamah !
Pañca santi pramāṇāni jaimini-vyāsayorhṛdi !

II

What is presented in Perception is not Consciousness

Rāmānuja takes up perception which is the *first* source of right knowledge. Perception belongs to the realm of external events which are changing and perishing constantly. It is an admitted fact that objects perish or undergo change constantly. The question of duration may be left over, though this is all important to the Schools of Buddhism as well as to Advaita. The external world of objects is the world of space-time (*kāla* and *deśa*), and is perceived by the self through its mind which is its *mukha* or face, when its sensory organs come into contact with it, in the forms of sound, touch, form, taste and smell. These sensations are of very brief duration in as much as they are shifting and changing and non-existent in the absence of the objects of perception, though they are preserved in consciousness in a somewhat attenuated form of memory (*jñānākara*). Śankara held the view that what is presented in perception is not of the stuff of sensations, not sound nor smell, nor form nor taste nor touch but principally Pure Consciousness itself. "In the beginning there is nothing beyond what is presented, what is and is felt, or rather felt simply." The purest perception which has not been influenced by the sense-organs or their functions, reveals only knowledge or more correctly consciousness alone. Thus the essence of all objects is pure consciousness. The forms and sense-characters are merely modifications generated by sense-organs due to *karma* and ignorance. In that pure¹ apprehension which is initial uncorrupted and unmodified by any element of karma or ignorance or *kalpana*, ratiocination, what is revealed is pure 'isness' which is undifferented and unqualified. This is true being. All that exists exists² purely as this stuff. In order to prove this thesis, the element of change or even momentariness of all things is a necessity forced upon any theory of modification by reason or understanding

1. Nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa is primary cognition.

2. Sarvāsti-vādinś hold a similar view to the above.

(*kalpana*). If this is accepted, then the Advaitic theory lands itself in buddhistic psychology of perception, and it can never get rid of its allegiances which it contracted at the beginning. Śrī Harṣa had undoubtedly found this to be the case, and affirmed that it is not at all a fault to accept even buddhistic theory if it were proved to be right as he felt it to be.

But the ordinary advaitin or more correctly the māyāvādin could find a way out from the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) through the orthodox schools instead of the heterodox. Indeed it appears that Advaitic theory was a powerful effort of the orthodox to win over the majority of buddhists to the Vedāntic fold, and in this Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara played the most prominent rôle.

In order to prove the theory of *kalpana* or modification and therefore falsification or illusification, Advaita snatched upon the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika distinction between two kinds or rather stages of perception, the *nirvikalpaka* and the *savikalpaka*, the indeterminate and the determinate perceptions. The *nirvikalpaka* *pratyakṣa* reveals, according to Śaṅkara, "a permanent reality and not a momentary isolated this.....as in the case of buddhist theory of *nirvikalpaka*,"¹ but according to Nyāya-vaiśeṣika, it is non definite, confused knowledge which awaits determination and definition and distinctness.

Rāmānuja undertakes to show that what experience involves in perception is never a mere 'is', the so-called permanent behind the momentary 'this', but always a well-formed isolated event which can only, because of these characteristics, point to a 'this'. Nor does it mean that the activity of knowledge is merely an 'is'—the metaphysical reality of a psychical stuff. Nor can it be ever identified with consciousness as such. Between the Naiyāyic *nirvikalpaka* *pratyakṣa* and the pure 'is' of Śaṅkara's theory, there is nothing in common except the name. Thus where Śaṅkara is prepared to see one problem alone, Rāmānuja sees three.

3. *Tarka-Saṃgraha* : MM. S. Kuppuswāmi Sāstriar, p. 220.

They are (i) The Naiyāyika nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa is not definite knowledge and hence is neither true nor false. Nothing can be said about it without further investigation and looking into, and the test by pragmatism becomes necessary.

(ii) The Naiyāyika nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa may be identical with Śāṅkara's nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa but it is not *anubhūti*, the undifferentiated consciousness or Pure Experience void of subject or object.

(iii) The act of cognizing may mean the fundamental functioning of consciousness, but what that consciousness reveals is neither consciousness merely, nor is it merely that which cognizes, namely the self. It is always an Object, self or non-self.

Rāmānuja's theory is an elucidation of these three points.

III

Two kinds of Perception

There are two kinds of perception, the determinate and the indeterminate. The indeterminate perception is that in which is presented a mere 'is' or pure being, according to Śāṅkara. According to Yogācāra, what is presented is a momentary existence, *sva-lakṣaṇa* or pure particular. Against this view, Rāmānuja holds that 'non-determinate perception is the *apprehension* of the object (in so far as it is) destitute of some differences but not all difference."¹ The apprehension of a mere 'is' without any difference whatever is in the first place not observed to take place, and in the second place, it is impossible.² All cognition can be stated in terms of 'this is such and such'. "The true distinction between non-determinate perception and determinate perception is the apprehension of the first individual among a number of things belonging to the same class, while the latter is the apprehension of a second, third, and so on individuals."

1. Ś. B. I. i. 1. Nirvikalpakam-nāma kenacid viśeṣa-viyuktasya grahaṇam. na sarvaviśaya rahitasya,

2. S. B. I. i. 1. (p. 41 Thibaut's trans.)

"Determinate perception is the extension to the perception of the generic character of a class-manifestation in a certain outward shape," which connects this act of perception with the earlier perception of the individuals of the same class. "Such extension or continuance of a certain generic character is, on the other hand, not apprehended on the apprehension of the first individual, and perception of the latter kind thence is indeterminate."¹

According to Rāmānuja every kind of perception involves (in a psychological interpretation) the perception of a structure or form (*saṁsthāna*) along with qualities of colour, touch and etc. Even the most initial perception reveals some form or structure (*saṁsthāna*) which is a *jāti* (for generic character is nothing but structure).² The apprehension in nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception is the apprehension of structure or *jāti* that gives rise to the judgment of difference or unique setting. This means that all perception is, firstly, an apprehension of a *rūpa*, a form, or *saṁsthāna-ākāra*, and secondly, when it is connected with some other recollected or memory-data, the form becomes the mediating class-concept, a universal, *jāti*. *Jāti* is the extension of the *rūpa* especially when the *rūpa* is available in more than one thing. The apprehension of a relation of identical form in two things which have been observed is called determinate perception, since it determines the nature of the thing in relation to other things around it. This extension of generic connection in several things and

1. Ś. B. I. i. 1. Nirvikalpakaṁ ekajātiya dravyeṣu prathamapinda-grahaṇam ; Dvitiyādi-pinda-grahaṇam savikalpam ;... (Ananda Press ed, Vol. I, p. 27). Savikalpakaṁ jatyādyaneka-padārtha-viśiṣṭa-viśayatvād-eva saviśeṣaviśayam, Nirvikalpakaṁ saviśaya-viśayameva. (Ibid. p. 26). cf. *Vedārtha Saṁgraha* 309. Nirvikalpakapratyakṣe'pi saviśeṣameva vastu pratiyate : cf. Gaṅgeśa who defines perception as immediate awareness: *pratyakṣasya sāksātkāritvaṁ lakṣaṇam*.

2. Ś. B. I. i. 1. p. 46 (Thibaut). Jains also hold that every perception is of *saviśeṣa-vastu* cf. *Hist. of Indian Phil.* Das Gupta Vol. I, p. 183

cf. *Vedārtha Saṁgraha* : 178 and 179 (p. 160 Telu. ed.) "Sanmātra grāhi pratyakṣam na bhedā grāhi" ityādi vādāḥ nirastāḥ. Jātyādisamsthānasamsthitasyaiva vastunaḥ, pratyakṣeṇa gṛhītatvāt, tasyaiva samsthānarūpajātyādeḥ, pratiyogyapekṣayā bhedavyavahāra hetutvācca,

the judgment thereon may give rise to judgments of difference as well as uniqueness, but no less than the second, the first perception displays the structure or form as an inherent characteristic of the thing perceived. Form is the structure of a thing and is perceived in the most initial perception, such as, 'this', 'that'. Form is a category in perception and there is no perception without form. Every 'is' or 'this' is a formed-is (*sarūpa*) and a *samsthāna-viśeṣa* (a structure-event). "Even if perceptive cognition takes place within one moment, we apprehend within that moment the generic character that constitutes on the one hand the difference of the thing from others, and on the other hand the peculiar character of the thing itself. And thus there remains nothing to be apprehended in a second moment¹ Every perception thus is a structure-event, and is an individual occurrence. It is not a mere mass of feeling, undifferented and inarticulate. It is consciously perceived and articulated and is never to be confused with mere feeling. Even feeling is not altogether free from quality; awareness, even whilst it is almost soaked in feeling has yet a quality. Perception even in its most elemental and initial character is a perception of a form, however vague it might be. It is only logical relationship and comparison that makes for determinate perception."² It is the sensation of modern psychology which later on becomes perception. Modern Gestalt theory in Psychology whose special attention has been in the direction of perception, has adequately and amply proved that even the most elementary sensation is a perception of a *gestalt*, *samsthāna-sthiti* or *rūpa*.³ Thus it is clear that a perception of the most primitive character which is said to be *nirvikalpaka*, is in reality defined, relatively less of course than the *savikalpaka* but nonetheless defined, by structure and colour etc., (*nirvikalpakamāpi saviśeṣa-viśayameva*).⁴ The

1. *Ś. B. I. i. 1.* (p. 44. T.) cf. *Nirvikalpakasya saviśeṣaviśayatām darśayati: Tātparyadīpikā: Sudarśanaśūri.* p. 77.

2. *Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa.*

3. *Gestalt Psychology: Kohler*, p. 120 ff. cf. *Psychologies of 1925.* article by Koffka.

4. *Satadūṣaṇī* by Śrī Vedānta Deśika, 11th refutation.

Buddhist view that what is perceived in *nirvikalpaka* is merely the momentary nature of a stream of consciousness (*kṣaṇika-svalakṣaṇa-jñāna-santāna*) not reduced into any fugitive permanent object is in no better position than the view we have criticized.

The refutation of the Nyāya-theory of *nirvikalpaka* *pratyakṣa* (as interpreted by Advaitins) lies in the fact that there is no sensation or perception which is not characterized by some form (*rūpa*) and colour even if it be a mere patch. But we can conceive of the first point of awareness as sensation indeed very pure in so far as it is not characterized by any definite quality; it is that awareness when the consciousness is reduced to extremest poverty, as Bergson says¹; and we can in modern psychological parlance, call it sensation as distinguished from perception which involves discrimination and exploration and comparison and all the other activities of constructive correlation of the mind. Sensation that is the undetermined unutterable matrix of perception, is something on which the mind has not operated in any manner and has not schematized it in any way and has not made it or reduced it into the set-patterns of objects which it pragmatically deals with. The unique quality of the sensation becomes in perception overlaid with construction of the mind and as such unreal. Sensation, *nirvikalpaka*, that is, that which is not compared or schematized by mind, is thus the unique first contact of the object with the mind. The main question then resolves itself into what that first moment should be like. It is as has been well said the point-instant when there is barely sufficient activity of consciousness, to apprehend the object.² Such a state of con-

5. *Creative Evolution* : p. 193.

6. cf. *Buddhist Logic* : Prof. Stcherbertsky Vol. I. p. 151, who quotes Dharmakīrti's view on this *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. "That sensation is something quite different from productive imagination can be proved just by introspection. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something utterable (capable of coalescing with a name). Now if we begin to stare at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other (objects), if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of rigidity, (and become as though unconscious), this will be the condition of the pure sensation..."

sciousness alone facilitates the awareness of the sensation, a sensation from which withdrawing we shall not be able to state at all as to what it was like.

According to Rāmānuja, there is nothing wrong in accepting two steps in perception, a first moment namely the sensation, and the second moment, the perception which is a product of discriminative activity (*vikalpa*) including comparison and inference: *nirvikalpakam ekajātiyadravyeṣu prathamapinda-grahaṇam*. Sensation is not to be reduced to the almost non-cognitive state, the state of rigidity of mind-body when no comparison or construction (*vikalpa*) is possible. *Nirvikalpaka* is either a state of cognition or it is not; it has either an element or object of consciousness or it has not. If it is, then even as such it is characterized as having an object of consciousness. If it is not, then the alternative is that it is not at all. The genetic theory of perception is utilized to discredit the very cognition. The contradictory contrast between thought and sense, which is said to be the highest peak of ancient as well as modern philosophy (more truly idealism from Parmenides and Plato, to Hegel and his followers), is utilized to demonstrate the correctness of the illusory theory. Once such a contradiction is raised no power on earth can rescue that view from ending in that thorough-going illusion whose culmination is to be found in Nirvāṇa and Nihilism. The *savikalpaka jñāna* is what we seek in knowing. It is undoubtedly a product of our mental activity linking present experience with the past. As Viṣṇu Citta has said it is influenced by *samskāra* and *udbodha*. If *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is merely the reaction of the sense-organs to the object,¹ *savikalpaka* is the discrimination which expands that sense-knowledge. It is that which relates that fragmentary experience to the total reality and educts its relations to it. It is synthesis as well as analysis, comprehension which follows on apprehension.

We find that the importance given to the *nirvikalpaka* as the *ding an sich*, *svalakṣaṇa*, thing-in-itself, as the real are ex-

1. Kevala-cakṣurādi-indriya-janyam nirvikalpakam, N. P. p. 43.

treme statements which seek to reduce the error arising out of the subject's previous cognitions and habits of interpretation. Thus having turned unduly critical of mind itself, idealists have inevitably reduced all cognition into illusionary imposition, all reality into chimerical display of causality that cannot apply anywhere. Prof. Dawes Hicks takes a standpoint very much recalling on this point Rāmānuja's views on the nature of Perception. There is no place for mere sensation in a dynamic consciousness. Even the sense-organs are operating only by the will of the Cognizer. There can obviously under these circumstances be no sensation. "Cognition is essentially the same in all its forms, both in its lowest and its highest levels... There is no break in its development. It is from the beginning a process of separating, distinguishing and comparing, (distinguishing differentiation, discernment and comparison of features, characters and marks which are to be found in the object). Cognition includes an act of synthesis, but this synthesis is not a putting together of the parts of the object. It consists rather in holding together different views of awareness. The essence of an act of cognizing is a process of distinguishing and comparing features which as given are already synthesized and not any creative synthetic activity exercised on the given manifold of experience."¹ Rāmānuja's view on perception is identical with the above. Whether as a pure sensation or as definite cognition, the object is not constructed, but what are in it are *educed*, to use the expressive phrase of Prof. Spearman.

Every cognition from the simplest sensation to the most highly correlated perception, is more or less mediated and the distinction drawn between knowledge through acquaintance and knowledge through description cannot be deemed to be absolute indeed if it is not denied.

1. cf. *Hundred Years of British Philosophy*: Rudolf Metz. p. 513.

IV

Nyāya-nirvikalpa-pratyakṣa and Nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa of Advaita.

We shall next consider how far we can assume that the Nyāya *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, sensation, is identical with the sensation of Advaita.

In the first place supposing the Nyāya *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is capable of revealing the mere 'isness' of a thing undifferentiated and undefined, is it the same as the *sanmātra* of Advaita? The latter 'isness' is the isness of consciousness or *anubhūti*, experience or *samvid*, and is not the mere 'is' of Nyāya—the atomic structure or material presentation in its mass-character. The tertiary compounds made out of binary atoms alone are the perceptible matrix of all objects. Their combinations and arrangements make objects. These are being perceived. The 'isness' of this character is different from the psychical 'isness' of the Advaitic idealism. That which is perceived in the one case is pure matter of the thing. in the other case, it is the pure expansiveness of consciousness without any limitation or name or quality. The latter is the pure consciousness alienated from the impressions and re-collections and associated tags of individual ignorance, which overlay all cognitions of objects. Every *savikalpa pratyakṣa* is a relational knowledge wherein the *matter* of the object is pure consciousness, and the form and name and relations, which constitute, what for us are outer and inner objects, are constructions of the mind itself on that original matrix. It is thus absolute for this theory of Advaita, and incidentally of Buddhism which was the parent of this theory, that *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* should be wholly erroneous from the ultimate standpoint; whereas for the realistic schools, though *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* might become erroneous due to over-burdening impositions of progressive symbolic relations, or due to the application of thought for the limited purposes of conduct and efficiency in a particular manner, it is not something that is fundamentally false; on the contrary, it is that which is fundamentally true, because it

is that which has been arrived at through careful observation and comparison, and experimentation too. Knowledge that is to be true should be definite, and well-defined that it leaves one in no doubt as to what is true, and as such unambiguous and clear. Therefore *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* can become a *pramāṇa*, a source of right knowledge. If, on the other hand, it be uninformative, nebulous and ambiguous, it can never be a *pramāṇa*. It is thus self-contradictory to hold at that rate that *pratyakṣa*, determinate or indeterminate, is true at all. Other sources of knowledge indeed have to be approached.

Knowledge is definition, and this definition can have and has a place as we have said in sensation understood in the sense of *nirvikalpaka*. We have already described the qualities of this sensation. Śankara's *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is said to transcend the definitions of true and false. Says Sir Radhakrishnan "Since indeterminate perception does not transcend immediacy, is dumb and unanalysed, is what James calls 'raw unverbaised experience', the distinction between true and false does not apply to it."¹ There is certainly nothing against accepting this statement which goes to show that it is immediate (that is, that it is almost a reflexive type of action *pratibimba*). As we have said the most initial sensation can only be definite, with distinctions however vague and blurred; there might be relative indefiniteness, but it is something, a 'something' and not a mere 'that'. But the implications of the sensation do not go only that far. Advaita holds that the sensation presents, firstly, non-difference, secondly, that it is unqualified, thirdly, that the stuff presented is homogeneous consciousness-stuff where there is no distinction between subject and object, and fourthly, that that it is unutterable, *anirvacanīya*. It is of course, a true claim to make that we shall never know the infinitude or the illimitability of truth, but that is not equivalent to saying that it is unknowable and unpredictable. Unspeakable it might be, but it is not unknowable. It is one of those claims of intuitionists who do not wish

1. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 60.

to see that definition is the fundamental nature of right knowledge, since definition precludes all watering down of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle. But even these laws can be overcome through the imagination. Intuition comes to birth as result of enquiry, and imagination helps this enquiry; in limiting all imagination by the principle of non-self contradiction we might arrive at new angles of vision, and achieve a synthesis that shall not possess the cast-iron moulds of mechanical logic. Direct intuition has universal significance, because it is synthetic apperception, definite in knowledge and essentially communicable in some manner, if not in words, in symbols that the mind in its multi-dimensional nature might grasp. Religious consciousness might be touched to the core by it and reveal essential significances inexpressible in words. But to mistake direct apperception of intuition for the initial raw un verbalized immediate sensation of mass-feeling is fundamentally wrong, and vitiated by inner contradiction, though forsooth it is impossible to refer any inner contradiction to it. Thought might not be adequate to express the tension of the spirit, and the rich concreteness of the sensation might be made to live an unreceptive life when the mind becomes rigid in its reception and as if unconscious of it. But sensation is the tension of the organ which is impinged upon by the object. Its liveliness, it owes to the object. Intuition is equally lively, but it is unambiguous and definite, and the complaint about its inexpressibility is due to the finiteness of the subject and its distance from integral truth and its limitations. The claim that intuition is sensation is untrue and such an experience does not exist.¹

The activity of thought (*vikalpa*) on the content of sensa-

1. cf. *Modern Philosophers*: H. Hoffding. It is true that Benedetto Croce accepts intuition as equivalent to sensation even as Kant does. But they were aware of the difference between an intuition of sense and intuition of reason. A confusion on this point has led to the view that all of us are intuitive in an elemental manner and that all experiences are intuitive. To what logical faults this doctrine may lead one need not be canvassed here. It is absolutely true that every idealism has ended in a dualism of absolute and finite. Ergo the truth is in this dualism. Idealism has failed.

tion modifies it, so to speak, and makes it a percept. It is not a merely additive function that thought does, for it makes the perception organic with the world of experience that it already knows. By no stretch of imagination can it be said that this sensation is mere consciousness, *samvid*. Even Kant who made the region of pure reason almost universal, could not surrender the realm of brute fact, so much so he held that conceptions without intuitions are empty. This has a nature indeed different from the cognizing consciousness. By no stretch of imagination can it be argued that we see in sensation a barren 'that'; even if it be true, it can never be consciousness. Consciousness does not get any place in sensation, since from it every effort of consciousness has been sedulously withdrawn. Consciousness gets a 'contact', and establishes a relation between the sense-organs of the embodied self and the external object. Without this awareness of relation there can be cognition. This is the importance of the consciousness in cognition. An obsessed idealist thinks that all things are merely states of consciousness or streams of states of consciousness and just psychical stuff. To find reason for this unfortunate deduction through introspective psychology he has to invent a theory of phenomenalism or categorical make-up and conjure up a power of ignorance that makes a world of appearance and creates a permanent subject. The material of this world of appearance has finally to be found in the creative activity of the subject, the storehouse of all these impressions or rather psychical imaginations, the *ālaya-vijñāna*, and thus there exist nothing else except series of states, and a storehouse of psychical impressions which might well be called the self, in a phenomenal sense according to Buddhist Yogācāra, and in a noumenal sense according to Advaita.

The 'that' in sensation is not of the stuff of consciousness. Though whatever is perceived is a consciously perceived object, it cannot be spoken of as consciousness itself, or as a formation of consciousness. Experience is a conscious experience, but experience involves also an experience of a 'that'.

The 'that' might persist or might not persist in the outer world, be it a momentary existence or persistent thing, but so far as the inner memory is concerned it belongs to consciousness and exists as psychical stuff or knowledge. At no time does it give up its reference to the outer object. Though it is a representation in one sense, in perception itself it is not the representation that we perceive but the object itself directly as standing out there. The representation in memory at no time loses its outer reference and projection, but on this account it cannot be said that representationalism is accepted. It is the *given*, and between this and the undifferentiating (undifferenced) consciousness, there is nothing in common.¹

It is an ingenious device to ask for a sanction of Nyāya for the advaitic conception of Nirvikalpaka as the core of reality. Even if it were an independent conception, which it is not, since this is undoubtedly buddhistic, it is an unprovable assumption. As Rāmānuja says there is no barren sensation, without an attribute of form, rūpa, and colour even if it be merely a patch of light. The concept of an undifferenced-sensation as a limiting phase of consciousness might be conceded, but without the qualifications attached to its appearance, it is an impossible experience, if not an unreal abstraction.

V

Consciousness and Cognition

The next point we shall discuss pertains to the nature of the act of cognition and the nature of consciousness which is claimed to be a homogeneous substance, the known and the act of knowing rolled into one.

Consciousness is a function of the knower revealed in the

1. S. B. I. i. 1. na sanmātrameva vastu. na-kenāpi pramāṇena nirviśeṣa-vastu siddhiḥ : *Vedārtha samgraha* 308.

I. i. 3 : atyantāndriyatvena pratyakṣādi pramāṇaviśayatayā brahmaṇś-śāstraikapramāṇakatvāt uktasvarūpam brahma : The Brahman is altogether beyond the senses, and so does not form the object of any means of proof, such as perception etc., and the śāstra alone forms the means of proving Him. *Kena. Up. I.*

act of cognition. It is realizable as a function of the knower necessary for the purpose of life itself and it is inseparable from the existence of the knower. Every act of cognition reveals more or less simultaneously three terms, the object, the subject and the cognitive relation. It is the essence of cognition to reveal both the object and the subject within itself as two poles which it connects, though it belongs inseparably to the subject-end. It is found that it is purposive in so far as it bears the message of the outer existence to its owner, the self, whose function it is revealed to be. It is thus a *dharma*, a function, a quality, dynamic, purposive and essentially belonging to some self. It is not found apart from its substrate, the self, whose function it is.¹ It reveals its owner as well as itself in the act of cognition, as also the object. Yāmunācārya writes that the perceptive consciousness is that which reveals a thing through itself at the time of presentation.² He defines Consciousness as *svāśrayasya svasattayaiva prakāśamānatvam svaviśaya-sādhana-tvam vā anubhūtitvam*. Rāmānuja accepts this definition of Consciousness as stated by Yāmunācārya.³ "The essential nature of consciousness consists there in that it shines forth or manifests itself through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment or that it is instrumental in proving its own object to *its subsirate*."

In the above definition one important feature is that cognition which is perceptive refers to the present moment and not to the past or the future. This limitation of cognition to the present moment has a fundamental reference to the conditions of time and space, refutation of which has led the other schools into pitfalls.

This consciousness is awareness of something be it ever so much as a mere structure or a *jāti*. It is not bare awareness

1. *Siddhitraya* : p. 21 (Benares Ed.)

2. *Siddhitraya* : p. 23. Pratyakṣasamvit svasattākāle svaviśayasya sadbhāvam sādhayanti.

3. *S B-I*. i. 1. "Anubhūtitvam nāma vartamānadaśāyām svasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam..."

without content or with non-existence as content. It is not either a form of consciousness that we perceive or consciousness merely that does not reveal even the subject. That which is perceived is a *real being*, a *sattā*, as we have already said, which is *objective*, and is never a mere *cit*. Even if it were another embodied being, a *cit* encased in a body, it is as an object that it is being perceived and not as one's self, whatever identity in *jāti* the subject and object might here possess. A *sanmātra* thus can never be identified with one's own *cinmātratva*, in perception. So far from conscious mind being owned by experience, it is experience that is being owned by conscious minds, just as the light is owned by the flame rather than the flame is owned by the light. Prof. Dawes Hicks says that "so far from conscious minds being owned as F. H. Bradley conceived, by experience, the fact rather is that experience is owned by conscious minds, if, indeed, it is permissible in this context, to talk of 'ownership' at all."¹

VI

Yogi-Pratyakṣa and Consciousness as object

A further contention is made that in the higher states of Consciousness we perceive the highest experience as a mere mass-feeling and that this can be attained by the practice of yoga (trance). In *aparokṣa-experience* (immediate higher experience) we are told that we do experience the Undifferentiated Consciousness, *nirviśaya*, *nirabhilāpya*, *anirvacanīya*, consciousness, as the substrate of all phenomena.

In Yoga there is a state of consciousness which is called the fourth, *turiya*, in which there is said to be the realization of the Unchanging self.² Gauḍapāda, one of the most profound thinkers undoubtedly influenced by Buddhistic Yogācāra school, in his *Kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, maintains

1. *Philosophical Bases of Theism* : Prof. Dawes Hicks : p. 31.

2. Buddhistic thought does not accept a *permanent* self, though it might accept an *ālaya-vijñāna* a storehouse of impressions, which also is a momentary thing.

that this state reveals the dissolution of the subject-object relation in an all-embracing consciousness.¹ It is in this state that the purest and undifferented identity of all reality, its singleness or monism is realized or known. Difference is the stigma of all phenomena and is the cause of all disruption and deceit, is the cause of perishability or mortality. The real is neither perishable nor difference nor causal prius.

Rāmānuja argues that *Yogi-Pratyakṣa* (this *aparokṣānubhūti*) has nothing to do with this *turya*-consciousness of the *Māṇḍūkya*. "Although such a perception—which springs from intense imagination implies a vivid presentation of things, it is after all nothing more than a reproduction of the previously perceived and does not therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge: for it has no means of applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously."²

What we find on analyzing Yogic experience is that it is most often nothing more than a hallucinatory self-projection of one's own memories and previous experiences gaining the vividness characteristic of perception, due to internal stimulation. It is a product of over-wrought imagination which might lead to erroneous judgment, and in any case it cannot be an instrument of pure knowledge. The realization of the *turya* state may be the state of realization of the limitless expanse of consciousness divested of all limitation of body and mind and all contradiction which thwart the apprehension of the real. Consciousness perceived in this manner in *turya* may be taken to be not the substance of all things but rather as the attribute of the individual who has been freed from all its limitations—*nirūpādhika-jñāna*.

Yogi pratyakṣa can never reveal reality as such, since it his imagination. It can never be real.

This conclusion ought not to be taken to mean that Rāmānuja does not accept any experience such as that.

1. Ajāti-vāda is that of Gaudapāda.

2. S. B. I. i. 3. Nāpi yogajanyam: bhāvanaprākarsaparyantajanmanas tasya viśadāvabhāsatve 'pi pūrvānubhūtavīṣayasmṛtimātratvāna prāmāṇyam

Yāmunācārya himself affirmed that the proof of divine existence can only be through Yoga ; that is, Yoga-praxis leads to or grants the divine perception. God in His infinite grace endows the vision which the normal eye cannot perceive.¹ This indeed is different in *kind* from the pratyakṣa that is said to be caused by Yoga. The perception which is super-sensory is granted by the grace of God as a fruit, so that the individual might perceive the entire organic character of reality even as the visions of Bali and Arjuna. *Bhagavad-prasāda-labdhā yogi-prayakṣam divyam.*² Thus this also is yogi pratyakṣa but it is a free gift of the Divine to the individual. This is the real intuition in relation to the external world when the individual is fit to receive this grace—*tat yuktāvasthāyām manomātra-janyam.*³ This is perception by the mind, a mind that has become an eye divine (*divya-cakṣus*).⁴

It is a fruit of disinterested service of the Divine, a fruit of freedom from vacillation and dejected consciousness. Whether it is the Divine Knowledge (gnosis) or the integral or complete knowledge of the world, does not make much of a difference. It is the attitude of absolute disinterestedness in imagination, coupled with complete union with the Divine in all activities that can lead to the true knowledge about any object. Constant remembrance of prior experiences cannot be a source of knowledge. *Bhāvana-balaja-mātram jagat-kartari-pratyakṣam pratikṣiptam.*⁵ In either case, real knowledge is available through the disinterested pursuit of truth, or truth pursued for its own sake. This truth is many-faced and undoubtedly infinite, and includes an integral aspect which grants it the unity or singleness as much as it does the manifoldness or plurality.

This knowledge is available to all freed souls after they

1. *Siddhitraya: Īśvarasiddhi.*
2. *Nyāya-parīśuddhi: Vedānta Deśika*, p. 38.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
4. "Śrīvantopi na Śrīvanti, Jānāntopi na jānate,
paśyantopi na paśyantipaśyanti jñāna-cakṣuṣaḥ."
5. *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* p. 40.

are liberated from their physical bodies which they had inherited : *viyuktā-vasthāyām tu bāhyendriya-janyamapi*.¹ When the individual by his consecrated devotion to the Highest God earns his freedom to know everything, which is said to be *svarūpāvadhāraṇam*, (an individual possessing capacity to know the entire world and merge² himself in the Divine Lord who is the Self of all other individuals too) then he gains the divine vision, the capacity to know the infinite mansions of the Divine. A new body that does not hide or interfere with perception but grants fullest freedom, knowledge and bliss becomes his ; a divine body is as it were worn. Thus *Divya-pratyakṣa* is not an impossible thing. Indeed it is the truth of the individual consciousness when it is liberated from the trammels of the sensory organs. But this is not the imagination intensified by praxis of Rāja and Haṭha yogas.

Thus we find that despite the fact that there is a variety of perception different from nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, such as the perception through the divine eye or mind, it does not even give a proof of the bare being, the *nirviṣaya*-consciousness or experience. The subject-object relation can never be reduced to mere experience. The object can never be made into a function of the subject, that is mere consciousness. The subject cannot be dissolved into its attributes or functions, though the three are inevitably implied in all perception.

It has been suggested that intuition reveals a bare or pure consciousness, meaning by intuition something different from perception. Rāmānuja considers this problem in detail. For our purpose it is not necessary to enter into the meaning of the texts. Suffice it to find out the logical basis of these experiences themselves.

1. *Nyāya-parīśuddhi*, p. 39.

2. *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* : p. 38.

CHAPTER II

INTUITION AND ŚRUTI-PRAMĀṆA.

I

In the previous chapter we have seen that Rāmānuja contends against Advaita and other schools who hold that experience is all and that it is proved by perception and that the 'that' revealed in perception is qualityless and without any differentiation or having any parts. In this chapter further consideration of the Aparokṣa-jñāna which is said to be super-perception involving no mediation of inference has been taken.

Rāmānuja holds that inference involves the discriminating activity of the knowing mind, and surely, no one denies that inference involves subject-object relation, and plurality. All that is sought is somehow to get over the limitations imposed on us by the discriminating intellect. Nor does inference shew anything more than the inter-relationships subsisting between individuals belonging to varying times and places and types and about the causal types of relationship. Indeed our ratiocinating mind functions according to the laws of thought seeking synthesis of diverse facts no less imperatively than it seeks to analyze the given in perception. Its content then is nothing more than what is perceived. Perception involves an elementary recipience, whereas inference disposed towards synthesis of the given involves greater activity of the mind. In this greater activity are involved the whole group of activities which we designate the personality, his wants, desires, memories and affections, his total being which carves out of the given only such parts of the same as stimulate his needs. Danger indeed lies here; and all faults of reasoning have their source in this. Thus the given is likely to be vitiated by the mental conditions. A pure mind devoid of all these conditions might be expected to know the real all the same. Savikalpaka involving as it does, the activity of mind, however slight, is vitiated; so also is

inference. The pure perception got through effort of the activity of the mind-in yoga, leads to an immediate perception, or more correctly, sense-organs are not the agents of this perception or experience.

Rāmānuja refuses to recognize any distinction between perception and *aparokṣa* in so far as they are experiences. Perception does not grant illusion nor is granting of reality the prerogative of immediacy, or non-sensory cognition, as such. Rāmānuja does not use the word *aparokṣa*, his word being *divya-pratyakṣa*. Śankara creates a dualism between the practical and pure phenomenal and the transcendental, *āpara* and *para*, and it stands for a new distinction between reality of the external world of matter and the reality of the self. In reality *aparokṣa* can only mean the perfect consciousness unlimited in range and intensity due to purification of the mind and *prāṇa* (vital consciousness).

If we grant that *pratyakṣa* gives us only the knowledge of events which are transitory and changing, and thus gives us knowledge of the external world of constant impacts between elements and actions on a huge mechanical scale, consciousness, which is pure, gives us not only the knowledge of the particular perishing existences but also the true and unique nature of their real relations with one another. Divine Perception is an apprehension of the whole of which these crashing atoms and movements are parts. Consciousness, in its limited condition, gives us knowledge of discrete data of the external world without any significant connections or unifying formula of inter-relationship. This self-same consciousness in its fully expanded condition gives us a fully articulated definition of reality throbbing with significance, and all fall into a unified picture as it were. Thus, consciousness, however veiled, is not a giver of illusion. This is the basis of the *satkhyāti*-theory of Rāmānuja.

Thus facts of the objective world are given to an embodied soul through perception: relations, general and particular, between these facts are inferred or seen by activity of thought or

intellection, *vikalpa*, and with the help of memory. The highest knowledge is attained neither by perceptions through sense which are particulars nor by inferences which present generalities as such, but only by supersensory perception or intuition.

To achieve this even, the 'words' of those who have already achieved and known have to be consulted and followed. Intuition even though natural to the individual, is feeble, and has to be strengthened by practice of disinterested devotion to knowledge and to the highest purposes of the Divine. Such then is the difference between the perceptive knowledge and intuitive knowledge, which we designate as insight into reality, for it is neither influenced by *karma* nor *vāsana* nor *vyavhāra* nor disease of the sense-organs. If a more clear-cut distinction has to be made, we may say that the external reality is perceived whilst the internal or the spiritual is intuited, defining the external and the internal as the two aspects of a thing itself, distinct indeed from the internal and external to the subject who perceives, for intuit.

Rāmānuja refuses to recognize the three degrees of reality of *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*, or in advaitic terminology, *pratyakṣa*, *parokṣa* and *aparokṣa* since that would mean that we are trying to impugn the reality of each in turn, especially the reality of the data given in perception. Further it is a distinction without a difference. An *identical* consciousness is operative in these three phases, and in each of these three phases some aspects of the real are exhibited.

It is true that perception is of a fragment of reality, a snatch and a patch, nothing more. It does not reveal the constitutive principles of knowledge or reality. It supplies, it is true, only snapshots, but even then snapshots do exhibit certain elementary relations and configurations, and these induce, so to speak, other extensions of the relationships with the help of principles governing perceived similarities. But the limitation under which inference suffers is serious when we consider that it has to build a superstructure on the basis of these snatches

and patches of perceptive data. Relieved from the immediate; contemplating the wide range of similar phenomena mediately or in imagination, undoubtedly there is facilitated the understanding of the principles of truth. And predictability becomes more and more sure and exact. But there are limits to this. Rāmānuja points out that despite the amount of expansion in our knowledge that intellectualizing reason or understanding might make, it can never lead to the knowledge of the highest reality or the highest perfection which is the limit supreme of intelligence itself.

That there is a Transcendent above the experienced has never been denied by Rāmānuja. The Transcendent can be known and experienced: this also Rāmānujā claims to be possible. But that there is opposition between the consciousness that knows this and the consciousness that knows That, he does not admit. He avers that reason or understanding that infers about other things is correct, but that it can never infer correctly about the Whole and the Supreme Transcendent.

II

Parā-vidyā or parā-jñāna.

Rāmānuja accepts the idealistic view that the essence that sustains the whole of reality is Spiritual and not material. It is the immanent principle of order and must be considered to be the active pervasive principle of reality all over. It is the absolute permanent in the changing world. Thus the truth of all existence must be sought in this essence, supreme *rasa*. It can be said to be the cause of the entire universe or the primary base of the cosmological and teleological arguments of the theists. An inference from the nature of experience to the existence of God is said to be sufficient proof for the existence of God. Rāmānuja contends that all arguments based on cosmology and teleology are grounded on comparisons and analogies available in the fragmentary creative activities of finite beings, and cannot lead to the proof of the omnicausal, omni-pervasive, omni-potent being at all. Further

such arguments prove a substance not a personality and a spirit. The Spinozistic proof without teleology led him to a substance. The Cartesian proof, ontological though it was, was grounded on nothing more than belief. The teleological principle cannot prove an omniscient being. Kant's famous criticism is perfect ; all these proofs at best may reveal the upper limit to the notion of cause, nothing more, never a real existence.

The Nyāya argument is that God could be *inferred* from the conception of the most perfect intelligence required for the sake of explaining the order and design of the world and its motion and arrangement. The animism inherent in common sense and the inference from the appearance of order in human creations lead to the inference of a supreme creator other than the mechanical movements of the atoms. At the back of all creation there is an intelligence. This in substance is the argument of Udayana. *Adṛṣṭa*, the unseen force, is a natural potency not an intelligence like the *Nous*. Thus neither karma nor *adṛṣṭa* can explain the design, though they might explain the moving and the acting. The world has a plan which no material entity, mechanical movement or inner necessity like *adṛṣṭa* can explain ; therefore God must be postulated as an existent being, as the supreme teleological cause of creation, whereas the material causes are the atoms and the instrumental causes are *adṛṣṭa* or any other.

Rāmānuja maintains that the proofs are not sufficient to prove the Divine. They may prove a very capable creator not the all-creator. Rāmānuja holds that God cannot be proved by perception, nor by inference which depends on the former, though inference may gather in many more perceptions into its reckoning. It cannot go beyond the given in the experience. And God is not given in perception. Continuity and extensity might be inferred to a great extent but they do not enable one to infer the supreme Intelligence. The cosmological argument cannot prove the *existence* of God: it may prove that it is necessary for the existence of the world that there should exist an intelligence superior to any we know. It cannot affirm the existence though it may necessitate a

presumption. And presumption is not proof. That is why it is said that the existence of God is proved by vision of Him, *sākṣātkāra*.

Inferentially *idea* cannot involve *existence*. Existence depends on the conditions of space-time, *deśakāla-ākāra*; the existence of God transcends the conditions of space and time. God thus cannot be known through ordinary perception nor by inference. Nor do all ideals or ideas *involve* existence. Existence is a predicate. The sky-flower cannot have an existence though it is an idea. It exists as an idea. Such ideas do not have a place nor time. Others exists at some places and at some times. Fictions such as horn of the hare and sky-flower or son of a barren women, involving intrinsic contradiction, are ideas outside space-time and causal conditions.

The Divine Being thus is outside the pale of the *pramāṇas* of perception and *anumāna* and *upamāna*. "Whom He chooses by him He is perceived." "Not by austerities nor yet by mere *jñāna* nor yet by works, but by the grace of the Divine only can the Highest be known, understood and entered."² Then alone does the Perfect Being become for the individual a real being: till then it should be content to believe in it as a regulative idea, a demand of practical reason or morality, and only possess a precarious existence as an idea constantly getting modifications as to its satisfying character as the *most* real and *most* perfect. That there is a higher demand on us, the *parama-puruṣārtha*, which means the demand to conceive of and realize the actual existence of the Most Perfect, even here and now, apart from which we have no place and being, entails the faith that fulfils itself as vision, as intuitive realization of His benign Existence. The moral demand and the religious imperative force us in our cognition to struggle forward beyond the immediate sensory and the mediate inferential towards the Vision that comes from Grace.

1. *Kaṭha* Up. I. ii. 23. Yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ

2. *B. Gītā* IX. 53 and 54.

III

Why should śabda be accepted as absolute authority ?

The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā is a variety of *tarka*, reasoning. It assists a *pramāṇa*, the *śabda*. Its main topic is the discovery of the correct apparatus by which we could arrive at Vedic truth. It is more interested in the truth that we have known through communication through sound or rather hearing (*śruti*), than in the other ways of knowing, like *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *upamāna*. The *pramāṇas* pertaining the latter three are discussed at length by the Nyāya-schools of thought. The schools of Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and their metaphysical and practical allies the Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Buddhist schools did not seriously consider the nature of the *śabda-pramāṇa*, the authoritative utterances received by seers from a transcendent source. In most cases they were content to define *śabda-pramāṇa* as *āpta-vacana*, meaning by *āpta* one who is interested in the ultimate welfare of the individual. It bears a very wide connotation since any one could be classed as an *āpta*, and it may not refer to the Vedas, upaniṣads and the other works which were deemed by the Vedāntins to be specially of the wise, and the supreme seers. All the other systems were more rationalistic in the sense that their reasoning was not based on the scriptural texts of the Vedas, though as we find some unorthodox schools did hold allegiance to other texts of their human teachers such as Gotama Buddha and Mahāvīra Jaina. At the best, words such as theirs represented such general tendencies of speculation which did not find adequate representation in the Vedas, not to speak of their being merely snatches without coherence from the body of the Doctrine propounded by the Vedas and upaniṣads. It was the intention of the *Vedānta Sūtras* to undertake a comprehensive synthetic unification of the entire body of the Scripture so as to enable us to know the Divine.¹ To the rationalists however the Vedas and the upaniṣads meant nothing more than one of the many interpretations of life's problems.

1. V.S.I.i.4 *Tattu samanvayāt*.

Why should we consider that the faults inherent in the other *pramāṇas* do not inhere in this *śruti* or *śabda-pramāṇa*? There is needed an analysis of the conditions of error which vitiate others and not this. Traditional knowledge may be considered to yield a coherent picture of reality in so far as it has been on the anvil of criticism for a pretty long period in the history of experience. But there are differences in the traditions, for empirical traditions are different indeed from the ritualistic which has formed part and parcel of all religious practices everywhere. The question is which tradition has the authentic signature of truth. Antiquity by itself does not sanction truthness of a thing. The *mīmāṃsakas* being rationalists—of course within the ambit of investigation into authority without denying the efficacy of the rituals at all,—were at pains to discover the principles of analysis and synthesis, and in so doing to discover the sources of error. There are, therefore, theories of error formulated by the *mīmāṃsakas* in addition to the absolute claim they make for the *śabda-pramāṇa*. We shall consider at another place *in extenso* the detailed theories of perceptual and other types of error. Here the point is that the *Śabda* is claimed to avoid the triple sources of error (*kāraṇa-doṣāḥ*).

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has given us the cues to the determination of what is wrong with perceptual knowledge. It has found the causes that lead to misapprehension due to the non-correspondence with reality. The defects are due to factors of senses or in the mind itself, but these defects can never be known or perceived except by a reference to reality directly through action, a reference that is incapable of being made *via* representation or comparison. This practical test is indeed extraneous to thought but it is not by any means extraneous to reality which is amenable to both thought and action in a synthesis of conduct.

Thus everything is known not only as to what it looks to the eye, but also as to what purpose it can be well put to, and for which it is adequate. Thus the causal principle and

teleological nature of every object get proved, or rather are implicit in each and every object of reality. To separate this two-fold nature, the thought and the practical content or nature of each thing, is to divorce reality of its worth and value. Illusions are resolved by the dual test rather than by any one. Indeed the cognition enforces the conduct in relation to it, is a preparation for action.

With regard to the theory of Prabhākara which upholds that non-discrimination, *akhyāti*, is the source of error, we have to say that it does not prove or explain all error. The *anyathākhyāti*-theory of Kumārila does not either. Whether there is any one theory which exhaustively explains all error on the perceptual level of experience without taking in, in some form, both the theories of error aforesaid, is a matter of grave doubt. Error in perception in the first place is due to non-discrimination, and in the second place is due to the mistaking of one thing for another. In the first case, more and more discrimination will get rid of the error, but in the second case, nothing less than the practical test will avail to dissolve the error in perception. It is *verification* of the perception that is necessary to avoid error. That is to say, to act in an erroneous manner leads not to the predicted consequences or known results but to some other results and consequences. Action becomes a failure and that decides the truth about a thing's existence or rather nature, *svarūpa*. It is true that the best cure for non-observation and wrong observation is more observation and careful observation. Such a thing is fruitful when there is nothing wrong about the sense-organs themselves as well as with our mind which is liable to fluctuations of attention and interest, grasping greeds and potencies. When however, the sense-organs are not in good condition, the test of *svataḥ-pramāṇya*, self-evidence, is indeed inadequate. But metaphysically speaking, almost all the theories of Indian Philosophy hold that the sense-organs are products of *karma*, action, and are imperfect veiling agents, making things appear otherwise than

what they are.¹ Coherence of facts continuously derived from faulty conditions might get a coherence of a sort, but that does not vouchsafe that that is the only test of reality. Reality is finally to be lived and experienced. As Rāmānuja said that for the universal vision of double moon (*timiradoṣa*) on a particular island there is no cure, even as the irremovable categorial blue spectacles of Kant can never make us perceive reality as it is in itself. As Bertrand Russell argued we can create any number of self-consistent systems of philosophy none of which bear any semblance to reality at all. The criterion of self-evidence or self-consistency cannot avail us in these cases. Nor would it be possible to arrive at truth if every one spent a fevered existence.

However much then this might satisfy us in so far as we seek to arrive at theoretical consistency without going forward towards objects themselves in order to testify to *their* truth, or otherwise, truth would remain an idle dream. To contend that knowledge must be full and complete before action can take place is as sane a possibility as a man should know swimming before he learns to swim. Action and knowledge mutually correct themselves in order to facilitate greater and greater knowledge. A healthy interaction between conduct, experience and experiment is a necessity forced upon any theory of truth.

So far then as our affirmations go, knowledge is its own testimony, *provided* the instruments of our cognition are all in a healthy condition, undiseased, sane and unemotional. Mīmāṃsā accepts the theory self-evidence with the conditions we have enumerated, namely, that there should be no error or

1. In Buddhism the sense-organs delude by making things which are momentary, appear permanent, the atoms as having form which they do not possess, in hypostatizing objects which are inside as outside, in shewing the non-existent as existent. In Jainism we have the karma-matter distorting perception. In Advaita-Vedānta there is again the action of Karma and Māyā which distort the one consciousness into the appearance of many. In Rāmānuja doctrine too this karma is an effective contracting agency which *limits* the ambit of perception, though it does not *distort* it. In Sāṃkhya and in Nyāya also Karma plays an important rôle as an illuding or distorting device.

mistake in the nature of the several instruments of cognition in perception.

The senses and the mind must be freed from all defects. Is this condition fulfilled by any person? Such knowledge is true only of the Vēda according to Mīmāṃsā. If the source that is the object itself is vitiated by ambiguity, that is, if it has a plausible or possible similarity with other things as in the case of snake or rope or mirage, then the knowledge that follows upon that perception is uncertain, indefinite, frustrating and invalid. We would be forced to settle this ambiguity only by a recourse to fact, a reference which could be only by way of conduct. Thus if the case of *akhyāti*, non-discrimination as the source of error, is that mere observation, more observation, most observation fully and scientifically (?) carried out can never lead us to definite truth but leads us to some ways of knowing apart from the purely cognitive, in the case of *anyathākhyāti*, we have to find out more and more fully the defects of sense-organs, the mind, the ambiguity in the object's nature itself in order to get over the illusion caused. By doing so, we arrive at the causes of error. Again it is a fact that error is a fruitful source of correct knowledge with regard to the objects other than those that we contemplate or seek to know about. Thus error leads to discovery of the properties of objects, that is to say, to knowledge.

Thus we find that one supreme principle emerges even out of the consideration of the incidence of error, that is, it could occur only at three points, the subject, the object, the means: in the subject, so far as emotional samskāric or karmic or vāsana-propensities lead to non-discrimination or partial observation of the given (object): in the object, in so far as it might possess ambiguity, that is to say, superficial similarity that could at first look lead to identification with another object (the fallacy of *upamāna*): and in the means, in so far as these have defects, natural or due to conditions of perception in the sense-organs.

In a similar manner we are enabled to discuss *pramāṇas* such as inference, and shew that *vyāpti*, invariable concomit-

tance, might be either superficial or intrinsic. Error would have to be detected in the *pratijñā* or in the *hetu*, or the example. The *pratijñā* is the subject, the example *udāharana* is the means, the *hetu* is the objective reason. Unless all these three are free from defects true conclusion is impossible.

Thus we find that in regard to the Śabda-pramāṇa we have to reject or rather select our well-wishers on the basis of certain conditions we have laid down. All verbal testimony cannot be considered to be intuitive śabda, just as all friends and well-wishers cannot be considered to be wise: the testimony that we get must be free from the initial errors of means and source. The source must be pure and perfect, so also the means must be pure and perfect. Such śabda is true and perfect. Such is the Veda. By the grace of the Divine granted to the Ṛṣis their visions are supersensory, untainted by the sense-organs and karma. The cause of the śabda, the objects are untainted and true and pure. Further to know them it is necessary to be in that receptive mood of mind wherein there is no confusion, no obsession, no inattention and no defect. Ṛṣi-minds were in a high stage of yoga due to *tapas*. The truths themselves and the rituals taught were all not creations by an intensified consciousness, but were seen to be the truths of eternal existence, not man-made. Śabda which is the Veda is uncreated even by God, therefore the causality of an imperfect or even Perfect Being for their existence is ruled out. Therefore they form a perfect document.

Such in brief then is the view entertained by the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the validity of the śabda-pramāṇa, which is pure in regard to the three possible sources of infection: the subject, the object, and the means. Other śāstras owe their origins to opinions of human beings, temporary historical figures of humanity, or even master-minds. But they are yet vitiated by lack of perfect truth.

Śāṅkara accepts śabda as valid testimony. But he pleads that it leads to the knowledge of the absolute pure Being

which is the undifferented consciousness.¹ Śabda is most close to intuitive cognition, and as such is superior to perception. "The śruti depends on direct perception (in the sphere of transcendent knowledge) for in order to be an authority, it is necessarily independent of all other authority: and smṛti plays a part analogous to that of induction since it also derives its authority from an authority other than itself."² This Śabda consists of two types of texts it is said, and Śankara dichotomously divides these into the transcendental texts and the phenomenal texts. This is in the realm of knowledge texts; for there is a division into knowledge texts and ritual texts.

Rāmānuja accepts the supremacy of the Śabda even like Śankara: he does not however admit that it teaches an undifferented Consciousness: he does not accept the dichotomous and mutually exclusive division into transcendental (*para*) and phenomenal (*apara*, *vyavahāra*) texts, nor does he consider the two-fold division into knowledge-texts and ritual-texts to be mutually incompatible. They are all one coherent structure, a single organic unity.³ To divide them in this manner can

1. *Māndukya Up.* 7. "The wise thing that the fourth (caturtha) which is cognizant neither of internal objects nor of external objects (in the distinctive and analytical way), nor at the same time of the one and the other (viewed synthetically and in principle), and which is not (even) a synthetic whole of integral knowledge, being neither cognizant nor non-cognizant is invisible (*adṛṣṭa*, and equally imperceptible by any faculty whatsoever), non-acting (*avyavahāra* in its immutable identity), incomprehensible (*agrāhya* since it comprises all), indefinable (*alakṣaṇa*, since it is without any limit), unthinkable (*acīntya*, incapable of being invested with any form), indescribable (*avyapadeśya*, incapable of being qualified in any particular attribution of determination), the sole basic essence (*pratyaya-sāra*) of the self (*ātma*, present in all states), devoid of any trace of development or manifestation (*prapañca upaśama*, and therefore absolutely and totally liberated from the special conditions of any mode whatever of existence), fullness of peace and bliss, without duality: It is Ātma (itself, beyond and independently of all conditions: (Thus) Must it be known."

2. Śankara *Bhāṣya* quoted by Rene Guenon: *Man and his Becoming* p. 11.

3. Rāmānuja claims that Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā are one śāstra. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, I. 1. 1: Mīmāṃsā śāstram—"Athāto Dharmajijñāsā 'ityārabhya 'Anāvṛttiśābdādānāvṛttiśābdāt' ityevamantam saṅgativaiśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭakramam.

never lead to synthesis but to division which will constantly be at battle with experience as we know it.

Śankara dichotomized the texts as pertaining to two different and even antagonistic teachings such as Karma and Brahma, saṅga and nirṅga, as transcendently and phenomenally real instructions. Śankara relegated karma and saṅga (the qualified) to the realm of Māyā or Avidyā which is contradictory to Jñāna and Nirṅga. This dichotomy is false and unwarranted, as it does not really show his allegiance to the One or unitary teaching of the Veda or its absolute worthiness. If it is conceded that Veda refers to two contradictory teachings we should seek a criterion that shall distinguish between them for our purposes. That would imply that the criterion other than self-evidence (*svataḥ-pranmānya*) would have to be framed. It means thus a refutation of self-evidence, and is a subtle way of entering into scriptural thought through reasoning which is valid only within the limits of actual sensory experience (*pratyakṣa*).

It may be difficult to unify the divergent trends of the Vedic and upaniṣadic instructions. Classification into vidyās, ways of knowing, has always been welcome but dichotomous division is unfortunately not the path towards synthesis, *samanvaya*. We have to discover a third principle from which or within which these two phases might get a realized unity. But such a unity which holds within it two opposites is irrational and cannot be substantiated. Further if Hegel is appealed to to help us in this predicament, we can remark that such an outlet is ruled out for Śankara, even if he had recourse to it, as some modern interpreters of Śankara are wont to, because the matter on which the discussion revolves does not belong to the perceptual or inferential order.

We have admitted that classification and definition are the means to understanding the several trends of thought in the Upaniṣads. But we have to note them not as contradictory to one another or annulling one another but as helping to make

for an integral realization of the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality.

Further the doctrine of negation as affirmation is crucial to the understanding of the classification. Dichotomy believes only in the opposition of its two terms or divisions and never admits distinctive synthesis. The use of the negative *an* or *a* or *na* only leads us to suppose that the qualification is to shew that the thing so qualified is *other than* and not the *opposite of*. This interpretation is valid in regard to the scriptural texts in general, because the insistence is that they form a synthetic or integral body of unitary instruction. Examples of this are furnished by the terms *A-Vidyā* which means Karma, *A-Sambhūti* as immortality, *A-Karma* as *Vidyā*, *A-sat* as *prakṛti*, *Na-iti*, the Transcendent.

Again on the same count the karma and jñāna portions of the Vedic literature or Śabda are a synthetic body of doctrine. This is substantiated by the teaching of the Upaniṣads themselves as evidenced by the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* which teaches that by the one one crosses over death, and by the other one attains the Immortal, thus once for all disposing of the argument for an irreconcilable dichotomous division in the texts.

Considered in this way, the true instruction contained in the Vedas and Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads is not at all about a nondual consciousness, but only about a true Being characterized by qualities of the highest perfection. In other words, the instruction contained in the Upaniṣads is regarding the Supreme Personality.

Intuition is a fundamental type of cognition capable of apprehending the true and the true only, when an individual is freed from all ignorance and karma and when he is freed from his body (*deha*) that is a product of karma. And Vedas alone can and do speak the voice of intuition fully and adequately. If the acceptance of Śruti is to be valid, it must be valid on the ground of its experiencebility in some manner by the individual. Thus the validity of the Śruti finally depends for its sanction

on the experience of the Divine or rather on the Vision of the Divine by the individual.¹

According to Rāmānuja, the śrutis are eternal.² They are of non-human origin (*apauruṣeya*). "The superhuman origin and the eternity of the Veda really mean that intelligent agents having perceived in their minds an impression due to previous recitation of the Veda in a fixed order of words, chapters and so on, remember and again recite it in that very same order of succession. This holds good both in regard to men and the highest Lord of all : there however is that difference between the two cases that the representations of the Veda which the supreme person forms in his own mind are spontaneous, not dependent on any impression previously made."³ In other words, the Vedas are universal truths of intuition or fixed immutable principles by which the Lord manifests or creates and governs the moral and physical orders of the universe. The world of the Veda so to speak is the unchanging permanent. The Lord alone is capable of spontaneously generating it. Since Vedic principles form the body of truth, they express the fundamental nature of the Lord. Creation being the real activity of the Lord, the order manifested by Him in His creation is of a fundamentally identical nature, though not of an eternally recurrent nature in so far as any particular individuals and instruments are concerned. There is no eternal recurrence in

1. In *Śrī-Raṅgarājastava* it is claimed that Divine Experience is more truly a vision than perception is. The Jaina concept of vision is more or less similar to the above position : purification of the body of the fruits of karma leads to vision or perception, pratyakṣa. According to them however sensory vision is not perception.

2. Ś. B. : I. iii. 29 : etadeva ca vedasyāpauruṣeyatvam nityatvam ca... cf. *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali* I. i. 3

"The veda not having been made and being therefore perfect, its testimony is implicitly accepted, like the statements of a friend returning from a distance. Where any of the statements conflict with what is known from other sources, they are rejected. Similarly if the Veda makes a statement conflicting with sense-perception, it should be understood in a sense as mere praise."

3. *ibid.* Yat pūrvapūrvocāraṇakrama-janita-samskāreṇa tameva krama viśeṣam smṛtvā tenaiva kramenocāryatvam.

4. *ibid.* samskāraṇapekṣam-eva svayameva anusamdhatte puruṣottamaḥ.

the Nietzschean sense, though there is an eternal recurrence in the order of the unfoldment and enfoldment, creation and dissolution, In fact ' He chooses the makers of the mantras " who 'see' the hymns and transmit them loyally.

Thus valid insight is approached and realized through the practice of the ways of knowing prescribed in the scriptures such as *madhu-vidyā* or *dahara-vidyā* etc., which are meditations on the Supreme. No other way is possible. In every case inference fails to establish the real and the perfect creator of the Universe.

IV

Cosmological argument and God.

The cosmological argument of Nyāya for the existence of God is disproved by Rāmānuja on the ground that the world is not of the nature of an effect in the same sense as jars, pots and cloth made by intelligent beings. Nor is it an effect in the sense that it is made up of parts or displays the connection with or control by an intelligent being as is the case with a body controlled by a mind. Nor should it be said that there must be an intelligent being to fit the several parts in an order so as to be a working or living tissue of existence. All the arguments merely reveal that the world is a product of the individual soul or self not of a universal or perfect being. We do observe that some persons of great yogic attainments or who are liberated are capable of creating some things and performing miracles too in many ways. "From all this it follows that the individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference leads to the Lord different from them in nature." *Tanubhuvanādi kṣetrajñakartṛkam, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat, īśvaraḥ kartā na bhavati, prayojanaśūnyatvāt, muktātmatvat, īśvaraḥ kartā na bhavati, āśarīratvāt na ca kṣetrajñānām svaśarīrādhiṣṭhāne vyabhicārah, tatrāpyanādessūksmaśarīrasya sadbhāvāt, vimati-viśayaḥ kālo na lokaśūnyaḥ, kālatvād vartamānakālavat-iti.* "The body, the world, &c, have the individual souls for their (producing) agents: because they possess the character of being

produced effects (even) as a pot does: (2) The Lord is no agent (in the act of creation); because he has no purpose (in creation) just as released souls (have not): (3) The Lord is no agent (in the act of creation) because he has no body (just as those same (released souls have not).” And this last reasoning is not fallacious in being too widely applicable to the case of individual souls getting to preside over their own bodies, because, in such a case also, there is the (previous) existence of the beginningless subtle body (in association with those souls): (4) Time about which there is difference of opinion, can never have been devoid of (created) worlds: because it possesses the character of being time, (even) like the present time.” (Ś. B. I. i. 3) All these arguments and many more that pertain to the embodied nature, active nature, etc., remind one of the paralogisms of Pure Reason that Kant utilized to shew the inapplicability of causality beyond the realm of the phenomena. All transcendental applications involve inner contradiction. The appeal for Kant lay in the Practical Reason and more fully in the Intuition of the *Critique of Judgment*. To Rāmānuja it lies in the Veda, the heard-word of the sages. The, ultimate word of Rāmānuja is that it alone makes us know about the unity of the instrumental and material and the teleological causality of Brahman. For “if we thought” says Rāmānuja, “that these texts do not mean to intimate the *real* existence of Brahman, the mere idea to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.” *Auṣaṇisadeṣvapi vākyeṣu brahmāstitvatātparyābhāvaniscaye brahmajñāne satyapi puruṣārthaparyavasānam na syāt.* (Ś. B. I. i. 4). Thus whatever the śabdapramāṇa, all its ideas are eternal existences. In the case of Divine intuition all the ideas or representations that are discovered by it are existent or rather possess existence as a predicate. This recalls strongly the view of Kant that the idea of a hundred dollars in the pocket does not involve its existence and cannot satisfy any one. The test of śruti does involve the practice of its methods (*vidyās*). Mere knowledge without practical test of the same will not make for insight and revelation (*anubhava*). We must perceive them even as God perceives them: that is the promise

of the equality that we shall attain when liberated from karma and rebirth.

V

Seeing and Being.

The 'seeing' of the scriptures by the Divine and the individual souls grants them an eternal value according to some thinkers. Does the highest Being see all things as eternally existent or as created by himself?

Rāmānuja says that the power of seeing and so on that belong to the Highest Self are not dependent on the sense-organs: "it rather results immediately from its essential nature, since its omniscience and power to realize its purposes are due to its own being only." It is because of this infinite capacity of His own nature, their beings are included in His seeing, or rather His seeing and their beings are one and the same thing. As the infinite Being whose nature is eternal knowledge and knowledge of a different kind indeed from any of the individual souls, bond or freed or eternally free, He is the source of all their being. In His case alone could it be true to say that *idea* involves *existence*. In the case of the individual souls, existence is contingency. We might also in perfect truth argue that He alone can cause or bring out anything from out of nothing too,¹ since in Him nothing is non-existent. It is true only of the individual finite soul to say that out of nothing nothing comes, *ex nihilo nihil fit, tuccād tuccameva abhavat*. Not so with the Divine Being who could out of His own wish by one single act produce out of nothing even the material and the ultimate form. There is nothing repugnant in endowing all impossibilities of the finite being to the Infinite Being. But Rāmānuja holds that whilst there may be enough justification for such a procedure and even acceptance, it is necessary also to hold that from out His eternal Being, which indeed is illimitable

1. *Meaning of Creation* : Very Rev. Hugh Pope in *Man* : Summer school of catholic studies. Sheed & Ward. pp. 89ff.

anything that comes into *existence* is in one sense eternally realized in his Being and therefore eternally existent. Knowledge of their eternal validity and existence is sanctioned by His nature itself and those who discover these hymns and truths find it impossible not to credit them with an eternal independent existence, independent of any human minds and independent of time and space.

To grant to the intuitive truths existence that is eternal is to make them into a realm of essences, to phrase it in terms of Santayana, different indeed from anything like the universals and floating ideas. But not all intuitive realizations can claim absolute existence and truthness, since most of these are got at through efforts of the individual soul. Those alone amongst the intuitive truths which have come out of the grace of the Divine can claim utter validity and peak of perfection. In the case of the Divine Lord Himself it is said that He sees them *spontaneously*, without the mediation of sense-organs.

VI

Divine Knowing.

The Knowledge of the Divine is creative unlike the individual's consciousness whose creative nature as consciousness is trifling, since God's knowledge becomes true or is true, whereas the individual's imagination and knowledge are not always capable of becoming true.¹ Rāmānuja contends that the creative nature of the finite or bond consciousness is next to nothing, and its imagination is fraught with illusory character. But this view goes against all creative art and also all inventive ability that we do observe. Most probably we shall be told that God is in that case acting through the agency of the individual. We find that the creative feature of knowledge most fully demonstrated in the inventions of man, even in the most primitive contracted state of his being. The urge towards greater expression, and manipulation of the

1. Ś. B. I. i. 1. na jīvasya saṅkalpa-mātreṇa sraṣṭṛtvam upapadyate.

environment have been achieved by the creative or constructive instinct of living beings. But it is instinctive and unconscious tendency, and we shall have to refer this to a higher consciousness that shall make them permanent. Else all creation of man is bound to be of a phenomenal and transitory nature. Here we find a cue. Creations of the Divine are permanent, *yathārthāḥ, śāśvatāḥ*, as the *Īsopaniṣad* says, and those of the humans otherwise. Consciousness in its perfect actuality is creative in nature. The question then would arise whether creation is not progressively increasing in intensity and amplitude as the consciousness more and more becomes limitless. Undoubtedly this is possible as evidenced by the *siddhis*. This an individual attains as shewn in the *Yoga śāstra* as also in Buddhistic literature. But the absoluteness of creation is possible only to the completely liberated being. There is yet a difference between the Divine and that individual, in so far as the creation of reality is concerned. That is the prerogative nature of the Divine only and of none else.¹ Otherwise a chaos of universes would result from the creative abilities of the individuals. Enjoyment and consciousness of ability may be had by the individuals, never indeed a creation of another universe or universes. A free consciousness thus becomes a contemplating and enjoying consciousness, participating no doubt in the work of the Divine, nothing more, or may even become a perfect instrument of the Divine in the governance of the world. Thus true creativity turns out to be dependent on the Supreme Being alone. Knowledge is real only in the Divine: outside Him, it is a figment of imagination, a fruitful source of illusion, hallucination and delusion. *Māyā* is the power of knowledge of the Divine,² but it is also the power of delusion for the un-free individual souls. In other words, it is in the hands of the individuals a power of ignorance, not of creation but of illusion, a creative power of the transitory fruits not of permanent reals.

1. Jagadvyāpāravarjam samāno jyotiṣā.

2. "Māyā vayunaṁ jñānam" iti jñānaparyāyamapi māyāśabdān naighaṇṭukā adhiyate." S. B. : I. i.21. (Nirukta)

VII

Time.

Time is one of the most important categories of experience. There has been not a little of talk about being beyond space and time, *kālātīta* being a term that denotes existence beyond time. But is it possible for any one to be beyond time and space? There is no possibility of even conceiving of a time or place beyond time and place, since all that is falls within the same. That being the case, the concept of beyond space and time interpreted literally yields nonsense. The view that God is beyond space and time means only that He never had been absent at any time or space like the human individuals. He is coeval with Time and co-existent with Space. But it yields sense to speak of *Kālātīta*, *triguṇātīta* etc, when we consider the alternative interpretation that He is *not limited* by space or time or the guṇas of matter. The non-limitation by these entities means that He is not dependent on them and is their master, and that He exists beyond space or time. It might be held that what it really means is that God is the Pure Concept or Essence which is outside existence. Can we legitimately speak of being outside or *a priori* when we speak about concepts even? That they do not exist but yet *are*, is a very uncouth self-contradiction. Time is a series, beginningless and endless: all things occur at different stages of it. It is *numerical* infinity in so far as it is unlimited on either side, it is *vibhu*, it is never a pure finite though men divide it into dates and seconds and moments. So also space. It is also a *numerical vibhu* though it is never a pure finite despite the divisions that might be made in it. These two are infinities containing and subsisting or rather substanding the finites. They are infinite mainly and thus are identical with Brahman. But they are finite to the Divine mind in so far as His omniscience and omnipresence *cover* them. Thus when Brahman is said to be *Kāla*, Time, it means His co-evalness at all times with time itself. He is beyond it in the sense that He is not itself that, rather He is the master of time, who brings into being creations, vast and multitudinous, within

it. He is more than it. Nor is He Space, He is wherever it is and thus coexistent with it : But He is beyond it also, in the sense that He is aware of all that happens in it and in Time. So also He is beyond Matter which is also eternal in the sense He controls it and sustains its changes etc. All that is meant by 'being Beyond Time' means that the individual is not affected by the divisions in it, which permit the judgments Now, Then, Afterwards, etc. That means man becomes omniscient and eternal.

The nature of the Concepts (i.e., how they are when they are known or when they are conceived merely) is rather an intricate matter, requiring the enquiry into the doctrine of their origins. Firstly the view taken by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinker is that these concepts or class-concepts (that is to say pseudo-concepts and concepts of Benedetto Croce) are the perceived forms of things; and the perceived behaviour of things and laws are merely the inferences of unities so perceived. That these, due to more cogitation and contemplation, lead to direct Experience, is also granted by them. Sākṣātkāra then is the fulfilment of the sensory perception. These concepts then are forms, resident in things perceived, and do not exist apart from the objects, and therefore are conditioned by space and time and number. But they are also remembered in the mind and persist as memory and bhāvanā, which we could reproduce separately on paper or stone or wall in the form of pictures, or images. This sensory origin of the concept is never forgotten. They do not exist apart from space and time and cannot even be conceived as existing apart from space and time. The contention is that concepts as ākāra are retained in the memory of the perceiver or knower which he utilizes for *anumāna* or *upamāna* the next time he comes across similar experiences. The truth of the contention that images exist in this manner might more easily be admitted than in the case of these ideas or concepts. Since concepts are universals whereas images are particular, it may be said that Universals exist *outside* finite minds and outside space and thus are nowhere existent. This means that we cannot give a correct account of their being.

This reduces itself to a futile explanation. On the other hand we can conceive of the Universals as the inherent laws of existence, that is, of all that are in time and space. That includes all minds, things, matter and categories. In other words, Kant's statement that all experience falls within these two intuitions of space and time and are categorized by categories, is valid and indisputably true. The only contest is whether we could legitimately speak of a Noumenon over and above the Phenomenon we know. Though Hegel himself rejected the Noumenon, his explanation of time and space were far from acceptable to the Realist mind. The concept of Beyond space and Time of Reality, is verily a spiritual intuition of the nature of Freedom which is the one fundamental truth of Reality known as spiritual, which is expressed by phrases such as Liberation, Mukti, Sākṣātāra, Nirvāṇa, Beatitude etc.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

I

We have seen that in perception what is presented is a differenced substance or object. What is presented even in the very initial sensation like the *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* is a *samsthāna-rūpa*, a structure-event, and not a bare existence. Even in the intuitive perception or vision we are not aware of a mere identity of consciousness or absolute consciousness but are aware of a supreme Personality, who is the Ultimate Deity or God. Even the *nirvikalpaka-samādhi* of the Yogi, to which appeal is made, does not annihilate the subject-object relation, since self-consciousness is yet a consciousness of the self by itself.

With the refutation of the consciousness as object of perception, we are presented with the problem of what consciousness is? The objects are not certainly psychic stuff or consciousness-stuff, either as limited or unlimited, either fictionally or really. The fact that consciousness goes along with every object of cognition does not entail the conclusion that this invariable connection or relation is proof of the psychic stuff-theory or the imaginal theory of *Yogācāra*.

We may, therefore, ask the next question as to how or rather why consciousness is more related to the subject-side rather than to the object-side in cognition? That is to say, having shewn that consciousness can exist apart from its outer objects as in introspection, dream and imagination, we find that even under these conditions we are unable to refute the subject of cognition. As we have already said the subject *owns* the consciousness, rather than that consciousness fulgurates into subjects and objects. That is to raise the function or adjective or quality of a subject to the level of a

substance, an entity. Idealistic thought has felt it chary to to accept the absoluteness of the terms, and yet no repugnance is felt when the subject and object are refunded into a function. Even if this function is raised to the power of infinity, it can never give up being the function of a subject.

The exact reason for this kind of epistemology is not far to seek. Every experience makes the object come into existence in a consciousness and therefore it becomes *possessed* by consciousness. This possession, in other words, makes the object an adjective of the consciousness. Thus it follows from another rule that the adjective can never exist apart from its substrate, that this adjective also cannot exist apart from the consciousness which now possesses it. This is the rationale if it is one, for the *ego-centric predicament*. Further the stream of consciousness is possessed of these objects and their images and all these objects reveal transitoriness of existence. The continuity of consciousness as a stream grants it the quality of being the substrate of these experiences of objects. Consciousness becomes an eternal and universal back-ground of all phenomenal experiences.

Against such views as these, Rāmānuja holds that the seeming absoluteness of consciousness, or rather its universal presence has been misunderstood and misinterpreted for the sake of false metaphysics and false psychology. A correct epistemological understanding of the nature of consciousness would require more detailed study of consciousness and its processes. Perhaps when the criticism is made that all psychology as well as epistemology are worthless, since they deal with the already vitiated experience or categorized *a priori* experience, we can only say that such a whole-sale illusion cannot be cured. Further it has no proof of its truth. A false understanding of psychology is bound to obsess a mind given to epistemological pursuit of reality. A correct understanding of consciousness reveals according to Rāmānuja five fundamental features.

I. Consciousness is an attribute belonging to a permanent

subject and is not a pure 'that' or existence which is observed in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*.¹

II. Consciousness is not a permanent but a transitory function, or rather it is present whenever the subject cognizes. It is not eternal in the sense that it is always in action of cognition, for consciousness itself testifies to its absence as in the judgements "I was not aware" "I was asleep." Consciousness is itself limited in time.²

III. Consciousness is a function of a subject. *Samviditi svāśrayam-prati sattayaiva kasyacit prakāśanaśilo jñānāvagaty anubhūtyādīpadaparyāyanāmā sakarmakaḥ samveditur ātmano dharmah prasiddhaḥ* says Yāmūnācārya.³ It is not a stream nor an expanse nor is it made up discrete snatches of momentary experiences like links in a chain. But it is also true that consciousness is aware of its absence, *abhāva*. It cannot prove that consciousness was present during its own absence, as some contend, on the principle that there must be something that perceived the absence. Subjects persist in sleep, and even in death in a state of what Dr. MacTaggart calls 'suspended animation', where consciousness is absent or, in other words, not-active, due to lack of body or lack of co-ordination. Consciousness exists as power, in that state as potent, and not as act. There is valid perception of non-consciousness (*anupalabdhi*), in the same way as there is valid perception of darkness or black colour or non-existence (*abhāva*).⁴

1. cf First chapter.

2. *Śrī Bhāṣya* I. i. 1. Anubhūtiprāgabhāvādes siddhyatas-tat-sama-kāla-bhāvanīyamo 'titi: kim tvayā kvacid evam drṣṭam? Yena nīyamam bravīṣi. Hanta tarhi tata eva darśanāt prāgabhāvādisiddha itī na tadapahnaḥ, tat-prāgabhāvam ca tatsamakālavartinam anunmattaḥ ko bravīti. Indriyajanmanah pratyakṣasya hyeṣa svabhāvanīyamaḥ, yatśvasamakālavartinah padārthasya grāhakatvam. Ananda Press, ed. Vol. I, p. 31. Anubhūtitvam nāma vartamānadaśāyām svasattayaiva svāśrayam prati prakāśamānatvam, svasattayaiva svaśīṣayasāadhanatvam vā. Ananda Press, ed. Vol. I. p 30, 1.

3. *Ātma-Siddhi* p 37.

4. *Sāmkhya Sūtras*: I. 56. Aniruddha's com. p 33. "Darkness is an entity.....from the fact that darkness is perceived, (because a perception is possible only) where there is an entity.

IV. Consciousness is neither agent nor subject but the act of cognition of a subject to whom it is specially related, as a function, dharma or viśeṣaṇa. It is not a witness, sākṣi, for to witness implies the subjectness of consciousness. "A knowing subject only, not mere consciousness is spoken of as witness : *sākṣitvam ca sākṣāt-jñātṛtvam eva*. Consciousness is a function of a subject.

V. Consciousness is not the Absolute Brahman nor yet the ātman, the individual soul. Because even though one might seek to dissolve all souls or subjects into objects of the Divine Lord or dependent on His absolute existence, the effort will not entail the granting to Consciousness, the nature of being a substance.

These five-fold objections against the theory of Consciousness as advocated by monistic idealists are serious enough. Rāmānuja shews that on grounds of actual experience and discriminated criticism there is no ground at all for asserting that consciousness is a substance or a witness or pure experience without subject or object. The true nature of consciousness reveals its polarity towards a subject to which it is invariably absolutely attached. Because this consciousness is observed in all subjects, it cannot be claimed that all these individual consciousnesses are fulgurations or fragments of a universal consciousness or phenomenal representations or copies or reflections of an absolute Consciousness. The problem that confronts the epistemologist is a serious one, thanks to the endeavours of the introspecting idealists. A universal consciousness which has been arrived at through a process of intense cogitation and refunding is an abstraction, a fiction and not a real existence. It is a concept, a limiting one perhaps, but it is nevertheless a fiction. "Whatever else is real, the finite mind of which each one of us is immediately" aware is real. Any notion of a ground of things which is incompatible with the reality of finite minds¹ has to be rejected as contrary to

1. cf. Dawes Hicks : *Metaphysical Systems of F. H. Bradley and James Ward* : Journ. of Phil. Studies, Vol. I. No. 1, p. 36.

what we are bound to accept as fact. The question whether the absolute consciousness is a consciousness only has not been faced by the idealists. A theory of consciousness falls or lives on an adequate answer to this question.

II

Consciousness not a substance.

Rāmānuja argues at considerable length against the theory that consciousness is a substance.

I. Consciousness is an attribute of a conscious self who is the permanent or eternal being behind all change, "The essential character of consciousness is that by its very nature it renders things capable of becoming objects to its own substrate of thought and speech." "Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents itself as the attribute of agent or as related to an object, it would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself agent, as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of action is the agent."¹ Consciousness is like light that reveals the object as well as itself to the substrate, *svāparanirvāhaka*, and does not need a third entity to relate it to itself.

II. Some persons hold that consciousness is the result of an act of cognizing or compresence of an object and the subject. This has been maintained by the Nyāya-school which holds consciousness to be a product due to compresence (*sannikarṣa*) between and object and sense-organs of the subject. Consciousness thus defined would be a phenomenon, distinct indeed from the subject and object and new thing. This view might with ease be forced to yield the position of cārvaka-materialism or the idealistic theory of consciousness. But Nyāya also holds that this situation itself is consciousness.

Secondly, it is contended that the subject was unconscious or nonexistent before the cognitive situation or compresence. The latter theory makes for the conclusion that is subject is

himself of the stuff of unconsciousness (*jada-vastu*)¹ and that he is capable of being consciousness only through the conjunction, *samyoga*, with the object. Consciousness in the Nyāya-theory becomes thus only referable to the subject as quality that emerges in it due to the objective situation, or else it lapses into non-consciousness.

These conclusions do not follow according to Rāmānuja, because the individual subject is capable of affirming himself as self-existence and conscious being without any need of a sensory compresence with an object. Perhaps this objection is invalid for the simple reason that the inner sense, like the *manas* acts in *samvedanā*, introspection, which connects itself with its self. The sensory contact with an object only calls into being consciousness which is by no means a product, a new and original entity coming into being because of the relation of compresence as a synthesis of opposites, but as the act of the subject who knows the object. The theory of realism standing on the rock of *asatkārya-vāda* could not accept the principle of inherence except as an external relation and never as a quality that is inseparably (*aprathaksiddha*) relation. Nyāya theory based on intellectual atomism and rationalism multiplied entites and categories galore and affirmed external relations between all things without any distinction. So much so even consciousness was bound to be a product of a relation, an epiphenomenon in that system. No wonder therefore that every entity and category can only be connected by another entity and so on *ad infinitum*. Yet even that system has to recognize at the hands of the new school of Nyāya the *sva-para-nirvāhakatva* of the relations. Despite this, consciousness is not adequately explained in this system.

The independence claimed for consciousness is impossible. It is neither a product nor an independent entity. It is the

1. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that in the pralaya or dissolution-state the individual souls are as if unconscious. In accepting this position it grants the potency of selves to become conscious. Consciousness comes into existence as a reaction or reflex action, stimulated by the object. This is undoubtedly a behaviouristic explanation as will be seen.

activity or quality of a subject which wishes to come into contact with outer objects.¹ It is a dynamic function, even as the Buddhist thought avers. It is however the inseparable adjunct of self which is capable of becoming self-conscious. Consciousness also reveals memories and recognizes past objects of experience. Consciousness in one of its major roles is memory, *smṛti*. It is more than this. It reveals the objects that are present before it in time and as such is implied in *pratyakṣa*. As bringing from the past memory into present consciousness and in relation to objects perceived, it is the consciousness active in recognition; and in keeping all images of previous experiences and perceptions it is memory that not a little influences our perceptions; and as the revelatory perception also it is this self-same consciousness that is in function. In dreams too, this consciousness is present, but it is only during sleep, *suṣṭi*, this is absent, incapable of presenting anything to its substrate. Thus it is an inseparable function¹ of the subject in all cognitive activities whatever. The subject is not a focalization of consciousness, but is the substrate of this consciousness even as a flame is the substrate of the rays of light issuing from it which reveals the subject as well as the object and itself too. It appears when the self is active, and is absent when it is inactive. As William James wrote "I mean only to deny that the word (consciousness) stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it stands for a function."²

III

Consciousness as attribute

Consciousness is an attribute of a self, a quality *viśeṣana*, inseparable and intrinsic to the self itself. On the occasion of every cognition it emerges to the fore and reveals

1. *Vedārtha Samgraha*: 237 Jñānena dharmeṇa svarūpa-nirūpitam, na tu jñānamātram brahmeti.

cf. *Siddhi Traya*. p. 17 Svārūpasattayaiva samvidāindriya-sannikarṣaṇeva viśayaḥ prakāśate.

3. cf: William James: "Does Consciousness Exist."

the nature of the object to its substrate. In waking life it is always and continuously operating, and reveals the outer objects to its substrate, and makes possible the judgments "I see that", "I perceive that as red", "Here is this".

Whilst the Nyāya system holds that consciousness is a novel product, an emergent so to speak at the beginning when the souls, resting in *pralaya* like stones, *pāśāṇavat*, came into contact with objects or rather congregations of atoms, Rāmānuja does not treat consciousness to be a product or an emergent at any time, but that which is inalienably and inseparably *aprathaksiddha-dharma*, of the conscients even as the light is of the flame.

Whilst the Vijñānavāda doctrine pleads for consciousness and the mental-state-stream as the only reality thus avoiding a self, that is other than the illusory permanence of the stream-contents, *samskāra-skanda*, Rāmānuja shows that this position cannot help at all, since the stream-state or the so-called store-house of consciousness is itself of momentary states, and thus even the *samskāra-skanda* can never resolve the difficulty of memory or recognition. A permanent consciousness is an impossible notion, since consciousness is of states and objects, and is undoubtedly not permanent. There must be a basis in which these states find a permanence, and this is other than the stream of consciousness, which is discontinuous as we have seen. Thus consciousness cannot be the self, whether this consciousness be a momentary store-house of impressions, or a permanent stream or even a permanent self, since consciousness is not found to be permanent at all. Memory and Recognition impugn the consciousness itself as the self. Consciousness *belongs* to a self and is not the self itself. The self persists under all changes and vicissitudes. Not so consciousness which is found to be, in deep sleep at any rate, non-existent.

Rāmānuja holds that consciousness is neither transient in the sense of momentary *kṣaṇika*, nor permanent in the sense of Advaita or Sāṃkhya; it is a function, *dharma*, dependent upon the needs and conditions of its substrate.

IV

Consciousness as absent.

Consciousness proves its own absence in the affirmation "I was asleep", or "I was not aware". In sleep the self is inactive and unaware of external objects and even of internal images or dreams.

Externality or objectivity is of two kinds, the one is real externality of objects that exist independent of the individual's consciousness or perception, the other is the field of memory *anṭahkaraṇa*, which can be surveyed through remembrance and recollection. In deep sleep both these fields are not available.

There are two views of this deep sleep. The self is functionally passive. It is mere selfness without action at all either inwards or outwards. It is impossible to consider this state to be a state of passive awareness. That the self might be self-luminous and as such be in a state of light is possible; but that there is awareness of any other objects, ideal or real, is out of the question. The Yogic description says that the self rests in the cave of the heart, that the self goes to the Highest in deep sleep.¹ Gaudapāda says that this stage is the stage of quiescence and lordship, *svayam-prakāśa-īśatva*; but no one ever denies that there is no cognition. It is likely that this self-luminosity of the self (*ātman*) (or *jīva*) has been mistaken for the activity of the consciousness, its function. The existence of self along with the non-existence of the consciousness under certain conditions is possible. Hence do we infer the presence of the self even in that state of deep sleep, not because consciousness perceives its own non-presence, which is a self-contradiction, but because the self recollects that it was non-functioning. Further there is nothing self-contradictory in consciousness inferring its own *past* non-presence. If no self is accepted and if consciousness is alone said to exist, then it is impossible to explain the

1. *Ch. Up.* VIII. iii. 2.

possibility of sleep, since there is inherent contradiction between existence and non-existence of consciousness *at the same time*. Therefore the argument for the existence of a self, other than but never separable from consciousness which is its quality, function or adjunct, gets reënforced by this theory whilst it is a pretty definite weakness in the theories which make consciousness itself the self.

V

Consciousness not the witness nor the self.

It is a feeling of certitude of our own being aware that makes us recognize the distinction between ourselves and our awareness of objects and desires. It is usually contended that the use of the word 'I' in the sentence 'I am aware' is due to ignorance, for the 'I' is said to be merely a closely-knit system of energies, memories and desires. Further we are told following the great experiments of Hume, who was anticipated centuries earlier by the Buddhists, that we never catch a self when we introspect, *sva-samvedanā*, nor through perception. Therefore the self is a *kalpana*, a creation by intellect. It is usually the sense of unity of the physical body that makes us affirm a self that has at least as much unity and identity as the body. It is a practical convenience to refer this unity to the self which is just a reflection of the unity of the body and its organs. It is because the body is tired and is incapable of perception that we say that we are asleep. Sleep is not a condition of the self but of the bodily nature. Does not Yoga say that sleep must be avoided? Sleep is a product of ignorance and productive of ignorance. Awareness is the true nature of the self and is the self itself. Consciousness thus is self itself, or rather there is no self at all but only consciousness.

All the above arguments, from diverse sources, do not make the notion of a permanent self impossible, for the self is not an object of thought but is that which can be realized in a direct vision or intuition. Try as we may it is impossible to

find the self apart from the consciousness which is its function. But that does not make for the reversion of the relationship between consciousness and self. Consciousness is never the *sākṣi*, the witness, but only the function of a witness, which is found to be the experience of all individuals. If an *a priori* deduction is ever to be made we should say that it is necessary that the witness should exist *a priori* and not that consciousness should exist *a priori*.

VI

Consciousness not the Absolute.

It is impossible to identify consciousness with the Absolute, the Absolute that is the ground of all experience and life and being just because the Absolute has been characterized as Personality possessing power and perfection and bliss. Consciousness is none these but the patient hand-maid, not even a separate hand-maid. Rāmānuja views consciousness not as being in itself luminous but that its self-luminosity is something that it gains by being the function of the self that is self-luminous.¹ The self is of the very stuff of self-luminosity, whether it rests in itself or the Divine Lord, or in freedom or in sleep, or whether it is active in the *svapna* or *jāgrat*; it is essentially self-luminous and luminous in its own nature for itself, *svayam-prakāśa*, and *svasmai prakāśa*.²

There is one objection that might with success be brought against the theistic and common-sense position of Rāmānuja, namely, all these are perhaps true of the ordinary human consciousness. This we also admit but these are

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya* I, i. 1. (Ananda Press ed. Vol. I, p. 36.)
 Mayi naṣṭe'pi matto'nyā kācijjñāptiravasthitā !
 Iti tatprāptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati !!
 Svasambandhitayā hyasyāssattā vijñāptitādi ca !
 Svasambandha-viyoge tu jñāptireva na siddhyati !!
 Chettuśchedyasya cābhāve chedanāderasiddhivat !
 Ato 'hamartho jñātaiva pratyagātmeti niścitam !!
2. *ibid.* Cid-rūpatā hi Svayamprakāśatā. p. 37.

not true of the Absolute Consciousness. Illusion makes all the difference. Here there may be a subject and even a self, *jīva*, but there there is no need for self or anything resembling it but Pure Undifferented Absolute Consciousness. This view, whilst apparently unanswerable, is defining its position from a dichotomous view of reality that is intent upon misunderstanding and denying the world of apprehension as we know it, so as to be able to postulate and affirm (a non-existent-ideal universe (*sic*) that is beyond all apprehension. In which case it is incapable of speaking about it and even knowing it in the sense of our knowing anything, and what it experiences or 'perceives (supersensorially) or is said to so experience, is something about which it cannot say anything, since it has itself to get dissolved in it never to come out of it again, *na punarāvartate*. Thus not only is epistemology impossible, epistemology is a fictional transaction. Metaphysics and ordinary experience become fictional constructions, and beyond all this there is something or nothing (?) relatively speaking, and knowledge becomes just approximation towards more or less unreality. In the Buddhistic schools these approximations are dynamically construed. In Advaita they are practically construed. In neither case, is reality possible within experience as we can know it. Further in these theories the constructive dynamism of thought is fundamentally of the vitiating character. Less and less of thought means more and more of Reality (*caitanya*)!!

Rāmānuja standing on the bed-rock of scriptural experience declares that more and more knowledge it is that leads to perfection of consciousness and not less and less. Knowledge it is that releases not less of knowledge. And knowledge is not knowledge if it is indefinite and nebulous and more and more an approximation to experience of the *nirvikalpaka*, the indistinguishable limit of sensations. Degrees of consciousness go with degrees of perfection and not with degrees of reality. The doctrine of degrees of reality is fatal to all reality. It is one thing to speak of awareness of the real, and the attainment of reality-consciousness, and quite another

to speak of relative reality and approximations to reality in reality.

VII

Consciousness as an attribute of a personality.

We thus find that if it is admitted that consciousness is more of the subject than of the object, then "knowledge like pleasure manifests itself to that conscious person who is its substrate and not to anybody else." The self thus owns consciousness just as it does all experiences as manifested in the judgments "I know this," "I enjoy this." Consciousness thus is not the absolute but the personal attribute of a self invariably associated as its function, *dharma*, therefore is it known as *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* as distinguished from the *svayam-prakāśātman* or *jīva* or the *ksetrajña*. It is creative in its perfect state of expansion, *vikāśa*, and in its lesser stages of perfection it is not creative of reality, but has inventiveness based on the real which it apprehends, and thus is the source of illusions which however always betray the core of the real in them, to a discriminative consciousness. That is to say in imagination, *vikalpa* or *kalpana*, capacity of consciousnesses to present the real is diminished and fantasies and fictions are created instead. To say that creative activity is not of consciousness is to deny the psychological truth of consciousness itself. This is not to deny that consciousness presents reality. Other factors than consciousness impede its presentation of the real. The creative activity of consciousness is a result of God's own activity through the individual who belong to Him.

VIII

Summary

Consciousness has been interpreted in various ways. In the Nyāya system¹ consciousness is an attribute in the case of souls, separable, and in the case of Īśvara or God inseparable,

1. *Hindu Realism*; Jagadish Chatterjee: p. 63. ff. Allahabad 1912.

since, in the one case, there is no subordination to creation and in the other case, there is. According to Mīmāṃsā of the Bhāṭṭa school, Consciousness is a part of the soul whereas the other parts are unconscious. The iceberg theory of modern psychology is very powerfully recalled by these thinkers. In the Sāṃkhyan system, consciousness is an independent entity and is not dependent upon any situation or condition. Nor is it conjunct with any self as a part of it or whole of it. Nor is it an epiphenomeon as in the materialistic school. The catalytic action which it exercises on the evolving psycho-physical dynamic principle *prakṛti* implies its becoming power, as well as power to influence the becoming of some other things.¹

In the idealistic schools there are four sub-schools as it were. In the first consciousness is described as perfect knowledge, as an element of the supreme reality but it is not the whole of it. Reality is full of infinity of attributes and there is nothing to suggest that consciousness or mind is that which substands all others. Spinoza and Rāmānuja agree in so far as they emphasize the *richness of content* of the Ultimate Reality. Pure consciousness according to this type of thought is an abstraction and not an experience. The second type whilst accepting the first view holds that pure consciousness is a reality not an abstraction. It is an illumination (*jyotiḥ*) of the Lord which all must realize. What this consciousness does is to radiate the light and perfection and supreme nature of ultimate reality which is rich in power and attributes of the transcendental kind.

The third type reverses the previous position and makes pure consciousness the goal of all effort and the real being into an illusory abstraction or construction. Thus there is a conversion of the logical real into a figment of the imagination. No better is the theory of *Ālaya-vijñāna* and Buddhist thought in general. So too is the theory of *Māyā*. The theory of the Śāktas makes an adjustment in so far as it seeks to make pure consciousness (with infinitely rich content) and

1. *Mahā Māyā*: Woodroffe and P. N. Mukhopadhyaya: Ganesh & Co.

Pure consciousness (without content) as logical aspects of a supralogical Experience. In so far as the theory powerfully shews that consciousness as pure, as described by Māyāvāda, is a logical outcome of the theory of reversion of substance-attribute relation, it refutes the view usually upheld that Māyāvāda view is the alogical culmination or the alogical Highest. The śākta view holds further that the pragmatism alone converts the alogical into logical or rather imposes its logical moulds on the alogical, even as Bergson upholds.

Thus two points emerge that the attributive theory of Rāmānuja is the first, and it may approve even of the second ; whilst the Māyāvāda and the Śākta views are reversions of this view and hold a substantive view of consciousness. For Rāmānuja, consciousness is not a stream nor a substance. It is a function of a subject or person expressing his perfection and richness according to the nature of the person as a perfect or released or bond being. If consciousness is particularized and attached to limited wants and interests, it leads to the mechanical dead level of uniformity and rigidity. If on the other it is either humanized or divinized as working for the perception of the highest reality there is proportional enlargement of consciousness. Release or freedom for an individual consists in the enlargement to the fullest level of parity with the Divine Lord Himself of his consciousness,

Consciousness is a stream as long as it lasts, that is to say as long as an object is possessed by it. This objectivity might be physical, or mental, as in dreams and in reflection. It is found that consciousness as reception and active in a mild or full state is available according to the state of tension of the individual in dream-states.¹

“Consciousness in the sum-total of all contents to which the ego stands in a certain unique relation which may be metaphorically indicated by the verb “to have”...” “Everything falls within the sphere of consciousness which the ego has.”...

1. cf. *Dreams in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja*: Annals of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute. Vol I. No. 1. Appendix I.

"Every fact of consciousness is made up of at least three moments; every such fact depends for its existence upon the presence of an ego, of a content of consciousness and of a relation between the two."..."The only necessity for consciousness is the presence of this relation or function. The nature of the content which enters into relation with the ego is a matter of indifference. It may belong to the psychical or physical."...

"We must draw a sharp dividing line between the act of knowing on the one side and the object and content known on the other: the act of knowledge is always a psychical state of the subject knowing and bears the character of an event (in other words, it is temporal), which comes to pass at the moment in which judgment is formed. On the other hand, the object and content of knowledge may be non-psychical trans-subjective and may belong to a different point of time from the cognitive act."...

"According to our theory of knowledge, even a changing and temporal content in so far as it is considered in relation to the act of knowing, may be a truth, that is, it has an eternal, identical and universally valid meaning. This result is not obtained by transforming a temporal element of the world into a timeless idea, but by admitting a specific and ideal relation between the subject knowing and the object known."...

"An act of cognition consists in a comparison. In this comparison, sameness and differences are established, that is, analysis is performed. In order that this psychological process may be set in motion, the presence of a certain something is necessary *with which the content of consciousness can be compared*."...

"The act of judging is an analysis which seeks to lay bare the synthetic necessity of connection between the contents of consciousness 'given-to-me.' The logical relation between subject and predicate of a judgment is not one of identity or of contradiction but of the synthetical necessity of connection.

The judgment should be thrown into the form 'Where S is, P necessarily is also.' This relation is a *functional dependence*."

"There exists between the elements which make up the world a *functional dependence* and it is this very dependence, in so far as it forms the objective side of judgment, which represents a logical interconnection, an interconnection determined by a synthetical necessity of combination."

The above extracts are culled from Professor Nicolai Lossky's important contribution on intuitive Logic entitled *Transformation of the Concept of Consciousness in Modern Epistemology and its Bearing on Logic*¹ to the *Encyclopædia of Philosophical Sciences* Vol. I. They serve to illustrate the modernity of Śrī Rāmānuja's views on the subject of consciousness.

1. cf. *His Intuitive Basis of Knowledge*

CHAPTER IV

THE COGNITIVE RELATION

I

Cognition a Relation

We have seen how perception has marks of difference within the presented content itself and that no amount of effort to reduce these differences in the presented can avail except to reduce the reality of the presented. In which case all perception will be vitiated so thoroughly as to be incapable in any manner of granting the real or even suggesting the real as substantiating these presentations. The effort to drag in the disparity in the activities of the mind in the presented and the presented itself, or in other words between intellect and sensation so as to reverse the usual views that intellect is a better and truer instrument of knowledge than sense, is an effort that is fraught with self-contradiction and scepticism.

The consideration of the cognitive relation is what we shall find to be most important. That cognition is a relation at all may be contested. But we shall show that cognition is a product of relation between the subject's consciousness and the object presented to it. This problem is truly a modern one and few thinkers had troubled themselves with metaphysics without at the same time being confronted with this. Cognition is the fact of subject-object relation. We find that these three terms go together. The two, subject and object, are entitles, whereas consciousness is the function of the subject in relation to the object. Thus the cognitive relation does not imply merely a static type of status but a dynamic act of the subject.

Sāmkhya accepted a kind of representationalism, since it made the world material and the puruṣa or self a passive spectator-consciousness. The act of perception was receptive-dynamic. Receptive in respect of the Puruṣa, it is because of

impressions and tendencies, dynamic in relation to objects. It has dynamic receptiveness also in its pure state.

But how could interaction occur between the inactive self which possesses (or is) consciousness and active matter which is unconsciousness? This is the most important point of criticism against this theory from the metaphysical side. The explanation of catalytic action is valuable and most probably explains the eternal persistence of the consciousness as such whilst it is in conjunction with matter. Even then the eschatological problem of release confronts the whole theory. If the self is active it would be involved in matter and release would be impossible. Connection with matter is therefore boundedness. This is the cause of all misery. If the self be mere consciousness without volitional and emotional characteristics, then the suffering endured or unendurable is a characteristic product that cannot ever touch the self of consciousness. All these criticisms show that so far as the metaphysical problem is considered the theory has some fatal faults despite its excellent analytic discrimination and realism.

II

Representationalism untenable

Representationalism is a theory of knowledge advanced by those who hold that there is impossibility of real contact between matter that is extended and mind that is unextended, or between the unintelligent and the intelligent. There happens thus a real difficulty regarding how we ever know the outer objects. Our imaginations and dreams show that they are of the stuff of experience. That knowing is a process happening within the consciousness of a self is an admitted fact. The fact of recollections and the experience of recognition lend credence to the view that what we perceive are the representations or mental copies registered within our consciousness or mind rather than the objects themselves. Objects are inferred to exist outside the consciousness on the basis of their independence to our wishes and the persistence and vividness of these copies derived from them, than in the case of images

in recollections and imagination. Thus truth is possible when there is correspondence perceived between the psychical (or material ?¹) copies and the original things themselves outside the body.

If the representationalistic theory of absolute difference be upheld between matter and spirit and their relation has to be incompatible in any direct manner, there can only be the reflection in consciousness of matter, or, in the alternative of Sāmkhya, of consciousness in matter. If not, a third alternative is that the mind should be capable of having imprints of matter in itself and even at a distance. The theories we have discussed are both of the representationalistic schools, and are represented by Sāmkhya and the Sautrāntika-buddhistic school. Whilst the representationalism of Sautrāntika is true to type with Des cartes and Locke, the Sāmkhyan theory is peculiar. In Sāmkhya the prakṛti or matter reflects the self and the buddhi which is said to occupy the status of mind or consciousness-function in relation to the self, behaves as the medium for the spirit to perceive the things of the world. Buddhi is of tenuous stuff, imperceptible to the eye though material in constitution. The stuff of representations or reflections is thus undoubtedly material though tenuous and imperceptible to the eye, and thus mediates between the perceptible matter and the imperceptible and conscious self. The images thus are not psychical stuff as in representationalism *a la type*. This feature does not make this doctrine any more acceptable than the other as this does not make buddhi any more perceptible than the rest to the self. If the spirit or mind or self is absolutely inactive and matter absolutely active, if the spirit or mind or self is absolute consciousness and matter absolutely an 'other', contact between the two is impossible and inconceivable. Either we accept the fact of their compresence and get along with this as basis, or else we have to find a meeting-ground or solution that will make this compresence possible. In the case of Sāmkhya it is matter

1, cf. Sāmkhya metaphysics.

that mirrors and it is matter that cognizes, wills and experiences, and knowledge becomes a feature of matter in its subtle form as buddhi, Knowledge thus having been relegated to the side of matter, there is no need for spirit, though Sāmkhya finds reasons for its existence on the basis of purpose betrayed in the movements of the world.

Knowledge or consciousness in Sāmkhya then will occupy a position not different from Cārvāka. In the other case (Cartesian and Sautrāntikan) the entire activity of reception and imprinting belongs to mind, which is said to be a *tabula rasa* or momentary series, capable of receiving sense-impressions from matter and getting imprinted. The contact between the self and matter is through the medium of representation a *tertium quid* which is of psychical stuff. But here also the spirit or mind is a *passive* recipient of impressions from matter. All falsifications of these impressions must be referred to the emotional and instinctive forces operating at all moments of an embodied creature's life.

The importance here lies in the necessity for an *extra-mental* reality or external reality without which there can be no representations at all, but which, however, could never be *known* to exist. As Berkeley proved there is no necessity to admit any external reality since the mind can of itself create its images, and secondly, since the objects said to exist outside can never be known or perceived at all as to how they *are*. All sensations are of the same worth and value and, therefore, it is impossible to admit an external reality other than what we perceive. And what we perceive are images and ideas. In which case matter is an appendage that could be dispensed with. The subjectivistic onslaught of Berkeley was followed up by Hume who shewed that the images and ideas are the ultimate reals, and there is no subject that we come across, to whom we could refer these imaginings and ideas. The doctrine of Representationalism thus, whether Eastern or Western, suffers from the defect of making the outer objects *inferred* in the sense of their being causes. If in addition to this, the doctrine of momentariness of impressions and things

and conscious-states is accepted as in Sautrāntika-buddhist school, then, it follows that the proof or evidence for their existence is wellnigh impossible. Non-existence alone is the *terminus quid* of Buddhist representationalism. The history of Representationalism is identical everywhere. It fails to explain the cognitive relation.

The doctrine of compresence is important, indeed all important, in this connection. The subject knows because of compresence with another object; it knows of its own knowing, and that it knows that it is knowing that it knows an object in the act of knowing. These facts belong to the order of experience as every one knows. To deny any one of these terms or factors is to invite criticism unless reasons are adequate to mark a departure from the ordinary explanation. *A priori* reasons are not as such true. Nor is it found in most cases of inference or rationality that is divorced from experience.

Śankara holding to the absolute difference and opposition between matter and mind and finding that it leads to the impossibility of any kind of representationalism of Vaibhāṣika or Sautrāntika, concluded like the Yogācāris that the self itself can manufacture its own images which may be called *māyā*. The only difficulty that it surmounts and refutes of the Buddhist thought is that it refutes the dynamic of the momentary consciousness-stream and instals a permanent self. The nihilistic appeal of Nāgārjuna was alluring undoubtedly, but it was a haven in which all cows were black and it meant also the surrender of the one omnipotent assurance of experience of God which he knew and bore witness to. The eristic dialectic of Nāgārjuna, which finds its parallel in the West in Zeno, discovered the antinomies underlying most hypotheses about reality and declared that all were infected with self-contradiction and destruction, and therefore the nihilistic and the sceptical conclusions were inescapable. Śankara availed himself of all the battery of dialectic of the Buddhist thought and utilized these to save the Self that transcends all change and movement and dialectic. The result was something like Kant's philosophy

but more vital and self-revealing. He built up his system of Advaita or the Non-dual reality on the experience of the Ātman or Atta. This *atta* or *ātman* is the *magnus* or Brahman not the individual egoistic soul formed out of *samskāra* and *vāsana*. Buddhistic psychology and sāmkhyan psychology had helped the discovery of the fourfold nature of egoism, as *buddhi*, as *ahamkāra*, as *citta* and *manas*. This egoism is the unreal reflection of the Infinite Self and parades as the *jīva* or individual soul. They may even be construed as the screens that hide the self from itself, but having increasing density. The rehabilitation of metaphysics was made possible only on the basis of this acceptance. Śāṅkara was too much of a realist to accept conclusion of Yogācāra which upheld a fictitious store-house of consciousness, *ālaya-vijñāna*, which was nearer the concept of *ahamkāra* or *antaḥkaraṇa* than the Self which was the unchanging one permanent. In other words, Śāṅkara refuted idealism vigorously when such idealism was not indistinguishable from Solipsism, but he was an idealist all the same in so far as he made reality consist absolutely only of the Spirit. It entailed the phenomenalizing of all ordinary experience of the senses; and the cognitive relation itself in so far as it betrayed the three entities at once was a phenomenal experience and could never be the truth about reality.

We cannot help discovering here, unfortunate though it is, that just as Kant was influenced by Hume and other rationalists whom of course he refuted with all vigour, Śāṅkara was influenced considerably by the buddhistic free-thinkers. Kantian influence was idealistic though Kant himself gave a refutation of it: Śāṅkara was an idealist, though he refuted Nāgārjuna and the Yogācāra doctrines. Kant's main contention was that we do not know reality *as it in itself* through Pure Reason, though *in fact* we are aware of it through practical and aesthetic Reason. In Kant the Noumenon need not be merely one, it may contain the many, though this is a travesty of his own thesis that oneness and manyness cannot be applied transcendently. The Practical Reason vouchsafed for him the manyness of selves. Not so in Śāṅkara's doctrine. The

religious intuitions of Upaniṣads according to him declare the Oneness or Single nature of the Noumeon. For him absolute identity is the truth, difference and manyness are absolutely false. This falsity is due to Māyā, a ratiocinating, emotional instinctive factor whose nature is indescribable either as real or unreal, anirvacanīya.

Śankara's Māyā is an illusory principle understood firstly, as sensory, secondly, as ignorance of true nature (rational), and thirdly as activity (or will). As sensory, it is the world of experience through the body of objects: as ignorance it is the world of selves which seek to attain reality of being but actually identify themselves with their bodies and desires; as activity, it is the Īśvara, the governor and destiner of the world of objects and selves.

III

Degrees of Reality not Valid

We will now consider whether in such a theory of reality there are available degrees of reality. It is usually contended that the dream states are less real than the waking states, that the state of dream is purely individual and imaginary and that it is caused by instinctive features, and wishes of the individual. The waking-state of consciousness is said to be less real than direct intuitive insight. But from the standpoint of the direct intuitive, *aparokṣa*, insight consciousness all the waking and dream and sleep states are absolutely unreal. There are degrees so to speak in the phenomenal and not in the real. Nor is this view helped by the conflicting views sometimes mentioned that the dream-state is a higher state of the self than the waking because of the independence from objects and objectivity that it entails. This latter is the solipsist. Absolutely speaking, all are absolutely unreal. The doctrine of degrees of reality is a question that obtains in the phenomenal universe and not in the transcendental. There then happens another type of reality that is in sooth unreality, within which there are degrees. But the fact of unreality as such cognized in regard to the whole universe must be

forgotten in that context. If we abandon then this transcendental, then what remains is the phenomenal, the only universe we know, and the criterion would be non-self-contradiction; and, if another be needed, as indeed it will be, the coherence with conduct. The phenomenal will reveal layers of veiling rather than degrees of reality. This solution does not solve the problem of the cognitive. The concept of Māyā brought in to dissolve the cognitive relation is futile in fact, as it is ineffectual in metaphysics and experience. A two-fold theory of Māyā, one universal and *a priori*, and the other, individual and *a posteriori*, the first leading to a transcendental conversion or veiling, the second to the individual illusions of sense, recall firmly the two stages of *a priori synthesis* of Kant also, one of Sense and the other of Understanding.

Illusions are of the sense, and could never happen to the illimitable intelligence. The simile of crystal and red-flower does not escape from the duality at the very start. Metaphors too entail the reality of the terms in some manner. Comparisons taken from experience apply in respect of transcendental explanations. The Spirit may have imaginations and creative power, and Vedānta does postulate this in the sūtra, *janmād yasya yataḥ* and *jagad-vyāpāra*,¹ but it has no illusions. Illusion is the quality of the sense-experience impregnated by hasty generalization. It is different from hallucination which is creative imagination forced outside the individual fiercely by any persistent psychic demand. Thus Māyā has no locus, *āśraya*, in Brahman. The Māyā-principle that trichotomizes the unique one, is a fictional principle itself incapable of being an explanation of itself. It was on the ground that it is an unwarranted principle that Rāmānuja refutes it. There are neither one veil or two veils nor three nor an infinite number. What is true is that the power of Brahman in so far as it is not apprehended as power of creation, is not understood, so to speak, as the Upaniṣad instructs us to perceive it. It is a phenomenon that baffles understanding. Once

1. V. Sūtras. I. i. 2 & IV. iv. 17.

the wondrous nature of Brahman Himself is understood, Māyā His power of creation or līlā becomes easily understandable. It is undoubtedly a curtain, *yavanikā*,¹ but not unreal.

IV

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view criticised

When we turn to the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, we find that they accept the mere connection between the self and its objects. In other words, they accept the cognitive relation. The objects are known in the presence of the contact between the sense organs and the objects. A sensation is due to the rays of light in the eye passing to the object. It does not explain how we ever can resolve the problem of opposition in the constitution of the two terms, mind and matter as atoms. Representationalism cannot avail here too. Direct apprehension does explain but what it can explain is next to nothing but the fact of occurrence of perception. The failure to put the question on the part of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a serious fault in that system. It is the ordinary unreflective man's philosophy so to speak or it is due to the perception of the very serious faults of any acceptance of representationalism. Once representationalism is in some manner accepted, there is no way out of the nihilistic conclusion *via* subjectivism, and yet that does not save Nyāya from being not sufficiently an *anvikṣiki*. The purely objectivistic and external observational manner of the materialist did not avail itself of this serious problem of epistemology. It is a purely descriptive philosophy and comprises a net-work of two kinds of relations, the external and the permanent. It is a philosophy of discrete data, somehow seeking to find integrality that it refused to realise or recognize. The *cul de sac* of Nyāya-logic is scepticism again, since absolute difference between atoms and souls cannot permit any adequate relation. The explanation of cognition that it is the act of grasping of the object by enveloping it with consciousness-as quality, is that of Advaita, and that can at least explain how representations can be taken or copies reproduced. But mere

1. Catuṣśloki of Yāmunācārya 1.

conjunction at one point can never lead to experience of the object as an object, nor can it ever lead to the reconstruction of all objects in memory. The Nyāya doctrine clean forgot, so to speak, the problem of memory. Nyāya's protest against internal relations, led to the sacrifice of all explanations of the cognitive relation. The problem of cognition can be solved only by the acceptance of the psychological fact of the relation of mind and matter as represented in the embodied human being, and from thence we have to infer the possibility of cognition as a psychological fact of observation and introspection. It is true that many criticisms are levelled against psychology as a science. The cognitive relation is a real relation, fundamental to knowledge and available wherever there is consciousness, and as such is fundamental to any theory of knowledge. Disembodied beings, if they exist, might have a way of knowing, about which we can have no idea, but knowledge is a feature of consciousness which again is invariably available wherever there is a subject. The cognitive relation cannot be had in the vacuum without a subject and an object. It comprises three terms, and the cognitive relation itself is a phenomenon that is temporal, that is to say, it can occur with respect of many objects in succession or contiguity. It does not assume the permanent presentation of any one object or compresence or connection with any one object, since that is not its nature, but it reveals itself as related to a permanent subject to whom consciousness as effecting the cognitive relation is an inseparable adjunct.

All idealisms end in systems of Experience. In any case they do not permit the real existence of time, space, nature, objects, though they are prepared to affirm the phenomenal or appearance-character of these. Realisms end in systems of relations and all of them finally seek to dissolve all objects into relations, or else they end in atomistic views in every direction, in the direction of matter, souls, relations and etc. An organic theory alone takes into consideration both these and affirms the unity and diversity character of these terms in cognitive relational experience.

V

Nature of Relation

"The very nature of knowledge presupposes the independent existence of the reality known," and to show that means that idealism is a variety of the subjective point of view. The failure of the thinkers of the idealist and the critical school of Kant is the failure to realize "(1) the directness of the relation between the knower and the reality known, and (2) the impossibility of transferring what belongs to one side of the relation to the other".¹ This is an admirable exposition of the realistic position and this refutes all assertions that it is "possible for the characteristic of a thing to belong to it as perceived though not in itself".² To quote from the same author, Prof. Prichard, "Knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge of it, and that we know it as it exists in this independence. It is simply *impossible* to think that any reality depends upon our knowledge of it, or upon any knowledge of it. If there is no knowledge, there must first *be* something to be known. In other words, knowledge is essentially discovery or the finding of what already is. If a reality could only be or come to be in virtue of some activity or process on the part of mind, that activity or process would not be 'knowing', but 'making' or 'creating', and to make and to know must in the end be admitted to be mutually exclusive."³ The real difficulty of the Buddhist idealism and their corresponding thinkers in the West, Berkeley and even Kant, was that they ignored consideration of the world as a reality simply and appealed exclusively to its special character as a thing *known*. The misinterpretation of the psychology of consciousness as such and the cognitive relation made it impossible for them to discover the essential directness and partialness of the cognitive relation as such. There are other powers of the

1. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*: H. A. Prichard, p. 112.

2. *Ibid.* p. 114.

3. *Ibid.* p. 118. (*italics in the text*).

mind that do not involve the dealing with objects as objects existent. The analysis of consciousness through dream states involved them in the autonomy of the consciousness as creator, but they did not see that it did not involve this autonomy in the experience or relation that is essentially discovery or knowing, and this is indeed different from and negative of the making-characteristic or *kalpanā*. There is danger and undoubtedly a serious defect if imagination should play the rôle of the perceiver. Such a function would be trespassing into knowing. Rāmānuja and the realists clearly admitted the capacity of the mind to create or make or delude itself because of its private wishes and desires and imaginations. But they found it to be different indeed in every respect from the knowing-process, that in the words of Prof. Prichard involves the discovery of 'what already is.' This is of the real, and always real. The content of dream states also on the principle that they are engendered in the individual dream state by the Divine Lord according to the moral deserts of each individual, is also real, because even there the cognitive relation is normal and not interfered with by the emotions and desires of the individual himself. They are not his *kalpanā*, but God's.

The mentalistic theory of the object owes its force also to the wrong interpretation of the object as similar to self-consciousness. The facts of recognition make this interpretation possible. But as Śrī Vedānta Deśika argues the self-same recognition, *pratyabhijñā*, reveals that the content of the recognition is not anything other than the outer world which is apparently not self-conscious. This view was manifestly at the back of the Advaita theory, that to be an object is to be *inconscious*. Though some objects are unconscious and some others are not and need not be, and indeed even self-conscious beings can become objects of consciousness of some one else, the fact remains that there is the clear understanding of the position that the object of knowledge is other than and is not self-consciousness. This is in direct contradiction to the view maintained that the object of consciousness, in the

very initial stage of perception is *cit*, consciousness alone. (see 1st chapter)

The doctrine that the object's existence depends on its being known, *esse est percipi*, makes the cognitive relation as the condition of existence. "The relation is one fact which has two sides which are separable and are not inseparable." The subject is always the subject of an object and equally an object is always the object of a subject", but the fact is that the subject and the object need not be subject and object *all the time*. The subject may continue to perceive or may not, and the object may continue to be perceived or may not be. The relation is terminable, and further the same object may not continue to be the object of a particular subject and it may vary its subjects *ad infinitum*. Equally the subject may wander from object to object in a continuous effort of cognition. But it may equally desist from this perpetual effort. Action demands the cognition; the cognition is purposive therefore, and cessation from action may involve the cessation from the cognitive activity of knowing.

The fact is, relations are of two kinds, terminable or separable, and inseparable. The one is the relation between universals and particulars, substance and qualities, genus and species. The very elements of the relation dissolve when the relation disappears. "The very being of the elements related involves the relation and apart from the relation disappears." This is the *aprathaksiddha*-relation of the Viśiṣṭādvaita, and this is in one sense the eternal relation. On the other hand the relation of object and subject, "of knowing is essentially temporal."¹ The elements exist independently of the relation. In other words, the *aprathaksiddha*-relation is internal relation, the cognitive relation is an external relation. The relation does bring about knowledge of the one to the other and is serviceable. But it does not involve the very being of the elements that it relates. Relations are non-regressive: the Cognitive relation also.

1. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*: H. A. Prichard, p. 132.

The theories of representationalism and subjectivism suffer from a fundamental defect. They are worried about the nature of relation itself. How could relations relate? How could they relate distinctly different entities such as a mental subject and a material object?

The first question raises a point that is not worth considering at all. The fact is that there is the relation, and to ask for a further elucidation of the position is to land oneself and not the relation or the *relata*, in a fruitless task. Relations relate because they are relations and they cannot be either the terms they relate, nor do they require any other relation to relate them and so on *ad infinitum*. To say that the relation requires another relation to relate it, is to treat a relation as if it were an object-term or relatum, which it is not. To conclude on the basis of this wrong analysis—a hyper-critical analysis—that all relations are illusion and that they are not available in the real, is to contradict the very possibility of knowledge. This extreme view has been held by several thinkers like Nāgārjuna, Śāṅkara, and in the West by the Absolute idealists amongst whom Bradley was the master mind.

Rāmānuja finds that the cognitive relation is like any other relation, that is, external, conjunctive and direct. There is nothing repugnant in a mind knowing its material object, and the doctrine of homogeneity between the subject and object is a false one and no *tertium quid* is needed to mediate between the mental and the material, in the form of a quasi-mental image or representation, leaving the subject to *infer* the material object outside. The important part of the whole position is that because the image is sensory it should be a part of the mind, and as such is different from the object outside, but in so far as it is outside also, in the sense that it is seen as characterising the object, it is, in some manner, of it. The Sāṃkhyan position in regard to the cognitive-relation is similar to this, and it was more alive to the issue of the homogeneity of the subject and object and made the mind (*buddhi*) into a material, tenuous and reflecting medium, so as to be the

locus of the representations. The theory of homogeneity is a device brought in to get rid of the theory of direct perception and ultimately to deny the reality of perception itself. There is indeed enough difficulty in the doctrine of representationalist cognition without any need to take recourse to the theory of homogeneity.

The embodied being is a unity, a psycho-physical unity, and in so far as this is fundamentally real and actual, the theory of homogeneity is useless; and no recourse need be had to the theory of parallelism such as that held by Spinoza. The problem of direct perception or knowledge of processes is only postponed and not solved by this theory of autonomous dualism-cum-parallelism.

The cognitive relation thus gives rise to the the following considerations :

(1). It is a relation that is established between a spiritual subject and an object that might be 'other' than itself.

(2). The experience of the outer world is a direct transaction between the sense-organs and the outer world, needing no *tertium quid*, such as images or representations. Ideas are mental; not so images which have objective loci.

(3). The transaction itself is an activity of the self which senses or perceives or intuits.

(4). The sense-impressions are parts of the outer reality which is a continuum characterised by space and time.

(5). Space and time are perceived as much as sense-impressions are perceived by the mind which is the sensorium in this case and directly. These reveal that the conjunction of extra-sensory and the sensory in the perceived content is due to the activity of the embodied being simultaneously in both of its aspects.

(6). All that is perceived in perception is real.

VI

Criterion of Falsity

The difference between the perception and the intention of a sense-datum and the sense-datum itself consists in the essential interpretation that is laid upon the sense-datum. The illusions of sense-data are not unreal. They are sensed in the manner in which they are given, and there is much truth in saying that normal senses do not lie as even Kant held. The conflict comes in perception or what they are made to stand for in the external world from which they are said to proceed. It is undoubtedly true to say that it is just possible that we do not apprehend all that are in the external universe and that the nature of objects is such that they cannot be fully known. It is perhaps also correct to think that because we do not perceive the minutest atoms in their isolation but only perceive them in their constellations or groupings, the atoms are not capable of being inferred to have any of the forms that we endow them with in their groupings.¹ That however need not deter us from thinking that this perceivability or the objective nature or even the possession of these qualities are not in the objects themselves, even as space and time are objective perceptions and cannot be said to be mental. The fatal objection to the mental theory of space or time lies in its inability even to grant the necessity to geometry and other so-called sciences, which depend on the acceptance of space as the property of objects as such and not *as perceived by us only*. Those who make space merely that which lies between any two visible objects and merely a non-existence (that is a mental construction) cannot make this non-existence fall into any category of non-existence. It is a definite perception and not a non-existence of either free space or non-existence merely. "As non-existence is clearly conceived as a special state of something actually existing, space even if admitted to be of the nature of

1. Sri Vedānta Deśika on the Sautrāntika system, *Paramata Bhanga*.

abhāva would not on that account be a futile non-entity (something *tuccha* or *nirupākhyā*)."¹

Falsity is a character that pertains to the value of a judgment we pass with regard to an occurrence, what interpretation we place on the datum given, rather than to the existence of the datum itself. This datum cannot be dismissed as an illusion. It exists, and in so far as it is it is real. We have to find out only as to where and in what context we shall have to place that event, discover the causes of its occurrence and discover also the *intent* that had the power to lead us astray. Its truth consists in what position or place it gets within the order of physical events not as to its *existence*, for that it is absolutely in its own right. Every fact faces the criterion whether it is a fact amongst other facts in a given context or otherwise, and secondly what it is within itself. Thus the criterion of reality of any sense-datum has two faces: how far it can be a fact among other facts, a question that leads to the comparison of the sense-datum with the objective reality of other events which are said to go along with this. The collocation of causes of diverse kinds leads to the production of this sensation and thus the causal theory of perception has in some sense to be assumed. Thus comparison is possible. Secondly, how far there are factors which are introduced by the subject himself into the object observed. "Truth can only be distinguished from falsity if there are marks by means of which the knowing subject can tell which elements proceed from the object and which are introduced by himself, the conscious subject." That this can be done also is actually seen. The fact that we can within the perception itself discover the causes of illusion and also within the perception itself can discover, with the help of the intent, misleading affinities are sufficient to reject the theory of general falsity and indeed can justifiably explain on the basis of common sense realism all illusions of the perceptive kind.

1. Ś. B. II. 2, 23: *Abhāvasya vidyamāna-padārthā-vāsthā-viśeṣatvo-papādanācc-ākāśasya-bhāvarūpatvepi no nirupākhyatvam.* (Ananda Press, ed. Vol. II, p. 94).

We find that our knowledge of objects is a direct process, not an effect on the sense-order as such, but really capable of declaring the nature of the perceptual field, whether it is one's own body or any other outside our body.

This possibility leads to the view that the objects of the physical world are capable of being known independently and directly. The physical objects since they do not enter into us form an objective continuum available to all: the sense-data are, on the other hand, individual, and capable of becoming defective due to the defects in the sense-organs. We may, in fact, speak of the sense-data as merely appearances of real objects or physical objects, and in perception we are aware of both, and not only one of them as in the representationalist view. And both sense-data and the physical objects are physical and reveal real events and are not psychical merely in any sense of the term.

At the base of the Rāmānuja's theory we do apprehend this fundamental view that the criterion of truth should be placed more upon the *intent*. And this reference to an object which has value and certain determined consequences as an object amongst other physical objects alone makes the experience true or false. In any case, being a real event it needs some explanation. Rāmānuja considers that illusions are crucial to the doctrine of perception and a real theory of knowledge. The cognitive relation is real and the contents of the cognitive relation are real also. Consciousness, if it does not know the objects directly, can know nothing at all. That it is embodied does not make it any the less capable of knowing through its windows so to speak. The objects cognized are cognized as physical objects and not as mental and it requires an extraordinary theory of projection to substantiate the theory of mental stuff. The refutation of idealism depends upon the refutation not only of the subjective nature of all ideas and impressions through the objective independence granted to them by Bosanquet and other objective idealists, but also by the refutation of the view that Spirit is the object also. Matter and spirit or both can be objects. Objects of perception are

material. The objects of supersensuous perception may be psychical or matter or God. This is fundamental to the understanding of the cognitive relation.

Rāmānuja's theory of truth and knowledge relies more upon the organic and common sense position than on any other system of thought. The distinction between appearance and reality is the most important factor in any theory of knowledge. According to common sense it means that the real is that which "recommends itself plainly," "it is that which contains the others." The real things or co-existent things are things which can be encountered again, since "this property of being able to present the same thing twice seems to be an ultimate (however mysterious) characteristic of the world with which we have to do." The reality of the hallucination consists in its being perceived only by the individual afflicted by it more than once. The unreality of its content lies in its failing to satisfy certain canons of acceptance or if we prefer the use of the words its reference or intention. Rāmānuja when he deals with the reality of the illusion of shell-silver or snake-rope affirms that their content has not only within them the form that is identical in some sense in both but also the specific quality of likeness in matter or the substance itself. Rāmānuja relies for this on the upaniṣadic view that there is quintuple intermixture of all pure elements in such proportions as to produce secondary elements which have one particular element in predominance whilst the rest are subsumed under its influence. This is the famous *pañcīkaraṇa-prakriya*, which is later than the *trivrit-karaṇa* of the earlier upaniṣads.

Another view is that since reality is only the container of all appearances which must be taken not only in the sense of perspectives but also from the point of view of individual differences, it is a substance with co-existing parts, each of which might be sensed apart, and as such a thing might 'look' as something and yet be not an *appearance* merely. It should not be forgotten that the real is not an aggregate however of all these parts or perspective looks. We consider a cube as having all its three dimensions as equal and yet it looks other-

wise from other angles of vision. We know the cube to be a thing of a particular nature, and this knowing is a *savikalpaka*-product and the sensations might be and indeed are otherwise.

The thing appears in a particular form to sense or rather in sensation, and it is not a fragment of the object at all. The inference as to the nature of the thing as in itself is a real inference based on the whole series of observations and disinterested discrimination made of it. The perception of silver in shell and snake in rope are merely instances of fragmentary appearances which are not unreal, but on the other hand fully real and articulate in the real thing. In other words "we thus seem to emerge with the result however we may feel baulked by the problems of hallucinations, illusions and error, that the real is not a few selected appearances only, that everything that appears at all is real. So far as the foregoing considerations reach, the real means all that is and what is, includes all that it seems to be. In a word' all appearance that ever are are real.'"¹ In Rāmānuja's own words 'What is is real'-*sarvam vijñānajatam yathārtham*.²

In this context it is necessary to bear in mind the important distinction that was made by Śankara regarding the phenomenal reality and error within the phenomenal, *prātibhāṣika*, and the transcendental which was beyond all reach of thought, understanding, sense and all except a superseusuous experience. He begins, even like Kant, to speak about the distinction "between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us, the distinction relating to one and the same reality regarded from two points of view. He ends with a distinction between two different realities, things in

1. *Common sense distinction of Appearance and Reality* : Mr. J. W. Scott. Arist. Sec. Pro. 1915-1916. p. 102.

2. Śrī Bhāṣya : I. i. 1. cf.

Yathārtham Sarvavijñānam iti Vedavidām matam !
Śruti-smṛtibhyas sarvasya sarvātmatva pratītiḥ !!

then follow 13 verses explaining the theory of Trivṛtkaraṇa of the Vedic view.

nā' to mithyārtha-satyārtha-viśayatva nibandhanah !
Evam sarvasya sarvatra vyavahāra vyavasthiṭṭh !!

themselves external to, in the sense of independent of, the mind, and phenomena or appearances within it."

This distinction is fatal to all real theories of error and no ultimate distinction can be made between appearance and reality at all. If we do not admit the possibility of any apprehension of reality with our consciousness or thought, there is no possibility of apprehension of error either as against the real. The fact is that illusions are caused by the fact of their being understood to be otherwise than what they appear at any moment in a particular context or condition, and yet the real is considered to be a factum of thought and the illusion as the actual apprehension of the senses.

Further as Prof. Prichard says "Just as it is absurd to describe the fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that while the stick is not bent, the appearance which it produces is bent, so it is, even on the face of it, nonsense to say that while things are not spatial, the appearances which they produce in us are spatial. For an 'appearance' being necessarily mental cannot possibly be said to be extended."² The more important defect of any doctrine that reduces all perception and perceived objects to the level of appearances lies in the fact that they tend to equate the things as appearing into mere appearances, a defect that lays bare the fundamental difference between the two. The first shows that the 'intent' the pointer of the sensation to the object external to the subject, the other reduces this intent to nothing and makes a first-class blunder in the analysis of cognition. It is a fundamentally wrong transition in thought.

It is fundamental to all theories knowledge that the distinction between truth and falsity should be clear and

1. *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* : H. A. Prichard, p. 75.

2. On the whole theory of this fallacious transitions in thought reference should be made to Prichard's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, which is masterly analysis. Sankara's and all other types of idealism commit similar mistakes. Chapters on Space and Phenomena and things-in-themselves are the most important, pp. 36-102.

unambiguous and should not be capable of being reduced to degrees. Knowledge that is arrived at through thought, *jñāna*, and that which we perceive through sensation are both real. Abolish this parity then we find ourselves in the quandry of illusionism, that thought itself is a deluding and illuding instrument. It is true that Consciousness acts as a sensory and thinking function of consciousness, as also of enjoyment of objects, But it is thought or thinking that makes us *think a thing as it is*, not sensation. "For it is a presupposition of thinking that things are in themselves what we think them to be: and from the nature of the case a presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned, but cannot be questioned at all." It is this same point that is constantly emphasized by Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika and other realistic schools. Once deny thought the power of apprehension of the real, and make it a delusive instrument and a creator of illusion, or mere imagination, *vikalpa*, then the road is clear for complete annihilation of all metaphysics and epistemology. To convert the power by which release is to be attained, *jñāna* into a power of delusive imagination, is to give up all chances of liberation of consciousness.

The paradox of the whole situation is that in seeking to extend the frontiers of understanding and knowledge, the effort actually made led to surrender of its potency and existence. No wonder the Doctrine of Reason, and Doctrine of the Super-experience abandoned the one principle of reality on which they based their dialectical opposition.

1. "There is no right for the nihilist to take part in argumentation since there is no means by which he could." "He who has himself known that all are chimerical, if he does not perform activities with reference to perceived objects he has no need to refute the activities of those who seek heaven and liberation. Since even the delusion that all are unreal is itself chimerical there is no need to get over it."

"To one who affirms that *vikalpa* is not a source of right knowledge, there is no way of accepting the indeterminate knowledge, which is itself determined to exist by determinate cognition alone"...Śrī Venkaṭanātha in *Paramata-bhanga*, Ch. XI (Annals S. V. O. I. Vol. I.)

VIII

Reality of all cognitive content

Every cognition is of a real thing. The cognitive act is real, and the subject of cognition is also real. The three terms are real and therefore the illusions that occur must be traced to certain extra-relational conditions. Intraorganic defects as well as the ambiguities in the objects perceived are important in any understanding of the problem of error and illusion. Illusions are of the sense-level, whilst errors pertain to the level of inferences or judgment. The failure of thinkers to study the theory of illusion from the standpoint of the physiological or embodied spirit has been at the basis of most failures. It is clearly seen that when the bodily state is otherwise than normal there has occurred frequently the failure to judge properly. Indolence and sleepiness are referable mainly to the bodily state of unpreparedness. That there is not any physiological process apart from the psychological may be easily demonstrated. The dream consciousness may be a state of the mind which is actively operating in the brain interorganically, receiving no stimulus from outside, but on the whole we find that at least no judgment is possible as to its rightness or falsity. Indeed we can say considering the physio-psychic disposition at that period that it is active and real during the period of its operation. "The conscious states experienced in dreams are not unreal." As Bradley says "There is nothing to prove that the dream world is unreal, though this restricted world of ours must be accepted for all practical purposes." The dream pictures and experiences are real and really experienced. Therefore the mental condition does produce certain impressions which so far as they go do grant real objects. The fact is that the conception of the real here is that which actually occurs as a fact of perception however much it may be private. Privacy of an experience does not make it unreal as such, nor is public experience or experience that is participated in by all, namely outer objects, in any better position. All depends on the veracity of the individual,

his real experience as a searcher and observer of his bodily processes, in so far as they also vibrate or reveal emotional conditions.

The nature of dream also in so far as its content is concerned is such that it is not anything other than the images already experienced now projected on the mind's canvass so to speak in such a form as to grant a retrospective emotion.¹

The jaundiced perception is a real perception. The experience of mirage is a real experience or cognition. The perception of continuity of a circle of fire when only a fire brand is rapidly revolved is a real experience. The reflection of the face in a mirror is a real fact of experience. The mistaking of direction is a common fact of experience. The perception of a double moon is also an actual experience.² The seeing of stars when the eye-lid is pressed is also as real as anything else. The rope is perceived as a snake, and a snake too appears as a rope. All these and others too can be explained. But the explanation does not abolish the actual experience or even the perception. The shell looks silver we say, and having known it, the shell *continues* to look like silver. The perception of similar structure and colour is the cause of the illusion here. The shell actually reveals the shining surface of silver. The illusion is a real fact since certain activities follow from the acceptance of the view that it is silver. Emotions are engendered by them. What is wrong is the associative reference which we have made by identifying this experience with the previous experience of silver. Illusion is impossible without prior knowledge. It is a product of wrong association of present experience with the past on the basis of a *perceived* similarity that approximates to *tādātmya*, identity. Thus we find that illusion is impossible unless two conditions are fulfilled and these two conditions are both real viz. (1) that there was prior experience and (2) that

1. cf. my article on the *Dreams in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja* : Annals Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute, Vol. I. 1.

2. cf. S. B. : I. i. 1. (Thi.'s trans. pp. 120-123).

the present experience has definite similarity of the perceptual kind with the previous experience. Given these two, the illusion is had.

In the case of the mirage, the feature is identical since from a distance a sheet of water looks in a particular manner, an experience already undergone, and since the immediate experience has features which are common to reflection by water, we take it that the content of this experience is the previous experience. Memory thus plays a significant part in illusion. The common quality may be called by any name: in the above instances as silverness, which is the specific quality or structure, form or colour, or water which is a specific quality or structure. The transitivity of the application depends on the first experience and also on the value of the experience. Silver is more useful than shell, water more than sand. Wherever therefore this previous judgment has been made, there the judgments that are passed in regard to illusory experience are governed by this predeliction.

Our first judgment, then, is 'this is silver', at the initial valuation. But this cognition is sublated in meaning or value by a further scrutiny or else by the actual confirming conduct such as we use in the case of gold, which takes cognition of its other qualities and history. The difference between silver and silvery quality of the shell perceived in the latter becomes manifest. Hence the second judgment 'This is *like* silver' or 'This resembles silver' and the further judgments "This is not silver. I have been deceived into thinking that this is silver."

In all these above cases what make the illusions possible are either the hasty generalizations due to the activity of imagination, generalizations based upon the fundamental similarity of structure—a *real* fact, undisputable and absolute, since the factors that make the illusions possible are not non-resident in things which apparently cause illusion, or due to the organic defects, or speed of motion which makes it impossible

for the eye to adapt itself to pictures or things moving at a greater speed than it can register, or ill-health or due to the imaginative activities of the individual or will of God.

Jaundice is an organic defect.¹ Mirage is due to perceptive illusion,² and Rāmānuja's explanation is that since according to the Upaniṣads everything is in every other thing due to (*pañcīkaraṇa*), there arises the possibility of illusion of water from the conjunction of light and earth. This may also be due to merit and demerit. The fire-brand swung rapidly looks like a wheel and this is due to the rapidity of motion, so much so the eye could not follow the intervals from one position to another. The reflection of the face in the mirror is due to the fact of rapid movement of light from the face to the mirror and back again and this interval is not perceived by us.³ We are unable to distinguish between the source of the rays and their backward movement. This is the cause of the illusion. The mistaking of direction is due primarily to the relativity of direction. What is south to one is north to the other and perhaps any other direction to the rest. The perception of the double moon is due to unequal adjustment of the two eyes to the common object, the moon. The defect in the organic apparatus is the cause of this illusion.

The fundamental principle then that emerges from this is that the actuality of the perception proves that some factors are real and these cannot be sublated by any explanations whatsoever. In this sense all experiences or states of cons-

1. *Srī Bhāṣya* I. i. 1. Pīṭasankhādou tu nayanavarti-pittadravya-sambhinnā nāyana-rāśma-yaśśankhādibhis-samyujyante. (Ananda Press Vol. I. p. 85,

2. *Srī Bhāṣya* I. i. 1. (p. 85, 86). Japākusuma-samīpa-varti-sphaṭikama nīrapi tatprabhābhībhūtatayā rakta itī gṛhyate.... Marīcīkā-jalajūṇa'pi tejah-ṛthivyorapy-ambuno vidyamānatvād indriyadoṣeṇa tejah-ṛthivyor-agrahaṇād adīṣṭavaśāccambuno grahaṇād yathārthatvam. Alātacakre'pyalātasya drutatara-gamanena sarvadeśa-samyogād antarālāgrahaṇāt tathā prātītir upapadyate. Cakrapratītāvapy antarālā grahaṇa-pūrvakatattad deśasamnyuktatattadvastu-grahaṇameva.

3. Darpaṇādiṣu nījamukhādīprātītirapi yathārthā. Darpaṇādi-pratihatagatayo hi nāyanaraśmayo darpaṇādidēśagrahaṇa-pūrvakam nījamukhādī gṛhṇanti. Tatrāpi atīśaighryād antarālāgrahaṇāt tathā prātītiḥ.

ciousness are real in so far as they have a beginning and actual effects.

Illusions of the perceptive level are such that if they were to be sublated they should no longer be seen. The reality of the entire perception is proved by the fact of persistence of the perception, and this is an important fact. The illusionist who speaks for the unreality of the perceived might say that there is persistence of ignorance even after enlightenment through knowledge. Thus he might say "The moon is one, and yet the diseased eye sees two moons. With the knowledge that there is but moon may not the knowledge of the 'duplicated moon' continue to exist? To this we reply:— 'this analogy does not apply to your case.' For the disease of the eye is a fact, whereas your disease viz., ignorance which produces the dualistic notion, is a figment. Again the cause, viz., the disease of the eye, giving birth to the sight of the 'duplicated moon,' remains: whereas your ignorance has vanished! There is thus reason for the persistence of the 'double moon' though it must be conceded that stronger evidence existing in favour of *one* moon renders the diseased eye, a proof of little or no importance....."¹

This *bādhitānuvritti*, the persistence of the illusory cognition even after knowledge of its illusoriness, is a special feature of the doctrine of Advaita. The traces of the illusion of duality persist after the knowledge of the Identity. This is refuted by Ramanuja on the basis that this is wrong analysis. The thing is true and its characteristic of similarity, *sādriśatva*, is in its very nature. That is why there is continuance of its nature after the distinctions that have been made. The illusion does not persist, it is only the nature of a thing to persist. Knowledge does not sublate the perception; it

1. *Gītā Bhāṣya*: Śrī Rāmānuja: II, 12. parama-purṣasyā-dhigatā dvaitajñānasya bādhitānuvṛttirūpam idam bhedajñānam dagdhapaṭādivan na bōdhakam ityucyeta nāitdupapadyate. marīcikaśalajñānādikam hi bādhitam anuvartamānam najalāharaṇādi pravṛtti hetuḥ Dvicandrajñānadau tu candraikatva-jñānena pāramārthika-timiradoṣasya dvicandrajñānahetorapi naṣṭatvād bādhitānuvṛttirvyukta,

corrects the false identification of this similarity with the intention of another thing.

Personalistic thought, such as that of Rāmānuja which is also organistic, regards the soul or self as distinct from God and looks upon the world as a vast system of stimuli' which serves as a medium of communication between God and man, and between spirits in general. There is thus an 'ineradicable dualism' which cannot be dismissed by any efforts of idealism. "If human thought is identified with absolute thought as in Hegelian epistemology, it is impossible to explain error. Error must have its counterpart in reality as well as in truth if idea equals a thing or object. Error as partial truth cancels error rather than explains it."¹ And "if ignorance and illusion are to be accounted for, there must be a more distinct separation between the human and the divine than absolute idealism permits. The fact of error is the Achilles' heel in every monistic epistemology."² Thus writes an excellent writer. And we can certainly agree with him in saying that the problem of error is crucial to any theory. A correspondence-theory of knowledge certainly is naive and can only be substantiated if ever we can prove that there are two ways of knowing simultaneously and the same object. It is this that has to be proved. The only test then will be by way of intention or pragmatic test. Not so according to the equally naive theory of monism which dismisses the object by taking it over into itself. There is no criterion of comparison or correspondence, but only of coherence. It is this simplicity and constructiveness of monism that has at once made it so ambitious and futile as an explanation. Thus personalistic thought confronted with the difficulty of affirming that the outer objects are anything other than mere wave lengths and movements or changes of location or independent continuity of process, is yet capable of turning critical by means of the acceptance of real order of unity in and through the Divine

1. *Philosophy of Personalism*: A. Knudsen. p. 105. Abingdon Press New York 1927.

2. *Ibid.*

Purpose which is affirmed by mystic experience. It is this mystic knowing that leads to the corrective of the purely empirical or phenomenal. The divorce achieved by the critical kantianism is removed without impairing its contribution to thought and knowledge.

IX

The Twofold Criterion and Falsity

According to the Philosophy of Rāmānuja we have seen that every cognition is of a real thing, that the truth of a sense-datum consists in itself, and that it can be determined only by an attentive analysis of its reference in physical reality by its effects. The considerations which we have brought forward till now were those of real similarity between two things mistaken for one another, which have identical or similar appearances, that is to say, as between the genera that they represent or rather manifest when viewed in a manner that is without any consideration of the 'intent' or reference to actual reality. Secondly, that these sometimes revealed that the sense-organs were defective or else that they were due to certain real instinctive and emotional factors which blurred the distinctions between the factors constituting the perception of the real object. Thus we are forced to consider firstly the value of each sense-datum presented on its own merits, and secondly, how far a physical object or sense-datum coheres with the experience of other objects similarly situated and perceived. This leads us to consider the value of each sense-datum, which ought to display or exhibit certain effects in order to be considered real. There is then available a two-fold criterion integral to one another that is, the perceptive and the consequential. This two-fold criterion indeed makes the object an effective existence and capable of guiding conduct. This is the dynamic element in the doctrine of knowledge. The philosophy of Rāmānuja is neither the static view nor yet the merely dynamic view illustrated by the radical doctrines of Buddha which culminated in an utterly self-negating Nihilism, and self-refuting conduct. It sees in the

real the fulfilment of purpose as well as the fulfilment of knowledge, or rather the fulfilment of knowledge through purpose and *vice versa*. Truth accordingly is that which is in accordance with the accepted conduct in regard to a particular object *vyavahārānugūṇa-jñānam prama*. Vyavahāra for Rāmānuja means nothing other than that which stands for the test of actual use of all or coherency in active life with the knowledge of other things and their utilities.

Thus the acceptance of the knowledge about a particular sense-datum would lead to certain initial judgments which would at once force us to carry out certain activities to meet the situation suggested or forced upon us by such a perception, because also of the urgency of the emotional situation. We act then *as if* the sense-datum is true and because it is a real occurrence. If the consequences of taking it as an objective factor, as a physical object or event, independent of individual sensing or being do follow, then we consider it to be a real factor or true fact or reality, or else it is no less real but it has to be explained as an event in the physical order. That would mean that these two factors of sense-datum and physical existence which are both given in an identical perception form so to speak a complex relation of body and soul. But any distinction of subjective sense-datum and objective physical continuum (both of which are united and form complete knowledge) is possible relatively with reference to the activity which is not a subjective affair. But how is this sense-datum as a physical object in an external continuum capable of fulfilling itself as a real effective entity, that is as an object in the external world of physical objects? Any discrepancy between sense and physical objectivity thus leads to the question of illusion. Thought means coherency, and as between physical objects, causal efficacy or relation or actual power is the important fact about them; thus an embodied being as a denizen of two worlds knows his complex truth or knowledge in a two-fold manner through sensation and conduct. In this connection we may use the analogy of binocular vision. The tri-dimensional manifold is perceived. The physical property

of motion in the objects themselves as different from the movements that we take are also registered by ocular adjustments of the ciliary muscles. Thus we find that the physical continuum cannot be separated from the sense-datum that we perceived.

Snake ceases to stand for a snake in consciousness as thought, though it continues to be a snake so far as the perception is concerned at first, but on second look it is found that the perception itself undergoes change from snake to a rope and what is residual in that experience betrays that quantum of similarity between the snake and the rope. Thus it seems wrong to hold that the perception stands as such even whilst the object's reference or place in thought has undergone the change into a rope. This feature it is that makes many persons hold the view that illusion is due to non-observation. Even perception, the more it becomes deep and profound and interpenetrative reveals the sources of the illusory perception. What happens in the period is firstly the gradual loss of emotion and other disturbances. In the second period there is more and more analysis of the structure of the content of the perception and this is achieved by a vigorous explorative activity of the mind and involves utter freedom from emotional and memory images. Lastly when it is found that all the factors have been analysed there is displayed the similarity that was the root of the illusion. This similarity is the true cause, is real and cannot be annihilated. This similarity is proved negatively and positively. Positively through experiment, and negatively, when it is superficial or unessential. Isomorphous substances need not also be isomeristic. Thus though illusions may be due to non-observation *akhyāti*, they are found to be also due to *anyathā-khyāti* that is inferring them to be otherwise because of previous associations. The emotion at the first moment is due to strong formal similarity and this is avoided or capable of being got over undoubtedly by more observation. But it is conduct or experimentation that abolishes the illusion.¹ The criterion then of error is that it

1. cf. Appendix on *Viśiṣṭādvaitic Theory of Perception*

must be capable of being sublated and we must have the feeling of reasoned certainty because of its persistence in the form it is proved to be on second looks into it. Rāmānuja contends that the snake as sense-datum was an actual experience which cannot be anything but real, but its falsity or error as a physical existence is due entirely to its not fulfilling the condition of coherency of its nature in relation to other objects and persons.

It is on this point we have to see that the element of time is introduced into this definition of reality. It is certainly not repugnant according to Rāmānuja for a thing to cease to be and yet be real. Dreams are real and they cease to be. Things are real and they cease to be. Reality is a characteristic of all things without which they can never be even for a moment. To deny reality is to embrace the void. Rightly therefore Rāmānuja holds that no half-way arrangements or compromises are possible between the Void and the Brahman. Brahman is Existence. It is the central core of all existences and the fact about all creation. All that appear are as much real as any permanent, since they could not well appear without really being what they are. Error consists in not treating the appearance as real and not in converting the appearance into an unexplainable mystery or myth or illusion.

Further the important fact remains that illusions are not all of the same type and have to be distinguished. If to distinguish, to analyse, is to create division, is to imagine differences where there are none, as evidenced by the attack on *Savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, then truth is an impossibility. Now that we find that the way into the open spaces of Intuition is barred to this knowledge of the Undifferentiated, there is no other go except to accept the differences as facts.

The fact is that the physical order is common to all embodied selves, and they themselves form part of it, in so far as they are embodied. That there might be disembodied spirits need not be questioned, as that is irrelevant to the theory of knowledge that we are concerned with here. This

objectivity might be brought to prove the validity or otherwise of a sense-datum. But merely because a number of persons say that the double moon is experienced, one cannot jump to the conclusion that there are two moons very close to one another (*samantara*) almost perhaps like double-stars of modern astronomy, and that they are moving round our planet. Rāmānuja refers to an island inhabited completely by such people (*timiradoṣa-grastha*). This is likely but it cannot double the moon. When we make this statement there is the awareness within perception itself that there cannot be two moons and that one moon alone is the truth. The defect universal cannot prove a thing true. This makes it imperative that the criterion in such cases must be found to be other than perception itself. Illusions of sense through sense-defects are adjusted to because of the failure in conduct. This factor of adjustment negatively to a defect is a common fact of experience. Thus the criterion of truth stands on the two-fold plank of discrimination and more discrimination and of conduct or experimentation *vyavahārānugūṇa-kriyā kārītva*.

In this context it is apt to quote the views of Professor G. F. Stout in his *Gifford Lectures*¹ "The bare fact that pink rats seem real to the drunkard is of itself presumptive evidence that they are real. The bare fact that the oar dipped in water looks bent is presumptive evidence that it is in fact bent. But the presumption is liable to be weakened and upset or reinforced and established according as the seeming fact fills its place or refuses to fill its place in a coherent context with other facts for each of which there is independent evidence supplied by other perceptual appearances. Further the coherence required is such as will make possible successful action effective adaptation of means to ends."... "Why do we believe the oar to be straight although it looks crooked? For such reasons as the following. If I try to grasp it in the water on the assumption that it is really bent I miss my aim. If it is really bent it ought to seem so to touch as well as sight, but

1. *Mind and Matter*: G. F. Stout. p 259. 1931.

it does not. If it was really bent how could one successfully row with it. Again on the assumption that the oar is straight as it seems to be when it is out of water, it would not become bent and unbent merely by being dipped and ceasing to be dipped." And we may add that in case it is said that it might be like the rod of iron that is capable of being bent when in fire and incapable of being bent when outside it, then we say that the bending and unbendingness are qualities *dependent upon the conditions*, and are real. In the case of the oar it is the refraction in water that is the matter about this bent-appearance, in the other case it is change in molecular arrangement in the iron rod brought about by heat in the atoms.

Judgments then must take into consideration the place, the conditions, the time and the nature of the structure available and its similarity and "*intent*", that is to say, what results must follow if it were the thing perceived.

Thus every event has to satisfy the dual tests, the intrinsic test that pertains to its nature: how far freed from the prejudice of memory and emotional disturbances, there are features of similarity which make their invariable appearance, and the experimental test (wrongly called pragmatic test), how far the object perceived as real is capable of fulfilling the obligations of its physical coherence.

Thus the object is a unity of sense and matter and between the two there is a coherence that is verified by the practical test or value. Knowledge apprehends this unity as such and there is nothing repugnant in an experience being real where it is also misinterpreted.

X

Reality as content of all cognition

From our study of illusions which are usually individual and belong to the individual embodied human beings, we shall now turn to the study of the nature of Cognition. Rāmānuja holds that there is nothing inherently wrong with our

cognitive processes which should make us apprehend falsity instead of truth. What we know is that there are certain essential limitations of the normal sense. Our knowledge of the world filters into us through our senses. That does not and cannot be said to present unreality. If the world is false there can never arise the knowledge of the true and the real. Nor could we apprehend it. It may with rightness be said that if our senses are purified then we shall perceive really. Jainistic thought held the view that when the *karma-matter* that has gathered into the soul is slowly heated by *tapas*, austerity, then the soul becomes capable of perception that is real. This they call *pratyakṣa*. Bergson held the view that if there were no sense-organs or the body we shall see all as in direct vision, whole and entire. The fact remains that no one can quarrel with the view that the senses must be purified, and also that *vāsanās*, tendencies or habits or desires should not corrupt the seeing-mind. For it is the mind that is said to move towards the object and gather it up or shall we say that the light in the eye goes over to the object and gets back again so that the object appears as erect, and not inverted as some psychologists contend these days. We know the world given to us in experience: making allowance for evil or unpurified thoughts and imaginations and habits or organic defects there is yet sufficient reality in these that cannot be over thrown. Knowing is the function of a real being. Consciousness is therefore a reality-giver. The cognitions that are are likewise of the real objects. Imagination also is the real nature of the individual. It is the creativity of the individual self.

Imagination no doubt creates an ineffectual reality like artistic products and these are mostly untrue since they can never pass into actual effects. Imagination requires 'some substrate in general.' Its manifestations are conditioned by the consciousness that it has. If it be perfect then its creations are of the real and if on the contrary the consciousness is imperfect or ignorant it may not be able to create at all or if creating, these will be not true. The individual as finite is not

at fault, it is his creative power of consciousness *iccha-kriyā-śakti* that undergoes mutilation and perversion when it is ignorant. Because there is equality between the freed individual and the Supreme Lord in so far as knowledge is concerned, *jñāna-sāmya*,¹ his creations then reveal reality.

The real is apprehended because it is the nature of consciousness to know the real: whilst contraction *sankoca* leads to partial visions, imaginary filling-up of the interstices of experiences and reading into things make the real false.

There is nothing repugnant in a real soul really creating anything, just as God Himself out of His magnificent Will creates all creation. The limit of the finite, however, is the universe itself: total creation is possible only to the Universal Self of all. Jagadvyāpāra and Janmād yasya yataḥ Sūtras explain this stand-point. There is also nothing essentially wrong in considering that the Lord might not have brought out of His infinite Being all through Will. Even the *Asat* of the Infinite means only the Infinite Not-yets of time. And time therefore plays a role in the scheme of creation. Rāmānuja tends to lean towards creationism, but finds that an inner determination of the Divine Lord and the reality of the individuals and the objective Nature make it impossible to reduce these into *real creations* of the Divine Lord. The moral and religious demand this otherness.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF UNITY.

I

Unity between Primary and Secondary Qualities

We have seen that Rāmānuja consistently holds that the individual's experience is a real experience and that this experience involves the cognition or recognition of both the subject and the object whose conjunction or compresence alone is the real factor constitutive of all experience. Consciousness is the function of an embodied being in knowing, and is not a function of a subject or mind as such (a fact which is rendered absolute even in the case of the Absolute Intelligence or God as we shall show). It is only a self-conscious subject that is capable of apprehending its own objects. The subject whether in the case of subjective mental states (inclusive of emotional states which invade the mental) as in dreams or in the case of objective things and states as in prophetic dreams, apprehends reality as such with or without the help of the exteriorly-turned sensory organs. The subject is capable of apprehending the sense-organs, since sense-organs are products of sensing rather than original organs which determine all sensing. They do not limit the perception, since all perception inclusive of the Divine is composed of sense-characters as sound, form, colour, touch and taste. The colours are seen, sounds are heard, touches are felt, and all these are present unambiguously in mystic *dhyaṇa*, and are also presented *without the mediation of sense-organs*. Thus Rāmānuja distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, *indriya pratyakṣa* and the Divine or *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. The former is conditioned-consciousness in the sense that all experiences filter through the sense-organs, whereas the latter is free-consciousness in the sense that its knowledge is direct and without (or with?) the mediation of or obstruction from sense-organs. The sense-organs are no

bar to full apprehension. They serve the mind in an absolute degree by being more and more adapted to suit the demands of a wide and full and integral apprehension. In any case the reception of knowledge proceeds from and is sustained by the entire spiritual being.

Rāmānuja accepts the view that sense-organs do not create the sensory experiences nor modify the external world. The sense-characters are in the objects themselves and what our sense-organs do is to grasp them. The sweetness of sugar is in the sugar and not in the mouth, since there are other tastes such as alkaline and saline and bitter etc. Nor are colours to be referred to the eye. The modern doctrine of primary and secondary qualities is undoubtedly a consequence of the representationalist view coupled with the theory of atoms of the homogeneous variety. The chemical theory is against the view that the qualities are in the things. But the fact that the mouth cannot but respond to a particular groupings of atoms in one definite way as sweet, whomsoever's this mouth it might be reveals despite differences that are not to be exaggerated, that there is this particular quality in the objective groupings themselves. The electronic or chemical theory cannot annul the findings of the objective nature of the particular sensation. Invariable concomitance itself justifies the subject-object unity of the primary and secondary sensations. There is a distinction undoubtedly but it is not a disjunction between the several kinds of sense-data. They form a unity. Their locus (*ālambana*) is in the object outside the individual's organism. The doctrine of exteriorization or projection of sense-impulses is made possible only on the basis of the object being 'covered' by the sensorium or light in the eye. This reading of the physiological situation in cognition is accepted also by the Advaitic view. Thus the cognition of the external object is made possible on either of the accounts. The objects have qualities that are perceptible, and there is nothing to show that what they possess is other than what we see, in the form of structure or colour or taste or touch, though there may be individual differences and peculiarities that make doubtful judgments possible.

Some thinkers make *karma* the all-solvent, and try to make it the principle which helps the exteriorization of internal images. This theory is on a par with the hallucinatory theory of all perception. Creationism is not to be equated with such a theory since creationism involves real creation not delusive projection. Karma as a power or agency can do nothing more than expand or contract the ambit of perception of consciousness according as it is good or bad. It cannot create anything. *Knowledge alone can create reality*, not ignorance nor unconsciousness. This is a central conception which cannot be given up under any conditions. Imperfection in creation means imperfection in knowledge.

If the virus of unreality is posited in consciousness itself no less than in Absolute Consciousness, in individual finite consciousness we shall have to face pure scepticism and illusionism. The consciousness that we know or have is that of individual subjects, though it must be conceded that there are degrees of expansion and enlightenedness that are far above the average. Such a consciousness we have always seen in embodied beings. It does not of course preclude the existence of disembodied selves. But even then Rāmānuja holds that they have bodies of another kind more amenable or suited to the higher functions of the consciousness, relieved from the strain and limitation due to a refractory and contracting body. In freed state, souls are said to possess an *aprākṛita* or non-material body of pure light. And unfreed souls on the other hand have *liṅga śarīras*, which are always related to them and which determine their future life-series. These are essentially modifiable by knowledge on the one hand, and on the other hand, also modifiable by actions of either kind, good or bad. It is this kārmic body that gets touched or infected.

Nor can we ever conceive of a pure consciousness or mind divorced from any kind of body as Aristotle conceived, or even as some thinkers of modern times hold, and as Advaita Vedānta conceives. In Aristotle, it is a self-contradictory conception, in Advaita, it is an imperative of its thought itself, but then

such an acceptance imperils the nature of reality itself. Absolute consciousness is yet a consciousness which cannot happen elsewhere than in matter or a body however tenuous or purified or perfect, for consciousness is a function of a subject and is not be perceived apart from an embodied being. The fact is that in the case of the Absolute Consciousness, it is a consciousness which is a function of the Most Perfect Being, and in whose case the instrumentality of our five-fold sense-organs or even the *manas* or *citta* or any other organ of mind in its imperfect career are nowhen needed. There is direct vision. His Perception is vision. It is perfect vision since it enfolds all infinity in its ken.

We find that the supremely intelligent mind's consciousness is capable of creative action and possesses more completely the body which it governs. The limitation of consciousness is due to, spiritual defect, or rather moral defect, which makes is impossible for it to function efficiently in a body which it holds. A higher morality or purity of living points to a greater and more facile control of the functions of the body. Thus reality does not change, the body does not become a barrier that has to be got rid of, but that spiritual life gets deepened and intensified, or in other words, perfected. Consciousness as we know in the manner we know may enlarge itself and even get transformed into a supermind or *Divya cakṣus* but in its essential nature as a function of a spirit it does not forsake its nature.

There are no degrees of reality according to Rāmānuja but only degrees of perfection.¹ And perfection is measured by its completeness of control over the body a soul has or tenants and in the creative feature of its consciousness. And creation in this sense means nothing more than making real the possible, the effectuating of the causal truth or will of God.

1. cf. *Basis of Realism*: S. Alexander. "The prejudice against Realism lies in the confusion between the different ideals of Reality and Perfection. Physical things are as real as the mind but not as perfect. When we speak of degrees of Reality we must be careful to ask whether we do not mean degrees of perfection."

II

Śarīra-Śarīrībhāva as the Typical Unity

Rāmānuja stands for the complete vindication of the body-soul relation even with regard to the Highest Spirit. A question may be asked whether God has a body in the very same sense that you and I have bodies? The point is not that God has a human body,—since such a limitation of God's nature to a body like ours will entail a crude anthropomorphism and a limitation on evolution which makes man the peak of creation which he is not. Surely He has a body which makes it possible for the Seers to see Him as having a body of light, auspicious and awe-inspiring, gracious and beneficent even as the Īśāvāsyopaniṣad seer says, *Yat te rūpam kalyāṇatamam* (verse 16). A body cannot be defined in terms of the appearance of the several types of bodies. A protoplasm has no sense-organs but it has a body, it has a nucleus which does animate the movements of its amorphous tissue. Thus a body cannot be defined in terms of the number of sense-organs or limbs or formations special or general. What is the body then except that which functions or acts as an instrument purely and absolutely for the service of its owner which is said to fight out its life-course in an environment? This serviceability to the animating life within or rather more precisely the soul within might be of any kind of enjoyability. Thus does Śrī Rāmānuja define the body: "A body is any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes and which stands in an entirely subordinate relation to it."¹

Rāmānuja finds essential unity to lie in this soul-body relation. Metaphysical reality is of the nature of soul-body. This is fundamental and from this we have to extract the view about the knowledge-relation. That the fundamental relation between subject and the object is a relation that is not organic

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, II. i. 9: *yasya cetanasya yaddravyām sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam yaccheṣataika svarūpam ca tat tasya śarīram.*

in the sense that they are always and eternally inseparably tied to one another, need not be said. But it is also a fact that to speak about a subject is also to speak about it as having an object. The objects change and vary and may be any number. The relation named cognition by the subject always remains except during deep sleep. Thus we find that we cannot affirm the subject-object relation to be anything more than what exists when the subject is awake or cognizing. A pure cognition without any object is a myth, though this also is granted by certain schools of thought especially by Yoga which claims a state of cognition which is objectless. But even this is found to imply only that there are no objects of the outer world then but not objects of the transcendental kind, objects which are of divine origin. That is to say, that to be conscious means to have some object, natural or divine, and the higher states of consciousness are those which have as their content the divine objects or objects which have God as their cause.

In one sense, however, we can yet speak of the cognitive relation as a soul-body relation. The object is enjoyed and utilized and controlled by the subject who cognizes it. That is to say cognition leads on to the two further ways of dealing with the object, namely, that it enjoys it and utilizes it or determines it. If the definition we have given of a body of the subject is accepted, then, there is every reason to treat the object as a body of the subject at that moment. The subject as such becomes the soul or self of the object. The subject-object relation thus reveals more than this relation in that it is possible to conceive all subjects as capable of holding their objects in an absolutely dependent relation. This however is not true, as objects do not exist for the subjects as such, and many subjects are capable of beholding the same object. This may be serious flaw in the Rāmānuja's theory of relation of subject and object if we treat them as having *śarīra-śarīri* relation. It would involve that the individual finite subjects must either be subjects or souls or else fragments of a self or Mind, because they have no relation of this kind with

the objects except their own bodies, and even then only in a limited manner. If the subjects are absolute subjects, the illusion of the many has to be accepted, in which case we shall have to argue for one Self alone, or else we must argue that souls are real partial aspects of one Subject which is the real, but who are capable of enjoying and appreciating and controlling the objects in a limited manner. But then this involves the breaking up of the one Self if it does not involve the view that the aspects have each an individuality, real and inalienable. Either there are many partial subjects or finite subjects which *somehow* have come into being from one supreme Subject or Self, or else the supreme Transcendent Self itself has *somehow* illusorily presented itself in various ways which are phenomenally real but not transcendently so.¹ Thus our problem of subject-object relation leads to the question of Unity or Oneness.

Before we take into consideration the problem itself, we shall discuss what we do mean by a Perfect Subject and its infinity: and what we do mean by the term infinity of subjects and things?

III

Infinity and what it means

A perfect subject according to Rāmānuja is exactly that person whose consciousness or *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* is full and complete in its range, without taint or fault or contraction, who wills the real, perceives the real and enjoys the real. The cognitive and affective and conative perfections are reached by such a consciousness.

1. Bhāskara's is the first view and Śankara's the second. In the Bhāskara-doctrine the aspects even when mutually contradictory co-exist in space and time, or without reference to space and time. This involves a view similar to the Jaina *sapta-bhaṅgi*. If the views are related to space and time and are not self-contradictory in that regard, since it is time and space that always cause this self-contradiction, there will be no difficulty about the acceptance of the Bheda-abheda view. Unfortunately this point of reference is lacking, hence the futility of the identity and difference view.

In actual experience we find however several degrees of this perfection of consciousness in several individuals. We may even think that there are several perspectives or grades which cover the entire range of perfection even as Leibniz conceived existence to be. There are infinite number of points of view possible and actual from which the universe might be telescoped or perceived by each of them. There are no vacant spaces; or rather we should say there are infinite directions, *disah*, and whilst it is conceivable that all the points of the circumference are occupied by some monad or other, it is not necessarily so. Leibniz held that indeed they are occupied and then in order to explain change in this dynamic universe he proceeded to convert the straight line of progress to perfection into a circular movement, so much so every monad had to repeat its history of contraction and expansion of consciousness as it passed from the most luminous insight into the darkest contraction of unconsciousness. This according to him was necessitated by the fact of infinite perspectives occupied and innervated by the actual presence of monads at each of them in the best possible of all worlds. Thus every monad seeks its fulfilment as a *monadus monadum*, but no sooner than it reaches it, it must make way for its successor awaiting anxiously for its dethronement. This eternal recurrence theory is utter nonsense from the standpoint of true religion which seeks a perfection that is beyond the constant threat of fall. The *Vedānta Sūtra* which echoes the words of the Upaniṣadic seer says *anāvṛttisabdāt*, because of the phrase that there is no return, no return to this cyclical existence there is needed this effort at realization.

Every pluralistic system has contended for the view that the things and selves in the universe are infinite in number. Vaiśeṣika as well as Sāṃkhya argue for infinite souls or puruṣas. What exactly does infinity mean? Is there any difference between numerical infinity and qualitative infinity? If so, what type of infinity applies to the souls? Do both avail? What type of infinity does the Supreme Brahman possess? These are important questions undoubtedly and interesting too.

Infinity means absence of finiteness or limitation. Limitation is of three kinds, limitations of space and time and distinctness or difference. All things occupy space and all things occupy some part of time. They are thus limited by time and place. Equally in so far as they are discrete and separate (*bhinna*) they are distinct from one another and therefore are capable of being counted or enumerated. These three limitations are thus available in regard to all created things.

Numerical infinity means that there are infinite number of discrete things. Infinite number means that they are countless or difficult to count. Thus the negative means only impossibility in so far as it applies to a finite self, not at all in the case of a self which could, and this Being is undoubtedly the Supreme Self of all. Though this assumption be on the basis of the scriptural texts it is yet valid. An all-knowing mind can comprehend all, and numerical infinity turns out to be a finity in regard to such a self.' "The proof of infinity rests altogether on the absence of limitation of space and time, not on account of the absence of substantial limitation: absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand, the whole world as constituting Brahman's body is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things."²

But this position is not what Rāmānuja is prepared to accept in regard to the relation between the Infinite and the finite. Brahman surely is at once beyond space and time limitations and also transcendent to all limitations in so far as He is a unique Being capable of pervading all. Things of nature are limited by space-time and distinctions, and as such they cannot occupy the same space at the same time. They are

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*. : II. 1. 15. Vol. II p. 33 (Ananda press ed.)

Anāntatvād ātmanānamuktāśca santīcitet-kimīdam anantatvam ? Asaṅkhyeyatvam-itīcenna, bhūyastvād alpajñair asaṅkhyeyatve'pīśvarasya sarvajñasya saṅkhyeyā eva...Anantatvam nāma-paricchedarahitavam.

2. *ibid.* p. 39. Anantyaprasiddhiśca deśakālaparicchedarahitavam-mātreṇa.

non-intelligent, and finiteness is their essential nature. Mustard seeds, beans, earthen pots and pieces of cloth are dependent upon their distinctions and are separate. Infinity is impossible where they are concerned. If numerical infinity is posited in the case of souls, then the matter takes on an entirely new aspect. Undoubtedly occupying space they are numerically many but not infinite. *Nānātva*, manyness, is not *anantatva*, infinity. The numerical manyness is thus a fact in regard to the individual souls. But this is not all about the individual souls. Whilst having distinctions in their very nature, there is a particular feature of the souls which makes it possible for each of them to be reckoned as an infinite or participating in the infinite. Infinity must be conceived in a different manner. It must be conceived as absence of all limitation. Substantial limitation is inescapable in regard to the souls. Is it the case with Brahman? The pluralists consider that this is involved, since the Brahman could be conceived to have these finites as its modes and yet be different from them. If He is different then there is limitation. It is impossible to think of Him as a numerical finite, one of the many. Thus we find that Rāmānuja is not prepared to accept the position developed by the dualist thinkers who speak about the substantial limitation of Brahman whilst yet granting Him a freedom from limitations of space and time. Transcendental in one sense, they find Him to be bound by this particular limitation. This obviously entails that Brahman exists as limited by the existence of other individuals and things. Taken along with the theory of plurality of separate existences, substantial limitation would lead to temporal and spatial limitations. All the selves and Brahman along with them would be limited by space and time, which would argue against all infinity.

Whilst therefore we find that the individual selves are really independent existences, if we hold them to be numerically many, we would be faced with the problem that they are not really infinite in number, and further that they are non-intelligent, since uniformity or number belongs to material differentiations. If on the other hand we define infinity to

consist in absence of all limitation it is found that the selves are really bound by the limitation of space and time and, therefore are not qualitatively infinite.

We find that the objects of this world must be really many and finite. We also find the selves or souls which are embodied are many and finite in number. Infinity for the selves can only mean the highest attainment of *qualitative* perfection. But does this qualitative perfection involve absence of all limitation? If it does, it impugns the very occupation of a body. No embodied being can ever be at once substantially limited and yet be perfect qualitatively. The absence of all limitations leads to absurdities. It may be absence of limitations due to space and time and material refractoriness that pertains to having a body, but could it also mean absence of all relations, since relations connect things and individuals and argues for dependence of one on the rest? But "absence of such (substantial) limitation is something akin to the 'horn of a hare', as the Brahmajñānavādin says, and is perceived no where."¹ Limitation is absolute and nothing is capable of existing without any limitations whatsoever. The individual selves are not infinite in the sense that they are numerically infinite but that they are substantially limited by their relation to the highest Brahman. But this substantial limitation is not of the same *kind* as limitation that occurs through space and time and nature.

No thing or soul is thus free from all limitations. Things are limited by space and time and substantial limitation: souls are also limited by substantial limitation. Thus both fall under the category of finite beings.

VI

Brahman, the true Infinite

Brahman is the only substance, the supreme subject who is free from all limitations including the substantial, or at least who surpasses the limitations from the stand-point of the qualitative transcendence. Transcendence over limitations

1 II. i. 15. p. 453 (Thibaut).

even of the substantial involves mastery over them, hence, not limitation at all. By this concept of transcendence enunciated very powerfully in the Upaniṣads Rāmānuja solves the difficulty that confronts the dualist who though he found himself in a position not dissimilar to Rāmānuja's was unable to solve the problem of substantial limitation, and accepted the position that Brahman too was subject to this substantial limitation. The relation that the things and souls bear to the Supreme Self is indeed a substantial relation of dependence, secondly they are objects occupied, governed and noticed and witnessed by the Supreme and fall within the category of elements that constitute the subject-object relation. But the subject-object relation is not all, though undoubtedly essential.

The only subject for whom all are objects at all times and therefore eternally is the Supreme Subject.

The importance of the meaning of the term infinity in regard to the numerically many is found therefore to lie in a very novel explanation. Infinity consists in having all the many in one vision and beholding them eternally in one's vision. This is possible only to the Highest.¹

There is however another meaning which is warranted by the Scriptures by the passages which shew that the supreme Brahman is unreachable by speech or mind : *yato vāco nivar-tante aprāpya manasā saha*.² This indeed is the meaning of the word *Anantam*, infinity. His truth and being and nature and form and qualities are transcendent and immeasurable in excellence and superior. From that Being our mind returns baffled and falls into a consciousness of its own finiteness.

Thus transcendence is the real definition of infinity. But this does not abjure the initial recognition of its measure-nature. It is immeasurable and this is transcendence. The transcendent does not refute the finite nor the limited, it contains all the limits within it and yet is afar. It is here and

1. cf Berkeley's *Siris*. cf. Leibniz's Theodicee.

2. Taittiriya (Ānandavalli.) VI. 1.

afar, near and distant. As the *Īśāvāsyopanīṣad* says : *tadejati tadu naijati taddūre tadvantike ! tadantarasya sarvasya tadu sarvasyāśya bāhyataḥ*. The finite cannot contain the infinite fully when considered from the standpoint of space and time and external relation, but when considered from the standpoint of spiritual pervasion it contains it. It is not a refutation of it, nor contradictory to it. It is within it as part and parcel of it. The element of transcendence it is that is all important, and it is this that makes the infinite the supreme subject of all experience. Reality is both subject and object and the infinite is composite of both. The doctrines that seek to reduce the subject to the level of the object or the object to the level of the subject are apparently doomed to failure. But this does not involve the giving up of the distinction in their status in regard to one another. The real is knowable, even the unknowable is merely the statement of transcendence and nothing more. This view is implicit in the doctrine of superiority of the subject when applied to the Supreme Being. The Supreme Lord possesses all objects as in their eternal nature in His ever-present vision. It is also true that He establishes all these in their real nature through years sempiternal. This is an important conception in so far as it shows that there is a fundamental distinction between the knowing and being in regard to Brahman the true Infinite, the transcendent, and the finite and subordinate. The contradictions and antinomies raised between the finite and the infinite, the infinite divisibility of the infinite or the composition of the infinite of the finites are all numerical devices which do not intimate but in fact impugn the integrity of the infinite. Brahman is the infinite, that is the transcendent. The transcendent is the subject, the supreme subject who establishes all things in their real nature from eternity.

V

Consciousness and its ideal nature

The ideal condition of consciousness is its unlimited nature. Consciousness itself is a function, which undergoes

contraction and expansion. In plants there is a widening of the scope of living as compared with metals and stones in which it is dormant and inconscient. As evolution moves forward the individual body lets consciousness function more and more or rather the consciousness within breaks through the material confines and organizes its own ways and means of knowing. Freedom is thus assured and is dependent upon the greater and higher perfection of consciousness which is the function of self. Perfection means the highest freedom of consciousness or conscious functioning of the self. The real is consciousness in the sense that whatever it reveals fully and intrinsically or illumines or whatever it grasps is real, *yathārtha*, because it is the real function of a real subject. "All cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects or cognitions and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Reality is of the nature of any object which is cognized by consciousness and things that are false are sublated by proofs which consciousness itself provides and reveals, failing which 'how it works' in practical application or conduct proves the presence of effects." Some of these cognitions "may rest on defects which are themselves real: others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defects." The distinction between false and true is not a distinction that should be brought in between the non-existent Absolute which is the Highest category of intellect and the existent world of practical conduct, nor between theoretical and practical, between which there need be no opposition, but between features which thought itself in its variant phases and expressions reveals. If the real is to be judged from the point of view of pure thought which does not fulfil action, then there is no doubt that we shall have only a splendid fiction, unknowable and beyond thought, Thought is in its very nature capable of infinite discrimination, *samkhya*, so that it finally defines things. Things of the outer world are patently enumerable having number and are finite. Notwithstanding their multiplicity, in their inner nature is revealed a supreme transcendence which is of the Real and the

Spiritual. It is this infinity that is within and over the finite of the numbers. But to convert the principles verifiable and functionally absolute in the realm of the outer into the principles of the inner and the unverifiable is to disrupt the integral diunity of the total.

The criticism that thought is not practical is meaningless, for it means to deny the expression or manifestation and power of intelligence as intelligence. Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is antagonistic to it but also of defining things, thus is rendering them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech."¹—*na hi virodha-nirāsana-mātram prakāśakatvam api tvārthaparicchadah.*—

VI

Thing-in-itself

The criticism that thought is not practical is meaningless because it denies the expression of intelligence as intelligence it is. This primal or principal distinction which Kant recognized very clearly was by Śankara denied. That it did issue from Knowledge he conceded, but that what it manifested, or resulted in was real was what he stoutly refuted. Such a radical theoreticism could only lead to mere phenomenalism and to solipsism. Even this is inadmissible because the Absolute is not a solipsist but an undifferenced *Consciousness* which is neither subject nor object and not even a thing-in-itself. To such an absolutely undifferenced *Consciousness* or intelligence not implying distinctions of subject or object, *svayamprakāśata* (self-illuminating power) cannot possibly belong.²

It may of course be argued that introspective vision will grant us the nature of the thing-in-itself whereas the exterior type of observation can only grant us an external view which despite its verifiability and objectivity can never give us the nature of a thing as it is established in itself. The importance

1. *Śrī Bhaṣya*. I. i. 1.

2. *Ibid.* II. i. 15.

of the concept of the *yathārtha*, the inner truth of existence of a thing as it is in itself and not to another consciousness is a very important fact that has to be explained only on the basis of the inwardness of the thing.

This process of introspective intuition is facilitated by the method of yogic intuition, or *samādhi*, and in that intuitive perception there is inward revelation of the nature of a thing as it is in itself. This is its essence which is always the subjective view of the thing not the object-view of the thing. Can any thing be known in the sense in which we use the term *know*, as it is in itself as subject and not object? Can this shift be achieved except by means of the abolition of the objective status of the object and by making it know itself through our subjectivity? If it could be known as even M. Bergson affirmed we could, then we shall know not in the sense of subject-object relation but by abolishing the object absolutely, and by being in rapport with the subject as an articulate self-existence as it is in itself; this would be supreme achievement of the seer and not the subject at all. Then we shall be able to say that Knowledge does not require a subject-object relation absolutely and under all conditions. An external knowing demands this relation, not the internal seizing of the essence through making the object the subject itself. The important question that arises at this point is whether in this subjectification, the object does, in fact, participate in the life and movement of the subject, or does the subject (namely, the person who subjectifies the object) lose himself in the object's subjectivity? Then, we are confronted with the problem of dual-subjectivity, between which it is difficult to find any identity. Thus the knowledge of a thing-in-itself is possible only to that thing itself and not to any other. When we reduce all objects to the nature of adjectives of the subject we do not arrive at the knowledge of the thing as it is in itself. But if we do reduce all the subjects (the so-reduced-objects) into one single spirit, then the problem gets simplified, and it is conceivable that we shall be in the presence of the One all-embracing Subject which shall know all as *they are in*

themselves, because they are in It. At any rate, the above way of reasoning makes the concept of the Subject sans-object, intelligible. It appears, then, that there is no other way except to accept the situation, as it is the only way by which we shall know *things as in themselves*, which is the intrinsic truth about them requiring no further confirmation. The object thus presents itself as having a subjective as well as an objective aspect. To deny either is to gain a fictitious truth. But as amongst the two, the more important is the thing-in-itself, which falls on the subject-side, and the knower has to identify himself with that part of the existence through intuition to gain access to it. The other aspect is freely gained through scientific observation, and requires the pragmatic test also. This is the *paratah-pramāṇa* necessary for gaining the truth of the external relationship of the object with other objects in a common universe. How these two have to get reconciled in the unity of knowledge is yet a deep and profound problem bringing in as it does, the problem of dual reality or appearance and reality,

There is only one way of escape, a way that has indeed been pointed out by the theologically inclined Berkeley, by the logical Bosanquet and others, and that is to treat the Absolute as the solipsist. To take refuge in Him or It and to console ourselves in its ability to grant us sufficient objectivity, and feel that the truthful Being will not deceive us. is our only alternative. So far as the individuals are concerned their knowledge as subjective experience is possible only through the Absolute, through which alone they could gain subjective thing-in-itselfness of the object. This is the seeing all things in the Supreme Divine, to see them all as having their self in the Divine. This is the possibility of seeing intimated by the pregnant words of the *Isāvāsyopaniṣad*: *Yāthā-tathya-to'rthān vyadadhāt śāśvatibhyaḥ samābhyaḥ*. (8).

Direct intuition is impossible. Only intuition through the Supreme Being or Absolute is capable of granting us the inward reality of all things, their *svarūpasthiti* and *svasmai-*

sthiti.¹ Equally it follows that our knowledge, true and right, of others or their minds, is possible only indirectly through the Absolute. This is obviously different from the perception of their bodies or their movements in space, growth etc, all of which yield only a pragmatic reality but not the thing-in-itself of the objects. It must in this connection be remarked that Rāmānuja has not touched the problem in this manner.² It is however necessary to insist on this two-fold manner of this cognition in order to show the importance of the diunity stressed by him in his doctrine of *śarīra-sarīri*-relation. The intrinsic thing-in-itselfness in Brahman is the essence, the is externality the outer *form* or manifestation of that essence to other modes on subjects. Both go together. And both are real.

VII

Diunity of Reality and Apprehension

Thus we find that the essential principle of explanation that needs must be understood in the Philosophy of Rāmānuja is this constant insistence on the two-fold unity or diunity of the nature of the thing. It is usual to find in this type of explanation the doctrine of identity *in* difference or identity *and* difference. But the theories of Bheda-abheda are by no means capable of answering the problems we have presented so far in regard to the intrinsic and external or

1. Prof. Laird has raised a very important discussion in his masterly Gifford Lectures "*Mind and Deity*" as to whether God knows the knowledges of souls as they reflexively know it for themselves. The infinity or Omniscience of God either includes or excludes this reflexive (*svasmai*) knowledge of the souls. If it excludes, His omniscience is not omniscient, if He knew it, they would not be souls. Even if they be souls and God knew their knowledges, a further question arises whether God knows this knowledge reflexively or otherwise. These are difficult questions to which no answer can be given except to a very limited extent.

2. What has been sketched above is a possible development of his thought. The whole concept of knowledge of a thing is dealt with from the relativistic position and not the subjectivist position. Śrī Rāmānuja takes up the subjectivist position only in so far as the liberation of the functional consciousness is concerned from its limitations due to *karma*.

objective nature of the self-same object. Bhāskara starts with a view that perilously lands it in self-contradictions. He states that the One Pure Intelligence or Consciousness distinguishes itself into subjects and objects which are real. That is, souls on the one hand and not-souls on the other are fragmentations from the Consciousness. Thus multiplicity is derived from the unity, which is precarious once we consider the meaning or manner of differentiation. It is said that the universal undifferentenced consciousness is stigmatised or else like the Fichtean '*Anstoss*' posits its other, which acts as the limiting element (*upādhi*), giving rise to the appearance of several subjects and several objects. Bhāskara who holds this view is refuted by Rāmānuja on the score of arguing for a double-aspect theory. There is no thing with two aspects. Bhāskara "makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea of discontinuance (distinction", but as a matter of fact there is no perception of these two elements in separation. Therefore the principle of Bhāskara's theory is grounded in false abstractionism.¹

Bhāskara contends that we are capable of distinguishing the difference and identity between dissimilar and similar characteristics in a thing when compared with another thing, and therefore we can clearly posit that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference belongs to the same thing viewed as effect and particular. This means that the two characteristic of difference and non-difference can be reconciled in one and the same thing. We find that the individual self, in so far as it has intelligence belongs to the genus, Brahman, and in so far as it is finite it is different from Brahman.² As against this view Rāmānuja holds that 'if difference belongs to the individual and non-difference to genus' this implies 'that there is no one thing with a double aspect'. On the contrary it means that there are two things which are conjoined together. "If you hold that the genus and the individual together constitute one thing, you abandon the view that it is

1. *Sri Bhāṣya*. I. i. 4.

2. *ibid.*, I. i. 4.

difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference."¹ Difference and non-difference thus cannot be predicated of genus and particular. The genus is merely a generic character which is not a real thing in the sense of an existent thing by itself apart from the particular, for it is arrived at by a process of abstraction. The individual is not a *manifestation* of the genus. For Bhāskara however to be a manifestation is to be identical with the genus. There is no difference except that the locus of its expression is difference.

But the individual is not a part of the genus since it has in itself its unique character of existence separately, which is exactly what the genus lacks in spite of its so-called universality and eternity. The individual is the Reality thing from which the concept of the genus ever arises. "The species is a form of the individual and does not manifest the individual." Bhāskara by making the genus the most important, by taking genus to be a real existent apart from or over and above the particular through which alone it has any plausible existence, has made the logical genus real, and the individual, the real imperfect manifestations of the Highest Reality or the genus. The identity or the genus-character is extensive and infinite (here consciousness is infinite), it is more than the difference which is the particular. The particular existences are perishable and fleeting. Therefore eternity is of the genus, and the perishing character belongs to the particulars only. Since therefore the genus is the identity, it is eternal and may be said to be the *svabhāvika* nature of a thing. The limited character is the perishable, character is *aupādhika* or contingent character of the genus itself as a thing. This equally applies to the intelligence which is seen as differentiated in the finite individuals having contracted intelligences. The intelligence is the eternal infinite, the finite is also intelligent but so made finite by limiting conditions of the bodies. The finites are as real as the Infinite but not as eternal.

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, I. i. 4.

In Śāṅkara's doctrine these differences are unreal, caused indeed as they are by ignorance and because they are perishing existences, or because they could be sublated: in Bhāskara's on the other hand, these difference are real, but not permanent. Already we find the recognition of the defect in the equation of the idealistic view namely that permanence is reality. Whether permanence is to be considered in the logical manner of non-self-contradiction or in the temporal sense of changelessness, it is clear the former is correct and acceptable to all whereas the latter is not. We may accept the former but not the latter criterion.

Regarding the multiplicity which is equivalent to differences, the unreality of the differences or *nānātva* is important in the doctrine of Śāṅkara. Equally so is it in the doctrine of Bhāskara. The nature of the conditioning agent is all that matters. Śāṅkara was more right in so far as he regarded the Consciousness of the Supreme as indivisible, and if we do indeed find differences it is due to the ignorance, the conditioning agency and not to the substance that we should look for the defect. For Bhāskara the absolute identity has the capacity of becoming many in the presence of the conditions or limitations. Consciousness can become personal, characterised by power to become or create or produce or diversify itself as the many. There are two tendencies which cut at the root of this philosophy. The one original consciousness is firstly revealed as the Absolute Identity having the power to become many selves. The one self becomes many selves in manifesting itself, though it is absolutely unconditionally real because it is its own nature. The many are limited manifestations which would lose their identity on becoming free from limitations. It is necessary to consider these limitations, *upādhis* as the power of self-determination or self-limitation for the sake of play or whatever purpose might be credited to that absolute consciousness. The crucial point in Bhāskara's theory consists however in his doctrine of Release. The formal character of Brahman becomes more and more pronounced and release seems to be the attainment of the full and complete formal perfection of

the genus by the individual. The platonic tendency thus is clearly traceable, becoming more and more patent when we consider the formal identity to be stressed more than the difference which can never find permanent footing in the lap of identity. Once the permanent footing is found, release is impossible if indeed it is not necessary, since it is by the will of God, the Absolute, that this permanent footing is being sought. Thus to manifest or not is not a matter for the striving of the individual at all. *Mokṣa* is not therefore explained. But what is really important in the analysis of the problem is his clear perception of the need to find a real relation of identity and difference between the many and the one. It is not release that should attract out attention in his philosophy because it is a hopelessly confused explanation that he gives, but only his rejection of the phenomenologists and illusionists. The individual is the essential part of the genus and is the condition *a priori* for the manifestation of the genus in actuality. In other words, the genus gets existence only under definite conditions of space and time and particularity apart from which it is only a conceptual abstraction, even then possessing a relation with a particular in the mind of the conceiver. The defect in his theory is that he could not but move towards the Absolute, and this was facilitated by his stressing the identity and the genus more than the particular and the reality of difference. He did not see that the annihilation of plurality would annihilate the identity. The double-aspect must be either a permanent feature of reality or else it cannot be a feature of reality at all. Multiplicity and unity or identity must be conceived either in an oppositional polarised manner or as integrally related to one another. To abolish them as terms at all by declaring their illusory nature or unreality character, or to abolish one of them whilst maintaining the status of the other, is to land oneself in fruitless contradictions. Bhāskara no less than Śaṅkara postponed the problem of unity and multiplicity. However it must be recognized that Bhāskara felt there was a way of resolving the problem. Rāmānuja it was who felt that an integral solution

was possible, and that required the abandonment of the prejudice of opposition between the unity and multiplicity. The way to seek it is to take examples of such unities that enfold or contain or manifest or express the multiplicity whilst yet remaining unities that they veritably are and will be. The relation must not only be real, it has to be integral, incapable of dissection into terms, that is to say the unity should exhibit the multiplicity and be itself the self and being of the multiplicity. In other words, it must be a unique or significant unity, the pattern of the unity that is exhibited on all planes of reality. Then it would be the principle which will explain all relations that manifest unity or multiplicity. That all relations cannot be reduced to this one pattern must be accepted, but there is no the reason to think that this one should not be a special relation. This type of relation is universal in the sense of being available wherever there are permanent types of relations called specially *aprathaksiddha*, inseparable or organic. This is the type that is most manifest and useful in our conduct and existence. All other types of relations are distinct but subordinate to this type of relation.

The cognitive relation is not an interminable relation. Nonetheless it displays the specific quality of a dependent relation. The subject is superior to the object in one sense and in another sense it is the subject that is inferior to the object. This kind of dual position as clearly found in the experience of Beauty is such that it precludes the possibility of making the finite individual superior to the object at all times. Creative power of the subject might make the individual superior to his creations, the adaptive powers of man might make him the knower and adapter and inventor of new things. but the apprehension of Natural beauty enforces the attention and subordination and wonder and awe of the individual in its presence.¹ Thus it follows that the secret of Unity is not to be conceived in any other way except through the perception of the relationship of permanent organic coexistence.

1. cf. *Collingwood's Theory of Beauty*: K. C. Varadachari. Indian Philosophical Quarterly Oct. 1940.

IX

Organic Unity

Rāmānuja finds that the unity which can hold multiplicity within itself must be significant, enfolding the multiplicity in a unique manner. Further the problem is one of dynamic multiplicity, a multiplicity that is growing, is full of contingent relations, in one word is one of ever increasing and renewing activity. In order to find in this growth and development and change, process and progress, it is imperative to conceive this unity in a special way. It is impossible to conceive it as a mechanical one or a material one. As progress and evolution cannot be registered in them, we have to find out whether this is possible in a spiritual unity of *love* that is most logically explainable as organic coexistence.

All unity is not material or external unity. Indeed it is found that the best unity that we have in external unity is the chemical compound within which the individual terms or substances undergo a thorough change and are unrecognizable. Disintegration brings them out of their transformation and makes them unique entities. Further arrangement between the terms is also important and this could not also be disturbed without shattering their individual natures as such. Not so the unity of an organism. The disintegration of the organism leaves us undoubtedly in the same state as in the case of compounds but the fact of development and reaction to stimuli are not features of the compounds. They specifically belong to the organism, which is a growing unity, not a unity that comes into existence after and out of independent elements, but a unity that reveals at once a self-sustaining oneness through all the diversity of organisations.

The way our knowledge coheres with other items of cognition reveals a unity, a mental one, between all experiences. The way our food and other objects inhere and sustain the unity of the organism reveals physiological equivalence to it. The way all the organs of the body maintain and sustain a dependence on the life-purpose whatever this may connote

in terms of human interests, such as *artha*, wealth, *kāma*, needs, and *mokṣa*, freedom from limitations of ignorance, reveals the unity of the multiplicity that can never be surrendered. At times the multiplicity might be more pronounced than the unity, and this tendency is the visible sign of change. A growing multiplicity or multiplicity that is constantly in movement is the World of Nature which contains both the souls and things. The souls or selves are also changing in the sense of undergoing changes in their consciousness-function though not in their substantial nature as knowers. The fixing of the individual self to a significant connection or relation is never possible to the growing individual who has to thrust forward and upward towards the highest aim. Not only is this possibility of connection between God and the individual one of constant alternation into several poses (and these are as many as there are fundamental human aspirations), but these several relations equally apply to every other relation between the several individuals themselves.

Absolute Unity must yet be a flexible unity that grants freedom or play to these fundamental human relations. And the most fundamental is that of love and sympathy or Grace. The Bhāgavata-mārga, which is that of Bhakti is one of utter dependence on this one type of relationship that manifests itself as the typical centre of all other types of *rasas*. Change that is characteristic of the world of matter, partial change which is characteristic of souls (of one type at least such as the bond), and non-change in either sense of the eternal and the Supreme Being who is the Lord of Change and Unchange, all these require a demonstrable unity which is at once integral and flexible. Rāmānuja approaches the conception of the Absolute through this triplicity of entities.

The unifying principle must be a concrete spiritual Being not merely consciousness or a generic Universal or concept or idea. It must be a person who persists in subordinating all the multiplicity to his will and pleasure and ordains its conduct. Whilst himself being permanent he should pervade all through

his will and omniscience. In other words, the multiplicity is in one sense and that in the fundamental sense servile to the Unity, through which alone it lives and moves and grows and gains perfection. To say that this is an eternal pervasion and indwellingness means that this relationship is absolute. The unity is signified by the absolute Lordship of the Supreme Being. The multiplicity of real existences which are the several selves and things must be embraced within this single substance or Being or Person, wherefore He is called *Puruṣottama*.

The argument for a single self alone is disposed of since multiplicity can not but be. Such a theory could only dispose of all multiplicity. Nor can the conditioning theory through *avidyā* or *māyā* explain the real multiplicity. The theory of degrees of reality abolishes all attempts at reconciling the reality of effort and attainment with the absolute identity or Oneness of Perfect Deity.

Rāmānuja affirms that the inequalities are inexplicable without real multiplicity, strongly recalling the views of Sāṃkhya. Release would be purposeless if it is merely a refunding into Brahman's homogeneous nature or into the causal substance. It is impossible to conceive freedom as uniformity or homogeneity, since it is particularly the function of uniqueness and difference, and in the highest sense is the attainment of freedom from all limitations of this uniqueness of being. Multiplicity accordingly requires for its fullest expression freedom, and true freedom is fully realized in the attainment of freedom from all limitations. So does Kāśakṛtsna¹ hold that the individuals can only be Brahman's bodies since in spite of attaining equality Brahman abides in them. The immensity of Brahman and the immortal freedom of Brahman are essentially the *differentiæ* between it and the individual souls. Brahman is infinite, in nature as well as in consciousness-function; the individuals on the contrary are finite in their substantiality and limited in their consciousness-functions only during their evolutionary

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*, I, iv. 22.

or bondage periods. The selves retain their distinctions even after abandoning their bodies, but they are all the same prevailed by Brahman. A merger cannot take place, since that involves the conclusion that limitation is unreal or transitory, which means that true multiplicity in unity cannot be sustained. Nor is it possible to hold that Pure Intelligence such as that of the Perfect Being could in any sense be obscured or hidden by *Māyā*. Brahman abides in the souls, the unity is the soul of multiplicity and continues to be so for ever, in darkness as well as in light. All the difference is what is made in respect of the individual souls themselves, whether they know Him (or it) or not know. The Infinite resides in the finite and is their strength, but they do not compose it or make it up. The doctrine of *Bhedābheda* narrowly misses the conclusion of compositeness by its theory of dual aspects. The Unity is non-disintegrative non-disjunctive, is indivisible and its wholeness cannot bear even surrender to multiplicity of finites. The organic unity is made possible by the principle of controlling indwellingness or pervasive power of God involving a capacity to actually indwell in each in certain ways such as have been asserted by the *Antaryāmi* theory of the *Vedānta* and *Pāñcarātra*.¹ Brahman thus is the indwelling person in the several individuals composing or constituting the multiplicity and forms with them an organic Unity, each of which apart from the Highest and the others can only be an abstraction.

Rāmānuja points out that the principle on which we accept Identity is quite valid as it is true to say that the Knowledge of the One leads to the knowledge of all, but the One here is not any piece of stone, or Tennyson's 'flower on the crannied wall', or an individual soul, but the Divine Person, the Supreme Brahman who is the One who has no compeer, who is the source and spring and life of all, who is the controller, destiner and goal of all things. When we refer to even a finite soul or thing, the reference is not to any

1. *Sri Bhāṣya* I, ii, 11, 19-21.

one thing of the several things composing the multiplicity but to the One Person who is the significant self of all of them. The Tennysonian touch, in which Bosanquet revels, is available because it means that the Real is the whole and that the part only represents a unique permanent locus of the whole. The part reveals its own fragmentary character, that is to say, its dependence on the larger and vaster Intelligence is indicated to its consciousness all through.

The Absolute Unity depends upon absolute knowledge of all, and is available to a mind which is in some measure capable of infinite apprehension or direct intuition. That is to say the singleness of Unity is perceived only when there is completest identification with its multiplicity, by a process of infinite condensation of perceived data. This is the unity that overflows and lives through the multiplicity. The two are different even in kind, and that is the reason why the multiplicity is incapable of abolishing the unity not to speak of its living in and through it, and why the unity is incapable being true without a recognition of its inevitable association with the multiplicity. The individual souls or subjects which are substantial existences are also adjectivally related to the Supreme God, without their substantiality being impaired or reduced or sublated. *Love* or *Sneha* is the principle expressed as the relation of Unity *viśiṣṭaikya*.

XI

Summary

Summarising we find that true unity cannot be a generic character or a pure being which is the highest essence or abstraction, though it is said to be consciousness or awareness or the subject-aspect of the cognitive relation. The subjective consciousness is said to be not an individual consciousness but a vastly enhanced and extensive universal consciousness which is the static basis of all activity, mutations and multiplicity. The concept of such a base is no better, if not considerably worse, than the matter of scientists, which is

the matrix of all stimulations of senses but which could never be known at all through the senses.

The subject unifies his experiences, just as his sense-organs and the brain condense infinite number of small stimuli affecting the sense-organs into qualified objects. The subject is the synthesizer of all these sensations into the unity of the concept. This is also if we may repeat the expression, condensation of sensations. He is also the performer of the actions stimulated by the sensations and concepts. The subject in cognition is alert and vigilant. All Philosophies which concede the epistemological situation as important and seek to affirm the view that knowledge it is that liberates an individual from his ignorance can, despite all other theories of release and metaphysical statements of the relationships which manifest themselves as genus-particular, substance-attribute, cause-effect, infinite-finite, unmanifest-manifest, affirm the uniqueness of the subject-object relation or the cognitive relation. It is this that reveals itself also as the psychological relationship of body and soul, as also as the relation of knowledge with other objects and minds and the Supreme Self also. Thus in this context of Cognitive Relation should the problems of Substance and Attribute, Infinite and Finite, Unity and Multiplicity be considered. Though materialistic phraseology is not always wrong, psychological or spiritual phraseology is the more apt and capable of granting a better and fuller representation.

CHAPTER VI

BRAHMAN—THE HIGHEST UNITY

I

From a study of the problem of unity we find that if ever a real and concrete unity is to be realized, it must be a real unity of concrete character or of concrete possibility, a Person who integrally sustains and manifests multiplicity of things and natures. That this unity is affirmed by the metaphysicians of the type of Śankara and Bhāskara in a being devoid of all character is what we have seen from the foregoing. The most abstract truth must find exemplification in the most concrete occasion of existence. The truth of the abstract lies in its infinite capacity to be concrete. That is why the Supreme and most transcendent Brahman, the Infinite, has complete powers of manifesting itself in the present conditions. Śankara does not allow any concrete nature to the transcendent and noumenal Being which is real but too real to exist under the conditions of Māyā, though it has the supreme power of being the *ālambana*, ground of all the illusions. Bhāskara grants a Being which is concrete in so far as it is said to possess qualities, *saguṇa*, but not in the sense of Spinoza's modal and attributive qualifications or possessing concrete nature of extension and thought, but purely in the sense, that it has the power to involve itself in differentiation through self-limitation. But no sooner than he grants this power to proliferate he says this is a limitation which is temporary, and which in fact must be got rid of by the seeker. By his theory of identity and difference he frustrates the spiritual characteristic of significant infinity and makes it merely a generic infinity.¹ Though Bhāskara thinks that his Being has essential intrinsic, *svābhāvika*, characteristics of

1. cf. *Philosophy of Bhedābheda*: P. N. Srinivasachari. M.A.,

power and perfection, he makes it at the same time an Idea "beating its ineffectual wings in the void" or a grand 'Samsāri'.

The Highest Unity must be a substance or Person as such and not an idea or mere formal unity. It must be conceived as an organic unity and not a mere conglomeration or compound. The relations in the organic unity are an ordered unity of relations and whilst the relations are not all of the same kind nor the *relata* of the same kind, the unity realized as between all these divers kinds is one of the most concrete manifestations of the ideal of Unity. Rāmānuja holds that the notion of unity can never belong to any thing except to the Spirit or Person which is not merely the material cause but also the operative cause of the continuing unity of organic existence. It is that alone which organizes unity in purpose, in works, in cognition, in enjoyment and in freedom. A material being like *prakṛti* can never organize, much less sustain the unity of its vital life.¹

The unity of subject and object is also expressed in terms of soul and body. The unity of subject or spirit in all activities is a positive evidence of the continuity of the self, despite the fact that its several ideas and perceptions and cognitions have a fluxional nature. It is in mind or self that all experiences of objects and ideas find their solution or integration and solace. The subject absorbs the object in one sense and understands it, and the more the absorption of the one in the other happens there is realization of the depths of the subject and object which now present a unity of experience. But this possibility is available not in mere sensation nor yet in mere comparison or inference, but in intuitional experience of reception of one another. Mutual reception is possible only when there is utter sympathy not mergence, *prema* not *nirvāṇa*.

But what it really means is, that the subject must not stand over against the objects as something to be subjugated

1. *Sri Bhāṣya*. II. 2. 3, ff.

and ordered but as something to be understood as it is *in itself*, and truly this is impossible if the object were to be treated as only a phenomenal existence. The subject himself in introspection fails to discover himself as he is *in himself*, thus all the troubles we have taken appear futile. But when we find that this definition of Self or subject really and absolutely applies to the Supreme Being alone and that that alone is the Subject and Unity as it is in Himself, we will be enabled to affirm that in His case there does not happen the difficulty of conceiving this Unity of the Organism.

The self as subject holds the multiplicity of its experience in its unity. The organism contains the multiplicity of its being. The subject expands its activities as more and more objects are brought within its circle of experience, equally the organism as constituted grows and increases in its dimensions through its various activities of absorption of alien bodies suited indeed to its needs of growth and survival. The self, as we find it, is a real agent of all activity. Consciousness is the function of this self, and in all attitudes it exists as its all-abiding function.¹ Empirical evidence points to the existence of a number of selves and their existence seems to be necessitated logically also as proved by the theories of Sāṃkhya and Nyāya, and Rāmānuja does not feel it necessary to refute the reality of these existences. On the contrary the individuality of each of these is guaranteed, as unique and intrinsic, and impossible of identification with other units or individuals. They are distinguished by their bodies which are different, belonging as they do to any class, genus or species, caste or state.² "There is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience."³

Nor is this uniqueness capable of being dissolved into the Unity of the One Intelligence, since such efforts thwart

1. *Sri Bhāṣya* II. iii. 29, 30, 33-34.

2. *Sri Bhāṣya* II. iii. 48. "Asantateścāvratikarah".

3. *Brahmāṃsatvādināikarūpatve satyapi jīvanām anyonyabhedād apu-
tvena pratiśarīram bhinnatvācca bhoga-vyatikaro'pi na bhavati.*

the existence of Intelligence itself. Apparent or real, the doctrine of deluding limitation, *upādhi*, is self-contradictory.¹

The individual selves are not all-pervading but pervade only their bodies. It is true that their sizes are not variable according to the sizes of the bodies they occupy, as in the Jaina doctrine, but they pervade through power, even as the rays of light pervade the room which they occupy even though their source is limited to one place. In the case of the individual souls the place they are limited to and from which they exercise their powers is said to be the heart. Thus the individual selves are finite in their pervasive action, since they cannot extend beyond their bodies for direction or action : their finitude is still further affirmed by their characteristic locus in the life of the Divine,² or if we may use a modern word, the perspective. Since this perspective which is unique and impossible of destruction or alienation is only a point, the individual as spirit must be conceived as atomic, or rather, as a unit without parts, or a unity without parts (*sic*), not in the physical sense but purely in the sense of a spiritual significant unity of direction and action and locus of the Divine All-Spirit. The number of these points are many, even uncountable by the individuals, but finite. Thus the individual souls are finite in quantity or number, finite in pervasive capacity, though they may, through the grace of the All-Spirit, enlarge their knowledge-pervasion to the limits of Divine Knowledge, and finite in their initial limitation of action due to the need for doing creational duty. Rāmānuja of course points out that this last limitation does not include the freed and the eternally free souls, who have no creational duties like the gods. Brahmā, Rudra and others, whom he considers to be bound to do the duty of creation etc. *karma-vaśyas*.

The second consideration to which the former leads is, if the individuals are such absolutely eternal entities, and

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya* (II. iii, 49.) Akhandaikarasa-prakāśamātra-svarūpasya svarūpa-tirodhāna-pūrvakopādhibhedopapādana-hetur-ābhāsa eva. Prakāśaika-svarūpasya prakāśa-tirodhānam prakāśa-nāśa eva.

2. *Svadharmā*.

subjects of experience, being spiritual in nature possessing cognitive activity, what must the nature of reality be which they perceive from their own unique points of view? Should it not be identical for all? This means that there must be one identical object for all individuals.

In the Philosophy of Nature we usually see this objective identity to rest in matter. This is the sensuous realm of our experience which despite the differences registered in individual experiences, forms the one identity of universe in which we do our work and strive to realise ends and purposes. This indeed is eternal in the sense that it is something into which we came in the particular form we have and have to accept it as having been existent from primordial time. But we have also seen that this changing universe is altering every instant though constant in its continuous nature as the cause of our sensations and as the field of our activities. It is true also that our consciousness is not able to penetrate into its inner nature through the senses, and is tempted to deny its reality, because it finds that according to its own canons it is pointing to an ordering Person and governing intelligence not perceivable in it as such. This sense-objectivity or externality is common to all thinking minds. The denial of the external reality of sensuous objects has resulted in positing all the properties that have been found in the object itself in the inner reality of the self. The positing has been facilitated by the phenomena of memory and creative constructive ability belonging to conscious person as such. Thus solipsism came into existence as a reaction, intellectual at first undoubtedly, against the sensuous erraticism of Nature. But no sooner than this inner objectivity of self-positing imaginative constructions of objects is accepted, despite the fact that without any prior cognitions through senses no imaginative constructions are possible, then the need for discovering the basis for the reality of the identical universe for all beings becomes imperative and urgent. This identity can then be established in two ways. Firstly, we can affirm that since the laws of thought are identical to all intelligences, the constructions

made by individuals independently will *ipso facto* be identical. Thus there will be constructed through out only one universe of reason though the constructions may indeed be many. We will thus be presented with similar and almost identical schemes of universe constructed through the efforts of the most pure creative thought. The diversity of the universes then will only be numerical but not logical. The differences registered in these universes must then be referred to the practical purity of the constructing intelligences and not to the Intelligence itself. The second view is, that all these intelligences are One only and the real Objectivity of the Universe lies in this Oneness of intelligence rather than in the supposed *anstossed* oneness of the material universes of sense. In either case the Oneness of Intelligence is the truth of the objectivity and not the multitudinous individual selves nor yet the sense-world of diverse objects. The second view achieves both the abolition of the sense-world and the manyness of the individuals at one stroke and thus is a more radical doctrine than the former. But looked at carefully the first view also is capable of being logically reduced to the second by the application of the principle of indistinguishability.¹

But this purely rationalized account of the objectivity cannot explain the actual dual objectivity experienced by the individual in regard to the life he leads. The objectivity of the sense-world, in general nature, is the externality, or otherness, restrictive of the individual's movement and life, conditioning him to time, space, life and death-perils.

The objectivity that the solipsist seeks to instal is the inner creative constructive logical universal spirit which is transcendent to his own finite limited logical, private, reiterative, reproductive activity. This Objectivity is the principle of Spirit which we have to discover in our inner Being as the Lord and self of our own selves, the Infinite which sustains the finite natures, the Ruler Immortal ruling and leading the feeble and dependent existences to His own Mansions of Light and

1. Leibniz's principle of *Identity of Indiscernables*.

Life and Glory imperishable. This too is the truth of existence, this too the goal to which all creation moves. But the objectivity of this Spirit is indeed different in *kind* from the objectivity of the Nature that we apprehend through our senses. The two are true. Whilst the material world which is objective is a principle of externality, the inner transcendent Spirit is objective but is a principle which includes us in itself and thus is not an *other* in the sense of the former.

The real objectivity which every individual grants to sense-perception is to be taken as fundamental to the question of existence of objects without our minds or individual beings, and in that sense common to all minds. The characteristics of colour and sound, touch and taste, and smell are refunded to Matter (the primordial principle) by Sāmkhya, though in a real sense they are responses made by the sensible (sātvic) cognitive quality of the sense organs to the vital or motional and gross and obstructive qualities of the elements of light, air, ether, water and earth. The conscious embodied being perceives everything through his consciousness in five ways and his experience is characterised by the objectivity revealed by the sensations. Even in the highest Yogic consciousness which is held to be due to over-wrought imagination the object appears in one of these five ways and cannot altogether annihilate the object. To say that these colours and other sensations are impediments to complete knowing or pure knowing is to declare firstly, that matter as such is unknowable, and secondly that matter is an obstruction to knowing in its capacity as the body of the psychological subject. To bring in the representationalist theory of knowledge is to drift into the view that knowledge is knowledge of mental states, that is of our responses alone, and therefore it is an affirmation of the impossibility of knowledge of any outer thing, and that finally leads to the denial of all existence. To claim that intelligence is capable of manifesting creative-activity which has got sensorial character as in hallucinations and the rest, is to give the case away, because nothing is created by the individual except what he has once observed or experienced. Surrealism

is not realism. The individual gives unity to these impressions in so far as his own reaction is concerned, for it is the business of an efficient consciousness to apprehend the real in its own uniqueness and unity, which is diversified and received in a five fold manner by the senses. As such the function of the mind in perception apparently is to integrate the disintegrated sensations. This is helpful in one sense to the activity of the individual as he can contemplate the difference in the object by individuated reception, but the whole object cannot but be apprehended as the unity that it essentially is. This perception of its unity through the integration of its own sensations in the order of existence is the activity which leaves abundant scope for illusory superimpositions. Thus whilst the senses might not be normally wrong, and the perception thus essentially true, the *kalpana*, the interpretation of the individual features received through senses makes error. All creativity of the individual is only a recreation of the object in new symbolic forms. Thus also is made possible the infinite capacity for the forms of nature to stand in symbolic relations with profoundest psychological truths or truths of spirit.

Matter or the matrix of objective sense-data is to be admitted. This matter is not identical with the scientist's matter which is said to be the substrate of all things but which can never enter into experience. Of course modern theories of matter are nebulous. To convert the impenetrable substance into mere waves of radiant character is not a success for the idealist with his hopes hitched on the materiality of Spirit or immateriality of matter. Sāmkhyān *Prakṛti* is the principle of objective experience of matter and it is the completest account of the psycho-physics of objectivity. The self is that which perceives it directly without the medium of senseorgans which indeed come into existence only after it has been known. In some sense the direct perception of the object is fundamental to the process of evolution of matter itself. It appears correctly as the basis of activity, for *Prakṛti* means the beginning of activity. The *Mahat*, or objective intellect is itself

the first-fruit of the practical tendency. The egoistic self-affirmation of independent existence (as distinct from its status as dependent-on-the-Supreme Spirit which is its *svarūpa*, intrinsic nature or quality), is also the second fruit. The cognition of objects for the purpose of instinctive grasping and possession, implicit in the egoistic self-assertion which seeks to sway and rule and grow mighty—God Almighty one might even say,¹—and the *citta* or *manas* functions as the nucleus of this integration of knowledge in the interest of practical grasping *kāmya-karma*. The senses also diversify themselves in the interests of selection of objects in this same manner. The functions of knowledge or cognition are secondary in this evolution and growth and manifestation. That is why it is affirmed that it is impossible to utilize these instruments of action, though at least some of these, are called *jñānendriyas*, organs of cognition.

II

Brahman, the Śarīrī.

We do not find consciousness anywhere else than in a body, though this consciousness be the most limited or most expanded as in the case of the human or the *avatāra*, the descents of the Lord as witnessed to in all religious literature, be it Buddhist or Hindu or the Christian. It is *in* a body, at least as the locus or occasion, that the consciousness ever manifests or is active either in recipience or creation. The self is aware of its own body *directly*, introspectively, as dependent on its own self for its existence, action, enjoyment as a body amongst other objects. Thus an objective and a subjective relationship are available in respect of one's own

1. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita it is not ignorance that is our difficulty but the Ignorance that we are independent that is the source of all our miseries. *Svatantrātma-bhrama* is the foundation of all other kinds of illusion. Once this is reversed, the instruments of action or even pseudo-action and cognition undergo a transformation and become implements of knowledge and not of selfish action. It is this reversal of the first causal ignorance that is absolutely necessary and is the greatest sacrifice. cf Appendix on *Dehātma-bhrama*.

body. The individual is capable of creating certain things, of having certain transactions with the physical world according to the ability of its body. But we find that it is very little and so trifling, that it can never explain how we can ever consider the entire reality or physical world which is a space-time configuration (continuum) to have a subject who can hold it as its object. Nothing in this world has value apart from being an object of some mind (subject). In fact, we are considering a question of metaphysical value when we put the question in the same manner as Berkeley did, that it is inconceivable how anything could exist unperceived? But with a difference that anything that can be known must be capable of being an object to a mind, subjectively or objectively or subjectively-objectively, as *śarīra-śarīri*. Since the total world of physical reality can never be apprehended fully but only partially by the several selves which are finite, it raises the question of a Mind or Self which can be the Absolute Subject of the totality of the objects. We have already said that to the real Infinite,¹ the manifold universe or multiplicity is a finite number capable of being apprehended by it. The antinomy between finite and Infinite is possible only as between the terms conceived as quantitative, and not when the Infinite bears other qualities which are definitely distinguishing It from the finite.

Further the necessity for the existence of the Infinite Spirit is necessitated by the fact of the independence of ideas and objects which cannot be created by the individual souls at all. It is one of the convictions of Śrī Rāmānuja that consciousness of the finites in their stage of ignorant beings or bound souls, cannot create anything as their power of true creation is almost nil. Thus dreams too are not the creations of the individual souls. They are the results of the karma-fruits of the individuals dispensed by the Lord, who is the Lord of all Karma, *karmādhyākṣa*. Thus the subjectivity of the ideas even cannot be claimed by them, whilst they them-

1 cf. chapter V. Sec. 3.

selves will be capable of asserting that all ideas and things are objective but only in a relative degree. Thus whilst the subjective idealist, conscious of his or oblivious of his limitations asserts that all things are relatively subjective, the realist will assert that in view of the independence of the objects and the consciousness of the limitation on the part of the souls, there is only objectivity. Mental states are as much objective as the objects of the outer universe are, since they appear to be independent of the individual's wishes. This is a truth which Sāṃkhya philosophy and Yoga have most clearly shown. To seek the aid of the Supreme Spirit to resolve the pathetic dilemma of the solipsist is not a new one. It has been always the refuge of great epistemologists. Berkeley affirmed the existence of the Supreme Mind or Spirit or God as the necessary being who alone can vouchsafe the objective independence of objects which he with ruthless analysis had deprived them of. The consolation was that they existed in the Mind, and that did keep up the pretence of logicity even when logic was overthrown. Creativity of all things is possible only to the Divine. But does creativity entail the existence of these creations in and through the Mind, or can it also mean the dependent existence of all things, apparently held to be independent, on the Supreme Self?

Rāmānuja at first view, like every theist, may be said to hold views somewhat like Berkeley, without his solipsism, but on closer inspection we find that he is not prepared to make *Prakṛti*, the matrix of the physical world, a creation of God, though he is anxious to make it not independent of God but absolutely dependent on God. It is that which he has established as real and remains real from years sempiternal. The creationistic view is many times an interesting view in so far as it seems to assure us with a monistic view. Then everything becomes the stuff of God's will, perhaps an emanation of the self-same Being, but it can never explain how Matter, the substance of Nature, the inert substance can ever come into existence out of Spirit. It is one thing to say that unintelligence comes out

of Intelligence, quite another to say that Intelligence controls and sustains and enjoys the unintelligent. If this latter relationship is realized in a permanent manner, than the changes in Matter can occur easily under the control of the intelligent Self. Then creation will mean nothing more than bringing about willed changes, forms of beauty and delight, in the material foundation of *Prakṛti* which is utterly dependent on the Supreme Brahman. Thus creation cannot mean the creation out of nothing or creation from His own Being, but the purposive bringing about of changes in Matter which is His *body*. The purpose is not something like the desire to gain or achieve anything that He lacks, but to enjoy delight of manifestation of Grace towards the souls which too are His *body*. It is for the pure enjoyment of self-delight that the Supreme Lord wills the changes and manifestations. Thus Matter is not created, nor are the souls created¹ but the processes of creation as well as destruction² are willed by the Divine Lord. The Lord then is the indwelling Self of all phenomena in so far as He it is who wills all the changes of creation or birth and death as also persistence. Without dependence on Him nothing can exist, can ever be.

Thus Śrī Rāmānuja perceives that the true interrelation between uncreated things, namely the finites which are distinct in kind from the Divine, though they possess some likenesses like intelligence etc., and the uncreated Matter which is distinct and capable of changes in form as well as in nature, the unmanifest *avyakta*, is fundamentally one of *functional* dependence on the Supreme Spirit. What is this dependence? It is not primarily a causal dependence but one of organic type. It is not like the ground and consequent relationship, nor is it capable of being likened to the substance and quality even in the sense of rose-colour bearing an inseparable relation to the flower-rose. It is not a *samavāya* relationship. This is of the organic type. The terms are apparently of the most distinctive kinds. Yet they are united, and united in some peculiar

1. Śrī Bhāṣya: II. ii. 39 *Utpattayasambhavāt*.

2. Śrī Bhāṣya: I. i. 2. *Janmādyasya yataḥ*.

relation of dependence on the Supreme Mind or Personality. It is a personality because it not only supports, it controls and enjoys them for its own supreme purposes.¹ This is what we know to be the characteristic relation of a body to the soul. But the relationship between the souls and their bodies is not so simple as all that, since our souls are not absolutely masters of their own bodies, and secondly, the death of the body should mean the death of the soul also if inseparability be affirmed between the body and the soul. This difficulty is serious. But as can be seen it is not necessary and it is not conceded by Rāmanuja that the bodies we have are ours absolutely. It is yet on the analogy of the body to the soul, that the organic relationship of dependence is being sought to be affirmed. God alone is the absolute Self of all, who supports all forms of Matter, its unmanifest nature and its mutable existences, for He it is who destines their changes and transformations and as such is their master. The individual souls tenant bodies and are limited by them and on these bodies ceasing, the souls have to wander in search of others determined by their previous *karmas*. Dependent existences cannot determine their own future or their existence. The finite souls though possessed of knowledge-activity are not capable of fullest power so long as they are bound to their own karma, and ignorance. The purest body that one can get will be that which comes after strenuous askesis of *jñāna*, karma and *Bhakti*. That even is given up for the super-material, *śuddha-sattva* body which results on liberation and physical death (*videha-mukti*).² It is just possible then for the individual souls to be lords of their bodies, but then they

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya*: Yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam, yaccheṣataikasvarūpam ca tat tasya śarīram.

2. The evolution of the soul to its fullest *sāmya* with the Brāhman can be likened to the progress of the caterpillar through its cryscales (pupa) state to its Butterfly career. The *jīva* is bound in the first state for it is a unidimensional material creature, and in the second stage it arrives at the state of yoga or *śamādhi*. After bursting out of this self-constructed self-denying Shell, the *jīva* arrives at the state of freedom. Thus *Videhamukti* has an analogy in biology. This it may be remarked is more true biologically than the *Bhramara-Kīṭa-Nyāya*.

themselves would have realized that they are bodies of the Lord, in the significant sense of dependence, entire and complete, that there is no occasion to claim their super-material body even as theirs.

From these it follows that since the relationship between the body and the self is not of the *samavāya*-type of the Naiyāyikas, but is a unique relationship of dependence that does not annul the dependent but sustains it, Rāmānuja's *aprathaksiddha śarīra-sarīri*-relation is of great importance as at once retaining the Unity of the three as well as affirming the distinctivs features of each of the three. It is in the human organism that we for the first time come across the consciousness of the ownership of the body, and the enjoyability of the universe and also the independence-notion of the individual. It is in this same manner that we are forced to realize that this body is not ours, that we are not our own, that both the body as well as ourselves are dependent on the Supreme Lord, who enjoys and supports and orders it and us. That this interpretation of the relationship between the individuals and matter and God is of greatest importance to Philosophic understanding need not be gainsaid. The unity herein brought into existence between the Divine and the human is of the essence of religious consciousness, and the mastery over Nature by God shows that this unity is also of the same order of dependence.

III

Brahman, a Person

The subject of knowledge is a personality. More so when the subject is the Supreme Infinite Being, and not less so as some contend. Further as we have shown this Supreme Infinite Being has the world and the souls as His bodies or rather body, and thus in one sense contains them within Himself and in another sense is their support indwelling in them through His pervasive power and lordship.¹ They cannot support the Lord, on the contrary they are supported by the

1. *Isa. Up.* I

Lord. The individuals selves are in one sense objects of the Supreme Subject, who is the perceiver of all things in the world through His supreme sustaining vision. We have no reason to think that these selves (which are objects dependent on the Supreme Lord) would become unconscious entities like the physical objects, an objection that the *māyā-vāda* brings forward by its proposition that to be an object is to be a material unconscious entity. But Rāmānuja says "We do not apprehend other selves as unconscious," nor is "the proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object tenable."² *na cānyaviṣayatve'nanubhūtitvam* Further, according to Common Sense, when we are speaking to each other, have what is called intersubjective intercourse, we do not treat others as mere objects subserving certain ends which do not belong to them or lie within them. All intercourse is possible only on one consideration, that the person to whom we are speaking is one who is as much an intelligent subject apprehending meaning of what we are speaking. We do not start with animism and later relinquish it as some thinkers might seek to make it appear, On the contrary, there is undoubtedly an effort and a natural one at that, to distinguish between the sensible and conscient and the non-conscient and to deal with them in two different ways, errors notwithstanding. We cannot allow the contention that consciousness by itself becomes unintelligent like the physical objects by becoming an object of another mind or when ensnared by another mind. What is possible is that in knowing, the other individual appears to be more a body, a thing in the physical order, just like any other physical object, but then we also apprehend him as a self who has the body on account of the perception of movements and other activities which places us in the presence of an embodied being. The perception or knowledge of other minds proceeds on a two-fold basis, firstly because of the objective resemblances to our activities and appearances, and secondly due to the subjective direct apprehension of the souls or selves or minds other than our own.

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya* I. i. 1. (p. 48 Thibaut) *anubhāvyatve' ananubhūtitvam* ityupahāsyam.

It leads to a certain kind of absurdity when we claim that Brahman or the Highest Being can be the goal or object of our knowledge, for such an object would by the very fact of its being an object turn out to be an unconscious entity. This absurdity the subjectivist cannot overcome by suggesting that the object is in fact *the* Subject, and that there can only be subjective subjects rather than objects in regard to the Spirit. For is it not the Self of all, of me, and am I not of It, according to the famous formula of *So'ham asmi*? The doctrine which seeks to transfer the object to the subjective status through the principle of experience of Identity is not altogether as wrong if it did not tag on to this theory of conversion, the faulty doctrine of objective unconsciousness. No doubt in a cognitive situation or relation, the intelligent subject is the principal (relatively speaking) Being having functional importance as against the object he cognizes. The subject can view it in all ways and thus his independence is not lost, but the object appears to have almost fallen into the hands of the mind for it to be turned round in any way it likes, provided of course the object does not hit back nastily, teaching the subject that it is a limited consciousness and a powerless finite existence. But admitting even that the other self or embodied being is being perceived, it cannot be affirmed without being gravely challenged that the other self which is the object is not also functioning or that it is functionally not cognizing the subject or some other object. In ordinary behaviour this is so real that the animated conversations and discussions and movements we make are not to be treated as mere unconscious movements, movements lacking coherence and intelligence and consciousness. It is a complete travesty of facts to say that to be an object is to be unintelligent. That there may be some objects which are unintelligent, does not prove that all objects are such. The major faults of the Māyāvāda and Advaita has been due to such facile universal propositions derived from a few fragmentary experiences. To build on such frail foundations a grand superstructure needs a profound optimism in oneself, and that optimism manifests itself in the great but misunderstood

doctrine of *So'hamasmi*. What is not impossible to the soul when it is indeed God? Everything is possible and this creative fancy which converts the object of consciousness into an unconsciousness is one such. It would have been more right to claim that all objects become conscious by falling into the mouth of the omnivorous consciousness, as indeed Berkeley and Bosanquet and others have sought to do. Indeed finally it is into this theory that Advaita lands itself, by its omniscient universal declaration that All is Spirit, is consciousness and nothing else, but this is in the transcendental sense. This is something that we may not admit at the peril of all intelligibility. Even the illusion cannot save itself, and thus we are left alone when all intelligibility, the one criterion of logical and philosophical thought, is thwarted and denied its rightful place in the scheme of metaphysics not to speak of epistemology. Epistemology cannot have a place in that kind of idealistic thought that finally culminates in the affirmation of the mere subject, albeit the self with a universal notation.

IV

Brahman, the Supreme Freedom

We thus find that our analysis of the nature of the Supreme Subject yields us an intelligent Personality, and Infinite Being, who is capable of sustaining and controlling and enjoying all things which are in one sense objects of His eternal vision, inseparably belonging to Him, and who in another sense is also their One Supreme Object, whom they because of their finiteness cannot perceive through their senses and their mind even, but who can be seen only by the special divine vision that is the gift of the Divine Lord Himself alone.

We have seen that to exalt the human consciousness or consciousness to the status or stature of a substance or to make it a permanent function that cannot but be always active is to make the facts of cognitive relation absolute, as

if other facts of the conative or the affective are not available. If the Divine Lord can be presumed to create or to withdraw from all creation, to enjoy or not to enjoy, if freedom indeed is the foundational fact about the Divine Existence or Being, then the power to know or not to know, to experience or not to experience are equally fundamental facts of this freedom. Thus the theory that consciousness is the Lord Himself, that at no time it was not in function goes against the fundamental principle of freedom, and one is reduced to the position that consciousness is a function, inseparable and inalienable indeed, of a person, who can cognize or not do so. Thus the characteristic nature of the Divine Lord or Subject is Will, the Supreme Will which is freedom, infinite in its power and range and kind, which nothing can lessen or shroud. Ignorance is itself non-existent in that nature, though this ignorance is capable of being engendered by the very infinity of the power of the Divine Infinite in an organic manner. Thus *Māyā* is the power of the Lord, wonderful, supreme, infinite deluding those who do not find their dependence nature, liberating those who do.

The nature of the selves as intelligent, but not always conscious, leads to certain significant affirmations. The individual selves always seek an universal content, even in the particular ambit of their beings. But this universal knowledge is possible, according to Rāmānuja, only when the individuals become pure which they do on attaining liberation from their *kārmic* bodies. For it is their karma that limits, restricts, dwarfs, depraves, deludes and diminishes their knowledge. It is the root-cause of the ignorance. There is a finiteness in the souls, a fundamental finiteness, which is a truth of their being. Also there is a sense of finiteness, a sense of being bound which gnaws into the vitals of one's consciousness, making it imperative to struggle against this, a sense of imprisonment which contrasts itself with the existence of liberated souls. Egoism is the result. And once this egoism is present, there is an easy transition to the

feeling of infiniteness and independence, which are indeed far from the truth of the finite soul, much as certain types of mysticism affirm the same. It is one thing then to be finite, and quite another to feel bound. That they may coexist and in fact do coexist, is not proof enough for their being identical or necessary to one another. Religious consciousness affirms the necessity for the feeling of dependence on the Supreme Lord and the recognition of the finiteness of the individual, even whilst it affirms the need to liberate oneself through the knowledge of God. Thus it is one thing to be finite, quite different to be liberated. These two co-exist in the liberated souls. The souls may be even divinised by the conscious (or super-conscious?) grace of the Lord; they may assume the form and body of the supermaterial nature, but they can never be more liberated than they are, that is they are related in a dependent-relation of body to the Divine. Liberation means the sense of fulness that comes to the individual in his perfected state of being. He becomes conscious of the Infinite within him, around him, everywhere and for all time.

These liberated beings may have enjoyment in the fullest measure, an enjoyment which is of the nature of truest nature and being of the Divine, the fountain and ocean of Delight, into whom they merge and engage in varied types of relationships of which the human is aware, and even change their very natures too, but of that power of controlling and husbanding the Universe they verily have none.¹ That is the distinctive mark of the Lord, and all the rest are dependent, subordinate to that Lord. If the power of entering into significant relation with even his own body is denied to the individual, how much more when the whole Nature is concerned and all other selves are concerned? Thus even from the stand-point of epistemology the individual finite being can never realize the extension of

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya* IV. iv. 17 ff. Jagadvyāpāra-varjam prakaraṇādasannihita-tvācca.

2. *ibid.* IV. iv. 18. akarmapratihata-jñāno mukto vikāralokān brahma-vibhūti-bhūtaṁ anubhūya yathākāmaṁ tīpīyati. Sakala-kalyāṇaguṇāṁ anubhavati muktaḥ. (IV. iv. 19).

its power to infinity. Rāmānuja however grants this infinity of knowledge to the individual souls; but certainly not the power of creation. The individual can enjoy all the worlds of the Divine Manifestation without let or hindrance, the unchanging and eternal *nitya-vibhūti*, as easily and fully as God Himself, as also the world of *līlā*, all worlds of the Divine (*jagatyām jagat* of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*, which the Lord manifests and controls and dwells in). The individual gains the fullest plenitude of auspicious existence. Freed from all karma he enjoys all the excellent characteristics of the Divine Lord Himself, except one, that is the power of creation of the worlds, of being the *sarvādhāra*, *sarva-nīyantr*, *sarveśa*, *sarvaśeṣin*.¹

It is true that that the height of Philosophy is fully and completely reached when the individual can have the fullest and completest vision of reality as his goal or ideal. This ideal is granted to the individual from the philosophical standpoint of knowledge but not on the plane of action. It may well be contended whether one can stop with this, short of the Divine Lord's completest identity? But then this is something that unfortunately is incapable of being realized. Our inmost religious consciousness and the experiences of mystic mankind have borne witness to this lack on the part of the individual. In all things he becomes equal to the Divine, except for the lordship over creation and other processes. Thus whilst the height of metaphysical knowledge may be attained by the individual soul, it does not follow that it can have also the fullest power of pervasion and governance and enjoyment of all things. The doctrine of identity may be achieved and substantiated in the realm of knowledge,

1. *ibid.* IV. iv. 20. ...apahatapāpmatvādis satya-sankalpatva-paryanto guṇagaṇaḥ pratyagātmanaḥ svābhāvika evāvirbhūtaḥ, tathā'pi tasya tathā-vidhatvameva paramapuruṣāyattam. tasya nityasthitiśca tadāyattā. paramapuruṣasyaitannityatāyāḥ nityeṣṭatvānnityatayā vartata iti na kaścid virodhaḥ. Evameva paramapuruṣabhogopakaraṇasya līlopakaraṇasya ca nityatayā śāstrāvagatasya paramapuruṣasya nityeṣṭatvādeva tathā'vasthānamastīti śāstrādavagamyate. ato muktasya satyasankalpatvam paramapuruṣasāmyam ca jagadvyāpārarajam.

because of the doctrine of identity of indiscernables, but this certainly does not grant that the individual can ever become the Infinite subject. What happens is that according to Rāmānuja, the *dharmabhūta-jñāna*, the functional consciousness, which had been in a contracted state during the soul's bondage, on liberation expands to its fullest ideal condition of universal expansion. That this expansion of its size so to speak, makes it also move in all the worlds of God's creation with equal wisdom and enjoyment, unfettered by any limitation whatsoever, is what is possible to the liberated soul. Nothing more. In which case there may accrue liberty without power of the infinite kind, enjoyment of all without obstruction and attachment, for it is attachment, which is consequent on the fear of going without it, that is the seed of all ignorance and egoistic grasping. Into this sense of fear of losing enjoyment the individual never falls once he has attained that fullest consciousness. There is no danger of a fall into the bond condition once the soul is liberated. This is the promise of Upaniṣadic thought, and the *Gītā*.¹

V

Brahman as Siddhōpāya.

We find that the totality of Phenomena are capable of being objects of the Supreme Subject, but only partially of the individual selves which are in a very limited degree subjects. Though these individuals may achieve in their liberated condition, *muktāvastha*, a range of perception which includes the whole range of phenomena without exception, yet they are incapable of being Supreme Subjects, because there is a difference in kind between that and this in other respects.²

1. Ch. Up. VIII. 15; Bh. G. VIII. 15-16.

2. This indeed is an important point. One may ask two questions: (1) Is the infinity of the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* of the freed soul of the same intensity and kind as the *dharmabhūta-jñāna* of the Lord? For Rāmānuja there is no difference. We can legitimately say that there is *sāmya*, *sa cānantyāya kalpate*, (2) The effort to tag on to the finite being an infinite range in consciousness is it not one more attempt at reducing the difference between the Divine Lord and the finite soul?

The very nature of the world as an order, a rational and spatio-temporal and causal order, requires an explanation in terms of a Spirit or Self, and no cause except the Highest Intelligence can make the world truly objective to the individual souls. It is impossible to assert on the plane of pure reason whether or not the world is an effect. The cosmological, teleological and the ontological¹ proofs given to substantiate the existence of God are all incapable of showing the creator to be like anything we conceive of. That is to say, these proofs prove nothing. The finite cannot create the infinite, nor can the infinite be known through the apparatus of our perceptions and inferences. Kant may be right in affirming that the causal law itself cannot be applied transcendently since it leads to antinomies. The moral law and the religious intuitions alone can grant sanction to this existence of this Ideal Subject of all Experience, the creator, the true infinite.

We arrive at the conclusion that the relation between the several selves may be regarded as eternal as well as external, because the subject-object relation between them though not impossible is not fundamentally organic. Whereas the relation between the world and the Supreme Subject is an absolute relation of dependence of the former on the latter, the relation between the Supreme Subject and the finite selves is a relation of exquisite internality,² which is also of the nature of dependence, on the part of the latter, but made possible by the intrinsic nature of knowledge which is the quality common to both the Supreme Brahman and the individual souls.

The view that it is this inner presence of the Brahman within the individual that has made it possible for him to be

1. cf. Udayana's arguments for the existence of God, are shown to be weak by Śrī Rāmānuja and others under the *Śāstrayonitvādhikaraṇa*. I. i. 3.

2. *antar-bahiṣca tatsarvam vyāpya nārāyaṇas sthitaḥ*.

even a subject, is admittedly a facile explanation¹ but as already shown, there can be no abandonment of the reality of the individual selves by this speculative assertion that the Infinite itself is *the* conscious principle in each body, and that the individual souls are false because mere partial predicates of it.

The Divine Lord therefore is a real unity, indeed the only Unity who holds within Himself all the multiplicity of the selves in an integral harmonious union making them more and more perfect in the light of wisdom, making them grow into the knowledge of the true and the real, making them realize their moral worth and religious status. He is not the substance in the sense of Spinoza. He is the unity because of His supreme power of control and power of enjoyment and power of knowledge. His Infinity-unity supports all and therefore substands all existence. The attributive theory of Spinoza also cannot avail here. The Supreme Brahman is not what appears to the individuals in or under the forms of the two attributes of thought and extension, whose respective modes are ideas and things. On the contrary, the Infinite Being is beyond the range of our normal perception, and cannot be apprehended except through His Grace.

The highest unity is thus realized in the Supreme Person, or Individuality, through which everything lives and moves and grows. The finite existences have undoubtedly a reality of their own, not as pure parts, *amsas*, in the materialistic and fragmentary sense, but in the sense of being related as bodies of the Supreme. This conception entails the view of direct

1. cf. The idealistic view of Hegel and Bosanquet and others who hold that the reality of anything is in and through the Reality. The view has much in its favour and in some senses is accepted by Rāmānuja, because everything has its self in that Brahman, and when we speak of ultimate things, it is to this Self of all, which is the support of all, that we refer and not to the finite being. But Rāmānuja rejects their theories which reduce the real finites, souls and things to mere adjectives or a "collection of adjectives" finding their ground in Reality. The souls are substances dependents, even as modes are, on the infinite Brahman.

relationship with the supreme Person. It means that the world consists of souls which are individually bodies of the Supreme, in the sense that they are sustained and supported, governed and led to the fullest experience of Himself, through Himself. This view is not to be confused with the view of Hegel that "ultimate reality is not a mere system, made up of parts, but an all-including Individual, constituting its members" and in which "the Individual has an existence fundamental, logically prior, to that of the parts or of the members. It is not separate from them, but it is distinguishable from them. It is fundamental to the parts, though they are real, are not absolutely essential to it: it expresses itself in the parts instead of being made up of them."² There is so much in the system of Hegel when realistically and pluralistically viewed that makes his thought fall into line with the religio-mystical philosophy of Monotheism, but then there is not that galvanization of that System by Spirit which could make it real. The system of Rāmānuja because of its fundamental loyalty to the truth of religious and mystical consciousness affirms the Unique Personality of the Divine Lord, who is logically and metaphysically the true abode of all things, whilst He Himself is neither composed nor made up of or constituted by the parts, or bodies or partial realities. The souls are not partial realities, they are wholly real. They are however not those which live independently. But if this be considered to be the mark of reality then we can say that the One Supreme existence of Brahman can safely be called the real. But it is not so. The ordinary meaning that we grant to the word real cannot be denuded of its meaning. What can be done is that these reals can be shown to depend upon a higher. Thus we are enabled to call the souls as *satya*, truth, and the Supreme Self as *satyasya satya*, truth of the true. Thus whilst dependence-relation may make a thing incomprehensible except through that on which it depends, and so on till we reach that which is Truth that is independent of others, the

1. *Persistent Problems of Philosophy*: Mary Calkins p. 376.

2. *ibid.* p. 378.

reality or existentiality of these selves cannot be impugned. Nor could a contradiction be raised between existence as actual and reality as ideal Truth, the truth that is independent of every thing but on which all other truths are dependent. Rāmānuja's protest against idealism is not against the claim that all things are dependent on One Infinite Spirit, whatever be the material or spiritual character of these dependents, but only against the view that reality claims degrees. Once this claim is admitted, then it logically follows that Spirit is the only really Real, whereas the lowest term, namely, matter which is absolutely dependent on it, and the souls also, become absolutely false or illusory or appearances, and between these two extremes we shall have to admit that there are any number of planes or degrees of reality.

Evolving from the crude unconscious life of the atoms, plants and the animals, the individual who has been embodied in matter (which acts as the body or structure into which the individual is placed according to his karma), evolves into the human nature aware of his being the master to a certain extent of the body which is perceived by him to be his, in so far as it bears a peculiar personal interest to him, and aware of the environment which he comes across and modifies according to his needs and aspirations through volitions which are dependent on the needs of the body and its continuance and perpetuation. From this level of conscious recognition of his own fundamental unity enriched by the complex structure of his experience, the individual looks far ahead to that grandest of all structures the final perfection which he recognizes to lie only in the personality which is real, embracing all the lesser personalities, whilst granting them value and individuality. This is the promise of the Divine Birth in mystic consciousness, when the individual feels himself as one with the Divine or at one with the entire cosmos as in pantheistic mysticism. Mystico-religious man finding himself to be inseparable from the Divine Life and Personality melts into, it and losing himself in it, emerges from it sanctified and made holy, viewing all things in

supreme ecstasy of perception *sub specie eternitatis*, verily with divine eyes of immortal vision. Such is the transformation of the individual into true personality. We might even say that there is an *osmosis*¹ in the contact of the Divine with the individuals, and the equality is established by the Divine. Such an *osmosis* does not exclude the reality of the individuals by themselves who compose the organic whole of reality. The individual forms an integral significant *amśa*, portion of the Divine. The truest definition of an *amśa* is the definition which keeps the soul neither aloof nor isolated but keeps it inseparably and inalienably integrated with the whole, without making it lose its individual character and function. The character of the part might undergo modification in so far as it becomes conscious of its dependence on the central Self of its existence, and almost wear even a diaphanous coat or body which makes one see it as if it is indistinguishable from the whole. It may even perceive its own unity to be firm and thorough, so that it cannot see itself as existent apart from it. But the germs of the finity and *amśatva* remain.

To modify a relation or character is not the same thing as sublating of an unreality or as getting rid of its nature as individual. The individuality has been the locus of their constellation and as such the faults of these are referred to it. Just as in the case of an organism, the mind does not sublimate the body, so also sensation is not sublated by thought. It is improved by it. Thought enters into things and makes them rich with concreteness in meaning, whereas abstract thought is made rich with images and thus made concrete by sensation. Thus the unity of the two is the fullest realization. The individual souls are permeated by the Divine Lord through His

1. *Osmosis* is the phenomenon whereby water passes through a semi-permeable membrane with a push. The membrane is permeable to the solvent (water) but not permeable to the dissolved substance. The pressure with which this push is achieved by the solvent is called the osmotic pressure. "The osmotic pressure is the excess of the pressure on the solution side of a semipermeable membrane over the pressure on the solvent side"; J. W. Mellor: *Modern Inorganic Chemistry* p. 207. It is the principle at work in living tissues also. cf. Loeb's *Mechanistic conception of Life*. p. 99.

will and are transformed and not sublated by Him. They too live in the light of the personality integrally united in the Consciousness of the Divine, devoted to Him. They are enriched by the perfect consciousness of the Highest, made now central in them through His grace. Whilst all the imperfections are their's, all the richness is His. Thus we can almost affirm that the individual finity is so built in this manner that it acts as the semi-permeable membrane which permits the solvent, God's grace, freely to move into the individual consciousness, whilst the imperfections and other frailties are incapable of passing over into the broad expanse of delight of the Divine Personality. But when the conscious unity is established, we find that the pressure and infiltration of the supreme consciousness are indeed great, so that it profoundly alters the entire personality of the individual, so that even his body undergoes a transformation so to speak, becomes completely divinised and diaphanous. So much so, the Divine peers through the individual. The individual becomes the Bhāgavata, God-dwelt, God-possessed, and utterly transformed being.

The Highest Unity is maintained and sustained and enforced by the Divine Consciousness of God alone, who is the Supreme Personality.¹

Rāmānuja finds in the Highest Personality, *Puruṣottama* not only the Ideal but the Actual. It is impossible to hold for a religious and mystical consciousness that the ideal that it has before it is something that is carved out by its own consciousness out of the stuff of its own reality, or by the askesis of the votary or *tapas* created out of the bosom of its reality. Such a view is entirely at variance with the profoundest

1. cf. *Pluralist Philosophies*: Jean Wahl, p 45. "The God of Fechner allows individual consciousness to live beneath him or by his side. The widest circle contains all the rest and yet each circle is as it were self-contained. The finite mind remains immanent in God though still an individuality and even when it appears as though absorbed by the supreme individuality, it still retains its personality. Does a visual sensation cease to be itself because it enters at the same time as other sensations into our greater consciousness?"

beliefs and realizations of all seers. It is true that in some schools of thought the claim is made that the Ruler Immortal within can through *mantra* and *tantra* be projected outside into an image properly and correctly made, so as to be the object of *savikalpaka dhyāna*, or *saguṇopāsana*.

Though Rāmānuja confesses that he cannot, and in fact no one could, prove the actual existence of the *Puruṣottama* with proofs drawn from perceptual and analogical sources, yet it is to the common and uncontradicted conviction and belief and realization of the seers of all ages and times that in the last resort we have to owe our allegiance. Ālvārs and Ṛṣis have with one voice affirmed the greatness of the Supreme *Puruṣottama*, His reality and His actual presence in each and in all. The voice of such firmness and certitude cannot be dismissed lightly. The highest truth is the transcendent Personality of the Divine, not the impersonal which is transcendent to the senses; undoubtedly beyond our ken He is yet the most gracious Lord who enters into relations with the humans who surrender themselves to His will and follow Him.

VI

Brahman the Puruṣottama.

The conception of the Divine *Puruṣottama* we have arrived at shows that in Rāmānuja's conception the Personality of the Lord has a two-fold nature, one of which is manifested in a personal effulgent, auspicious and utterly transcendent body of light and truth and power immeasurable, qualified with the six transcendent qualities of *jñāna*, *aśvarya*, *śakti*, *tejas*, *vīrya* and *bala*. "He possesses infinite measure of Knowledge (*jñāna*) and *ānanda*, and is bereft of all bad qualities: He is characterised by knowledge and power and unlimited auspicious qualities. He has a divine auspicious form and has as his bodies eternal and play worlds."¹ The Infinite Lord has infinite qualities but "amongst these the

1. *Rahasya-traya-sāra* : Śrī Vedānta Deśika ch. IV (Arthapañcakam.)

following six, knowledge, strength, lordship, courage, power and splendour (*tejas*) are apprehended by all as useful to meditation. *Sauśilya*, *Vātsalya*, *Saulabhya*, these too are inherent in the nature of the *Īśvara*.¹

We find that the meaning of *śarīra* undergoes a wide amplification; the personal body of light and strength, blazing with effulgence, blinding and of terrific power all these indeed constitute His form. It is qualified all the same by the sweet presence which He has, easy of access, of love and beauty.² The manifestations of his two-fold empires and the eternal world of freed, free and divine natures, and the world of the bond and struggling and the world of manifestation of His Grace, exist mainly for His delight, though the *līlā*-world is created for His pure play. This two-foldness is made possible because of the definition of body that he has given as the only perfect definition. That which a sentient soul is capable of supporting, controlling and enjoying for its own purposes absolutely is the body of that soul. Thus the unity of many bodies is possible only to a single Supreme Personality like the *Puruṣottama*.³ The *aprākṛta* non-material non-nonsentient, body is possessed by the Lord at the same time as He possesses the material, *prākṛtic* body.

Rāmānuja fuses the reality of the physical continuum with the spiritual reality which is capable of holding it always in its consciousness, and is capable of sustaining it. The embodied self is a unity of concrete character or Nature, and the unity of matter and mind is available in an embodied self. The moot-problem for Modern Psychology has been how the body and soul could exist together if they are such different substances as idealistic metaphysics tries to make them. Either they are one and the same or owe their interaction to a common matrix, namely matter (as the behaviorists hold in the correct scientific manner) or *elan vital* (as vitalists like

1. *ibid* ch. V. (Tattva-traya).

2. *Bhagavad Gītā*. XI. 46-47.

3. Examples of Śaughari and others are sometimes given as instances.

Bergson and his school holds), but none is prepared to accept the origination of these material things from one spirit. Idealism has to find a way out through the theory of *vivarta* or illusion to get at matter or appearential matter, the unconsciousness. Rāmānuja finds that the derivative relation is not capable of making for any clear explanation. Between the Sylla of Māyāvāda and the Charybdis of Materialism, he undertook to solve it by the theory of psycho-physical organism. There is no physical event that has not been ordained by a spirit or controlled or enjoyed by one such, and thus there is corresponding causal situations in mental and spiritual consciousnesses. This dependent and yet non-derivative relation is fundamental to reality from the highest to the lowest. Such is the manner by which the psycho-physical interaction is explained. The only proof for the assertion is its actual availability in experience. Mind controls matter, enjoys it; and even as the pregnant truth of Sāṃkhya lies in its affirmation that Prakṛti exists for the enjoyment of the Puruṣa,¹ this is a metaphysical truth. Metaphysics does not sublate physics but makes physics possible.

Matter ranges from the most obstructive to the least obstructive.² The more gross matter is, the less likely is it for any intelligence to shine through it or to enjoy it. Or rather the more necessary is it for the intelligence to be perfect in order to enable it to utilise or control matter. Thus we find that whilst great minds are enabled to snatch the ideal truths of essences and meanings and all that, there is not in them that same capacity for controlling and subordinating matter. In other words, till a particular stage in evolution, we find that matter and mind are in inverse ratio to one another. But when creative activity begins to manifest, as indeed it does, when the intelligence possessing the knowledge of laws of nature and of the mathematical and physical order is able to apply them to the conditions of life, then we find that it is

1. *Sāṃkhya Kārika*. XVII.

2. cf. Aristotle arranged all things between the two limits of pure Matter and pure Form.

possible, may necessary, to speak of the realization of the ideal truths in existence. This supreme capacity for creative activity is of course something dependent on the perfection of consciousness or rather independence of consciousness from the trammels of its ignorance. It is likely that we have gradual liberation, liberation in certain directions more swiftly than in others, and hence there results the manifestation of creative activity in certain directions and not in all directions. The supreme capacity for creation of course is that of God, so much so the perfect subordination of the most recalcitrant form of matter is available to Him, and not to any individual soul of whatever height or perfection. Two theories are possible in this context. Either the souls may be presumed to act creatively having been ordered or willed by God, the most Perfect Being, or else that God, the indwelling Lord in all beings, Himself creates through the individual. A third possibility may be envisaged. It may be said that greatest creative artists are possessors of bodies and souls which are receptive of the light and truth of God in the most perfect and purest way possible. Without a body of some kind there is possible no activity of any kind. Pure Intelligence is merely a ghost floating or beating ineffectively its wings in the void. Mere matter can never be anything apart from the soul or intelligence that enlivens it.

God is the supreme Being, the most perfect and Infinite Intelligence, possessing infinite auspicious qualities,¹ whose nature is different in certain respects, through not in all respects, from the individual souls, but who whilst He may manifest Himself as the finite, yet never ceases to be the Infinite Being He ever is, auspicious, perfect and supreme. His body or *śarīra* or divine form, *divya-māṅgala-vigraha*, is of light, supreme, transcendental, excellent and auspicious, in which the souls can seek and find refuge in meditation.² This is His special form, His personal form of beneficent radiance and puissant effulgence, which seeing no one can ever seek

1. cf. *Gāḍya-traya* of Śrī Rāmānuja.

2. Cf. *Bhagavad Gītā* XI, 46.

to look at anything else. The other forms are of the cosmic and terrific kinds. The *virāt-svarūpa* described in the great *Puruṣa-sūkta* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, and that which *Hiraṇyakaśipu* in the story of *Prahlāda* saw just before he was killed are instances of these kinds. To say that God has no form only means that He is not having a form that limits Him; He is transcendent to all material forms. To say that God does not have a body, *akāyam*, only means that He has no body which is a result of karma. He has a body which is assumed by Him out of His own free Will for the sake of His *līlā*.

Each individual soul wears a body which is useful to it for the service of the Divine Lord. Every¹ soul is embodied, whether it be a body of karma or of *śuddha-sattva*, pure super-matter; in *pralaya*, deluge, due to God's will, the bound souls, even like matter, lie strewn incapable of functioning because their consciousness-function is completely contracted and their karma-bodies are in a very subtle state.² This state undoubtedly is the most pitiable, but necessitated by the foolish prostitution of functions by the souls. The most important function of the individual is indeed the function of dependence on the Lord for knowledge, growth action, and enjoyment. It is manifested through service, *kainkarya* to God. It is not merely the possession of consciousness-activity of cognition that is important but also *kainkarya*, service to the Divine who is all.

It is this realization of ecstatic dependence on the Supreme, a trustful surrender to God that makes the cognitive situation pass over into the affective situation. It is

1. See however *Śrī Bhāṣya* IV. iv. 10-14 (*Abhāvādhikaraṇa*). In discussing the subject whether souls when freed have bodies or not, *Bādarāyaṇa* holds that the freed souls elect to have or not to have *śuddha sattva* bodies. *Bādari's* view is that the souls have no bodies, whereas *Jaimini* holds that they have bodies. *Śrī Venkaṭanātha* in his *Virodhāparihāra*, a rahasya-work, in para 78 discusses this point and says that their possession of even the *śuddha sattva* bodies depends on the will and pleasure of the Lord.

2. According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* the souls during *pralaya* being divorced from activity and matter, lie strewn like stones, *paśānavat*.

not ultimately the cognitive that is soothing to the human consciousness. It is the sense of Joy, of Delight of living under the sign and experience of the highest knowledge and God that matters. It is true to say that knowledge is very important, but what is this knowledge that is true and shall be true for ever regarding the Highest Object of our knowledge, namely the Real, Absolute Being? The several individuals draw their life and light and being from its central relationship. The two-fold relation between these two can be expressed adequately only by saying that the Real is the Independent, which means that all are dependent on It, and *Secondly*, that all these dependents can realize or achieve that knowledge and enjoy their unity with It. Thus the chief characteristic of the Absolute Personality or God is His independence which sustains and improves the dependence of all souls on Him absolutely, whilst the chief characteristic of the individual souls lies in their utter and complete dependence on that One supreme Independent Personality alone. It is this mystic philosophy or more appropriately the religious philosophy, that makes it possible for the realization of knowledge in love, in that utter or complete consecrated love, whose concentrated movement is towards the central Sun of its existence. The unity thus realized is *sneha-bhāva*; it is the central fact about the Identity claimed and affirmed between the Supreme and the individual, an identity which is not mere identity, since it reveals the relation of the conjointment between the Independent and dependent in the fullest embrace as *śarīra-śarīrī, dharma-dharmī, śeṣa-śeṣī*.

Thus we find that the supreme cognitive situation between subject and object finally leads not to the superiority of the subject over the Object when that object is something consistent and Independent, as in the case of God or total Nature, but to the realization of the utter dependence of the individual on the Divine Object of his life, a realization that is not merely of his knowledge, but also of his love and being.

The Highest Unity is of the Spirit which is Infinite, which is also the Infinite Subject, which is embodied and not void of any body. With this difference, however, that whilst the continuum of the physical world is apprehended in fragments and as ragged edges showing reference to beyond themselves thus making for confusion of sense-data and physical objects by the individuals, in this case, there is no such confusion or partial apprehension but only total and pure apprehension or Knowledge. Thus His body is what He apprehends as His own in the same sense in which we view our bodies as ours as being connected in a unique manner with us, as dependent upon us more than upon others, as subservient to our wishes and desires and enjoyments than to others, as being a glory to our being as our expression and wealth. Our selves also bear the same relation to the Highest Intelligence because we are equally dependent upon Him, subservient to Him and are guided by Him in our lives and actions. We are the bodies of the Lord. Every one of us is unique and yet every one of us lives and moves and has his being in Him who pervades all and is the source and goal, *alpha* and *omega* of existence, who is the Ideal Being immanent and real in each and in all beings at once and for all time, without Whom we cannot even exist.

Just as the ocean is composed of small drops of water, wherein each drop is in itself and yet finds itself in the ocean enveloped all round so as to be indistinguishable in it, so also every individual finds his own fulfilment in this great envelopment of himself in the Divine, inside and outside his being. This is the supreme union and glory and freedom. The complete pervasion by Divine Consciousness is the summit of our fullness.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the highest unity is had in a real embodied person who in so far as He holds the entire universe or reality in a subordinate relation absolutely and eternally. He is Spiritual and Infinite and Perfect.

The individual souls who are parts of the universe, though spiritual are units or monads within the Highest Object and thus form parts of the body, or if we may say form integral portions of that whole One. The Lord is the One supreme Subject, and Person, *Puruṣottama*, distinguished alike from the souls as partial subjects of experience, and from the world of matter, which is the pure or mere object in the epistemological sense, who through His power, unlimitedness and uniqueness of being holds all the worlds as His possession, which He supports and pervades and manifests and enjoys. All relations are sustained by His love, which is the only power that is capable of being at the same time freedom.

There is no reason to suspect that this fundamental relation with the Highest Subject involves the lesser subjects in any imperfection. Imperfection is not incident on dependence or subordination to the Highest. It is incident only on the involvement of the individual in his own egoism and in the world which he seeks to possess and enjoy as his own possession. Nor can it be said that the lesser subjects, being many and yet unique in their activities, become inanimate objects or things. Nor can it be said that these individual souls because of their spiritual nature could be dissolved into a vast ocean of Consciousness. The drops of the Ocean cannot be annulled even by the greatness of Ocean, the rays of light cannot be absorbed in the glare of their source, the parts cannot be surrendered even in the fullest presentation of the whole. The whole is a whole of parts, and this whole must be

considered to be the body (*śarīra*) of the Lord in the very same sense in which we claim our body as ours. The doctrine which makes God, a whole of parts, even like the Absolute of Western Idealism, is wrong since it is essentially a mechanical or pseudo-organic conception. Idealists labouring under the mistaken dualism of mind and body hope to resolve the world into mere foci of consciousness or souls fulgurated from a central source of light and spirituality, and seek to explain the souls as parts of the one whole. The logical interrelation of these parts with the whole leads to that telescoping of all individuals into the bosom of the Absolute which now presents the spectacle of a metaphysical continent. It is impossible to grant this construction of an Absolute any life or movement or value since the Spirit is not traceable anywhere in it. It is just the body of the Lord that has been traced not the nature of the Absolute Reality, the Spirit that sustains the interrelations of the Natura, to use the excellent word of Spinoza. There is thus presented the necessity of going ahead of the theist and the pantheist and of affirming that the Absolute of metaphysical epistemology is just the Natura of Spinoza, for Rāmānuja's *śarīra* cannot exist apart from the *śarīrin*, the Lord and Supreme Person who realizes therein the supreme values of Truth and Goodness and Beauty, Auspiciousness and Supreme Freedom through Love. Instead of making the Absolute the complete and self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled Existence or Ideal, it becomes necessary to make the *Puruṣottama* greater than the *Akṣara*, the immutable, and not as the idealists contend make God, less than the Absolute.

Thus it becomes possible to build up a clear and consistent philosophy of Religion on the basis of the organistic theory. Life instead of being depleted of all content and reality becomes restored to value and vitality and morality and realization of beauty. Instead of having to reverse our conduct and deepest intuitions and criteria of reality and worth, we are promised here a great and powerful experience of God through the realization of our dependence on the Supreme

Lord. Not experience merely of God but also intimate relationship, not merely the cognition or knowledge of all reality but also the deep elevating numinous consciousness rich with infinite radiance due to contact and co-existence and unity with the Divine Lord is the goal of human life. The Life of the individual becomes transformed and transfigured, and man achieves the supreme Birth into the consciousness of that transfigured relationship of unity which emphasises without annihilating the nearness and fullness of the individual in his Self.

Rāmānuja is the first thinker of importance who laid stress on the relationship of body and soul as explaining the Unity-category. The unity category may manifest itself in various ways of identity, and identity and difference, but the truth about all types of *sāmānādhikarāṇya*, co-ordination-relation is entirely the body-soul relation. Having accepted this relation of fundamental importance which saves the reality of things and facts and experiences, there is no reason to expect that what is presented in consciousness to a subject is unreal. On the other hand, reality is something that belongs to the object also and cannot be referred to the subject alone, for it is the truth of the object that is in question not the subject's existence or experience. It is this reality of the object that is to be guaranteed by perception, inference and comparison and other sources of right knowledge (*pramāṇāni*) and not the individual's existence. Further knowledge is the specific relation of cognitive result informing the subject about the object, and can never be divorced from its special function of intimating to its subject the truth about the thing the subject has apprehended through its consciousness. Illusion is merely the wrong intimation due to defect in the subject, or object or in the medium itself. This has been discussed already under illusions of perception. The problem of illusion is the problem of how we are able to apprehend a thing other than what it is. If we are unable to explain it we call it inexplicable, but not that it is ignorance that makes it inexplicable by over laying itself on the object or rather that the object

itself is illusive ignorance. Such an *anstossing* of subjective ignorance to objective existence is a perverse way of going about explaining knowledge. Thus most kinds of idealism are not wrong in so far as they seek to affirm the transcendent reality of Spirit or God, but wrong in the reasons they give. It was Bergson who wrote "The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely what it appears to be."¹

There is no need to deny reality to matter and no need to convert it into a manifestation of spirit, or a perversion of spirit, or reversion or fulguration or emanation of spirit. It is necessary however to point out that there is no inward occult power in it just as the materialists and cārvākas claim no inner power or vitality just as the vitalists and sāmkhya claim for it, nor any other characteristics. Realism of the common-sense variety demands the acceptance of matter different in kind from Spirit. But then in regard to the problem of their actually available relation we have to state reasons that are acceptable. It is not a necessity of metaphysics to affirm that which is above the understanding of the common sense, or to discover ways and means of reducing the ordinary man's view to nullity and illusion. There is no such contradiction between the physics and metaphysics as to make either metaphysics or physics impossible. All the same metaphysics shows that the fullest explanation of reality is discovered not only in the realm of ordinary experience but also in supra-physical, supra-perceptual, supra-inferential reality of Spirit. This level is the level of the Śabda, of scriptural testimony, which alone can give us knowledge of the Supreme-perceptual Divine natures as also our own inward nature. That however does not entail the reduction of the perceptual and inferential and the ordinary man's world to illusion and ignorance. Rāmānuja thus finds it necessary to affirm the firmest and fundamental unity between the physical and the spiritual, between the world and God, souls

1. H. Bergson ; *Matter and Memory*. p. 80.

and God, and nothing fulfils this realistic criterion of relationship better than the organic conception which is universally applicable on all planes.

Spirit is the Self, is master, enjoyer, destiner ; matter is the body, is servant, enjoyed and destined and ordered. The souls too are subordinate, dependent absolutely on the Lord, existing for His enjoyment and service. Thus we find that Rāmānuja does not merely make the world an object of contemplation but an object of enjoyment and control.

It has been beautifully said that four persons went out on a walk to a garden. One gentleman said that the flower Rose was beautiful in form, another added that its smell was fragrant and another touching it said that it was wonderfully soft, and the fourth added that it has honey also within it. Thus each one of these later statements added to the richness of the experience. None of them contradicted the rest. Thus the reality of the integral Godhead involves the acceptance of the reality of every thing as related to Him integrally, that is organically as body to that Self. Multiplanal existence is God's, multidimensional is His Nature. The God of Religion is not the Absolute but more. He contains and manifests wondrous infinities and auspiciousnesses. He is the rich source of all bliss and fullness of perfection. From Him all freedom and creation proceeds in the context of material and temporal existence. Reality is granted by Him to all, for without Him nothing can even be.

Thus does metaphysics find its real basis in Religion. To Rāmānuja goes the credit of restoring Religion to its real status and revealing that the individual is not God or Brahman but that he belongs to Brahman and that he is dependent on It alone. Rāmānuja restored to Vedānta its God, the Supreme Subject and Supreme Object of all Knowledge and Love.

APPENDIX I

THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION AND PERCEPTIVE ERROR—A CRITIQUE

It is always requisite in correct knowledge to know how we know any object. The consensus of opinion with regard to this is that sensation (*samvedanā*) is possible only if there are objects, sense-organs and the preceiver who cognizes the object through his sense-organs. These three factors, then, are the most important, as without the cognizer and his sense-organs, no object could ever be sensed, and without the sense-organs, it is impossible for any one to sense at all, lacking the instruments, so to speak, of cognition, and without the objects what one might perceive is certainly not a sensation, whatever else that may be. These, then, are important, and no theory of perception can claim to have solved the problem of perception, if it did not take up the realistic aim of discovering these three factors. A metaphysical theory might, if so minded, claim that the one indubitable certainty about perception is the existence of the perceiver alone, or else might claim that the existence of the self or preceiver is only a reflective act, due to the perception of the object experienced as that of a subject. An empirical theory may claim to solve this quarrel by pointing out that both these, subject and object, fall within the sphere of consciousness, and as such both of them are but moments of the consciousness. All these explanations, however, do not touch the core of the problem of perception at all or its reality or falsity.

Truth must be self-consistent, and must be a proof of its own being. That is to say that, if we see truth, it must exhibit at once inner consistency and self validity. It must fulfil the promises of its own being. In other words, even as the Buddhists, Jains and the pragmatists claim, the nature of truth is dynamic, and every truth exhibits purposiveness, which need not be specially that which pleases us or any one.

The nature of perception as a psychological process must be first understood. Indian thinkers hold generally that perception through senses (*pratyakṣa*) is due to the contact of sense organs with the object.¹ The process of this contact is not that the object stimulates the subject's sense-organs, but that the subject's consciousness goes over to the object through the senses or rather through the instrumentality of the powers of the senses. For instance, the eye is the instrument of cognition of colours and forms, and it is claimed that the light-rays in the eye move to the object and apprehend the object.² This is a dynamic way of putting the case, and is in consonance with the dynamic nature of psychology that has through out characterized the Indian schools of thought. The importance of this contactual relation in any general explanation of perception and its validity can easily be understood, when we find that many theories have come into existence to explain the causes of error. Error in perception, or illusion, is a fact that has to be reckoned with in our ordinary life. An escape from it is necessitated, because without correct knowledge there can possibly be no adequate action, not to speak of life itself. Our life is governed for the most part by the correctness of our perceptions; our inferences grow out of these perceptions; and indeed the discovery

1, इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । *Tarkasaṃgraha*.

2. ग्रहणप्रकारस्तु आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते, मन इन्द्रियेणेन्द्रियमर्थेन । इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्य-
प्रकाशकारित्वनियमात् । *Yatindramatadīpikā*. p. 5. Cf. *Nyāya-Siddhānta-janam* :
p. 293. (Memo. Ed.) 1934. Śrī Vedānta Deśika quotes Varada Nārāyaṇa
Bhaṭṭāraka about the perception of sound thus :

दूरे शब्दः समीपे च प्राच्यां चेत्यादिदर्शनात् ।

गत्वा श्रोत्रेन्द्रियं तत्रतत्र शब्दग्रहक्षमम् ॥ १ ॥

आगता दूरतः शब्दमाला श्रोत्रेण गृह्यते ।

समवायाद्यदि तदैवं न गृह्येत दूरजा ॥ २ ॥

शब्दमान्यादिभिर्दूरोत्थत्वादिग्रहसम्भवे ।

अपि प्राच्यां प्रतिच्यां चेत्येवं न ग्रहसंभवः ॥ ३ ॥

The second half of the second verse is metrically defective. It must read समवायाद्यदि तदा नैवं गृह्येत दूरजा ।

of the differences between one experience and another is the mainstay of civilized life.

What is it that the senses grasp when knowing an object in the manner we have stated above? Do the senses or rather the consciousness working through the instruments of sensation (*jñānendriyas* and *manas*) snatch the objects and bring back the impressions to the self, the substrate of the consciousness? Or does the consciousness in perception apprehend the object as having characteristics which are capable of being apprehended by the sense-organs? Whatever be the nature of the object as such, whether it is a constellation of atoms or whirling wavicles, the psychological fact of perception shows that these constellations of atoms or whirling wavicles, which are apprehended by us in perception, are found to possess the sensory characters that we receive from them. Therefore, we are forced to affirm, at the risk of being called naive, that the object's nature in fact has characteristics which are apprehended by us as sensory, and therefore we can grant the name *sensa* or sense-data to these features of the objects, provided it is clearly understood that these are not the mental ideas belonging to the subject, but rather belong to the object itself. Cognition or perception involves, even in its most rudimentary phase, an act of holding together different views of the object gathered through the several senses. It is a process of separating, distinguishing and comparing, and as such, errors are traceable in almost all cases to this discrimination of the several facts belonging to the object that is cognized. This view is accepted by Prof. Dawes Hicks¹ who finds that cognition does not mechanically piece up the several parts of the perceived-content, and thus introduce an order that did not exist in the object, but it discovers the unity in it as *belonging* to it. It is only when, due to prior experience, we bring in irrelevant or invalid comparisons that we commit error. But that error cannot be an error of perception, but only of the synthesizing activity by which we link up this particular experience with similar experiences for the sake of our practical action, present or future.

As Prof. Stout states "The underlying principle is that physical facts are not separate and self-contained, but essentially incomplete parts of a whole within which each has its consequences and conditions more or less probable and sometimes practically certain. So far as what *seems* to be a physical fact in each of the several perceptions is a condition or consequent of what seems to be physical fact in the others, each being founded in its own immediate sense-experience, and so far relatively independent of others' support and is supported by them. This is what is meant by saying, they cohere. Such coherence is the warrant for our ordinary confidence in the testimony of our senses....."²

Rightly does Prof. Stout point out also that "the sensory continuum of the individual is a partial extract from a world-continuum,in entire harmony with the seeming discontinuity between the immediate content of sense-experience and the world of physical phenomena." Thus it is that we find that the difficulty of explaining the sense-impressions or percepts having sensory character apart from the object, is bridged by affirming that in perception, at any rate, we are aware of partial extracts from a world-continuum, but due to its being extracted, so to speak, or delimited by the perceptual field from the world-continuum, it does not lose its continuity with the entire world-continuum. Thus in perception we are aware of two things at once, namely, the sensum of the object as well as its "perceptual appearance", which is its continuity with the world-continuum. The difficulty in this position is, that it tries to explain the example of the oar in water as bent by pointing out that though the sensum gives bentness to it, our perceptual appearance will dictate the belief that it is straight. Are we indeed aware of the two factors in perception? The belief that it is straight, a matter belonging to the realm of prior cognition that the oar is straight, is a *smṛti-fact*, and it is this that engenders the belief

1. Cf. *Hundred years of British Philosophy* : Rudolf Metz. p. 513,

2. *Mind and Matter* : Vol. I. p. 260.

that the oar is straight, and it is this that overrules the *sensum* 'bentness'. Thus the account given by Prof. Stout, though valuable, has finally to explain the origin of the belief in the perceptual continuum, which is the physical aspect of the object, distinct in one sense, from the sensory aspect of it. It is criticising this view that Prof. A. E. Taylor writes "My difficulty is that (a) I cannot feel at all sure that, in the case supposed (the oar), there is anything at all which merely looks but is bent, and (b) that if there is something which is bent, when I try to say more precisely what this something can be, it always turns out to be a problematic something *e.g.* an image on the retina) which is not sensed at all. since I certainly do not look at images on my retina—and is definitely physical and not mental.....".

Thus it is clear that in perception we have to accept that the perceived object is a 'characterised-that' which belongs definitely to the realm of the physical, and is physical. The perception is an experience of the embodied being belonging indeed to nature, and experiencing it. The sense impressions are indeed parts of the object, and all that is being perceived is true. In one sense, we can go to the extent of saying that in perception we are in direct compresence with physical nature (*sākṣātkāra*), and what we sense is true and real. The facts of error or illusion must be discovered, in almost all cases, in the nature of the object itself. This is what is meant by saying that it belongs to the physical order or continuum, or in one word Nature, despite what may be apprehended of it by the individuals. This is the central principle also of the *Yathārthakhyāti* of Rāmānuja, of Nāthamuni before him, and of Śrī Vedānta Deśika and other writers of the Viśiṣṭa-dvaita school of thought.

That all knowledge is of the real is a general tenet of Prābhākaras, and this includes perceptual knowledge too. This is what Rāmānuja points out as the view espoused by the knowers of the Veda :

यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानं इति वेदविदां मतम् ।

श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यः सर्वस्य सर्वात्मत्वप्रतीतिः ॥ and following verses.

Śrī Bhāṣya, I. i. 1.

Yāmunācārya in his *Ātma-siddhi* writes that Nāthamuni, the first amongst the Ācāryas of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava School, held the *Yathārtha-khyāti* view :

प्रपञ्चितश्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसाभागयोः निरालम्बनप्रतिषेधः यथार्थख्यातिसमर्थनेन च शास्त्रं इति न वर्ण्यते ।

—*Annamalai Uni. Ed.* p. 34.

In the *Nyāya-parisuddhi* Śrī Vedānta Deśika affirms that Nāthamuni and others held this view :

यन्नाथमुनिमिश्रायैः यथार्थख्यातिसाधनम् ।

तल्लोकबुद्ध्यनारोहात् वैमर्षं केचिद्बुचिरे ।

—*Mem. Ed.* p. 24.

That this view is held and expounded by Śrī Nāthamuni in his *Nyāyatattva* is also stated by him in his *Tattva-muktā-kalāpa* ;

नाथैरुक्ता यथार्था विमतमतिरपि न्यायतत्त्वे । —*Buddhisara* : v. 10.

The criticism against a theory of this kind such as the *yathārthakhyāti*, wherein the illusory object, or rather, the so-called object of illusory-cognition, (which is, by the way, a very misleading expression which predicates of the cognition itself falsity) is, as it has been accepted by all, in some sense, under the generous influence of memories or *samskāras* which unconsciously and instinctively encroach upon its functions for the sake of practical activity, lies only in so far as it cannot be accepted in the manner in which it has been stated by the Upaniṣadic theorists. The quintuplication of the primary elements as explaining the actual presence of all elements in all things, though in different proportions, may be or may not be true. Aver that it is so, yet it is impossible to explain the formal similarities which pertain to the genus-characteristics, rather than to substantial characteristics. It is true that it is impossible to divorce the form from the matter in which it inheres, but our essential illusion is precisely when we do commit this divorce, and attribute the qualities that belong to

a thing to something else on the basis of the principle of accepted unity of quality with substrate. That is to say, on seeing a likeness of snake, we attribute to the substrate where it is perceived, the other qualities belonging to the snake over and above the actually perceived form. This is the principle of *Anyathākhyāti*, wherein one thing appears as different from what it is. Critiques of illusion cannot and should not dismiss lightly this problem as a problem purely pertaining to the realm of sensory-illusion, and nothing more. The ultimate question has to be faced, and that is, supposing we observe properly and investigate properly and experiment properly, what would be the causes, real and invariable, of the illusion which indeed has occurred? As Śrī Vedānta Deśika¹ pointed out, we find that the *Akhyāti* theory, which holds that illusion is a matter referable to non-observation or non-discrimination between two perceptions (indeed one of the perceptions is not a perception at all but a recognition of a perception if not pure remembrance) is a very acceptable one, only because of its conforming to the principle of parsimony (*lāghavam*). But the *Anyathā-khyāti* theory, which indeed cannot but accept in some way the failure to discriminate in its theory of mal-observation or otherwise-cognition, is at once an efficient theory as well as conforming to the principle of parsimony (*laghīyāsī*)¹. Claims could be brought forward to show that one or other of these theories is more acceptable than the other, and we could indeed even accept the theory of indefinability of 'the object of illusory cognition'. It is, however, very clear that most Indian thinkers have not tried to enquire as to the causes which have tended to bring about the illusion. The reference ultimately is to the object's nature, and this is certainly not answered by saying that the cognition of the previous snake is superimposed here, or that there are two cognitions, one of which happens to be only a *real* re-

1. *Nyāya-parīśuddhi* : Mem. Ed. p. 13

सर्वैरप्यन्यथाख्यातिर्दुस्त्यजत्वाङ्घ्रियसी ।

तद्वादिनाऽप्यवर्ज्यत्वात् ततोऽन्यख्यातिलाघवम् ॥

collection of a previous experience of *real* silver in a shop, which now interferes with the brilliance or *tejas* of the nacre, or that it is impossible to describe whether the thing, the snake taken as such is a real entity or an unreal entity, real because it has been experienced, unreal because it has been proved to be otherwise in action or thus sublated.

A correct understanding of the nature of the object is what is vouched by even error. Error indeed is the gateway to knowledge, because it arrests our attention to certain features of the object which though they may be similar to other previously experienced objects, has a unique difference. The doctrine of *Yathārthakhyāti* only points out that so far as our perceptual experience goes, it is impossible to explain away the differences or identities as false, for indeed *they are not sublated*. The rope can yet be utilised to frighten others in the twilight; the nacre can yet be palmed off, even as synthetic diamonds can be sold as diamonds. This is the essential point about the reality of the object, and obviously no mere perception can reveal the inner nature of the object.

An excellent survey of all the theories of error has been given in the Introduction to his edition of the *Brahma-siddhi*¹ by Prof. Mahāmahopādhyāya S. Kuppuswami Sastriar, and this can be consulted. But whilst it is most excellently presented from the stand-point of Indian Schools, a constructive survey is yet a desideratum from the standpoint of philosophy which does not divorce the epistemological from the physical. Strict relevance in regard to perceptual theory which does not debunk any features of reality, however distressing this might be to settled convictions has always been the mark of progress.

Reality is said to be characterised by either eternity or persistency. Any inner contradiction in a thing due to its having parts will make continuity or persistency impossible, and therefore all things that have parts should be declared to

1. Pp. I. xii ff. 1937.

be unreal. Under this principle all created things will become unreal. This was made the chief criticism by the Eleatics downwards to Bradley and other idealists, of all reality of change. As to eternity, shorn of all change, it would be just a self-evident and self-valid existence having what is known as internal coherence. But what about the ordinary things of life, which have no self-valid inner coherence? They have therefore to be treated as unreal. But these twin principles do not really explain the reality of change; and the reality of momentary states is the fundamental principle of Buddhism. So far as the problem of perception is concerned, we have to put to ourselves the question whether perception is a way to knowledge or is not? If it is a way to knowledge, then what it presents is real; if not, all that it presents will have to be deemed to be unreal, and not merely a real overlain with unreality due to subjective ignorance. If it is objective ignorance that is said to delude, the uncovering of it will mean the more and more clear understanding of the object's unity of characteristics, wherein the specific characteristics may be said to have similarities in various degrees with other objects. The nature of the object is unique, and it is this uniqueness that grants it the specific power to bring about results, or to cause anything, or to fulfil certain activities due to its relationship in the universe. Thus the practical efficacy or causal efficacy of objects is most important in determining once for all the reality of an object as an object amongst objects. It is this that is recognised in the schools of Cārvāka, Buddhist and Jain, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Kumārila, and in Rāmānuja's school. Let me briefly refer to these theories by way of explaining my point of view.

The materialists (Cārvākas) hold that truth is available only through perception. It is the only source of knowledge for us. They do not admit that it is ever possible to have any other kind of knowledge, through any other medium. Reasoning cannot furnish truth, and inference has no place in the understanding of reality as an independent instrument of

knowledge. It is clear from certain writings of the Cārvākas that they do not mean to accept inference at all¹. But the truth about the matter seems to be that they do not accept inference as an independent *pramāṇa*, source of right knowledge, for what it is dependent upon is the memory or impressions or perceptions of objects. It is true, of course, that since what we receive from sensations or perceptions are the material on which we act, and since these are of a transient nature, the Cārvāka cannot but finally deny the whole of reality. The intention of the Cārvāka thinker, on the other hand, seems to be, that despite himself, he was prepared to be inconsistent enough to say that there was a metaphysical possibility of the world consisting of four elements². Even here he holds that perception is all and is all-sufficient for our purposes. To go beyond the perceived is to land oneself in speculative fictions. Reasoning should confine itself to interpretation of sensations and nothing more. Once however this standpoint is taken, it is important to know as to whose perception is valid: whether it is one's own perception, or should we arrive at a consensus of opinion in this matter regarding the nature of the object? How can subjectivity of perception be overcome so as to yield the consensus of opinion which is a kind of objectivity? Cārvāka theorists only assert that all that one perceives is true for that individual, under the circumstances.

That which furthers or advances their pleasure is truth, and that which does not is false. Truth is the pleasant, is that which is adequate and easy of performance, and is that which does not cause sorrow or distress. Therefore an affective-criterion of truth and a frustration-criterion of truth are given. The frustration-criterion, as I shall call it, really is a veiled pragmatic test of practical success or that which works. *artha-kriyākāritva*. It is what the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* system

1. Cf. *Lokāyata-vāda-bhaṅga*: J. S. V. O. I. Vol. I.

2. The progress of the materialist school in the East, as in the West, has been mainly in the direction of Scientific Progress, despite all theocratic criticism.

calls the extraneous or extrinsic test (*paratah-prāmāṇya*). Whether it is necessary to consider this to be a test extraneous to the object's reality, is a matter very much under dispute, as some hold that the object's reality includes its effective existence which can only be discovered in and through its reactions. The 'intention' of an object is as much important as its actual state, and is part and parcel of the sensation itself. This theory then already envisages the need to study the purpose or dynamic quality of the object as already being given in the perception, though what is plainly sensed through the senses is just an integral portion, so to speak, of the object. It is not enough to affirm that an object is merely its sensed-content, for it is also a dynamic object in relation to the purposes and promises it enfolds in its being. This fact it is that is discovered in the illusion. Illusion is possible only because there has been non-discrimination of the pure sensation from the 'intention,' or rather, illusion occurs wherever the intention has been affirmed of a thing which indeed does not possess this 'intent'. Illusions of perceptions, then, need not be purely sensory; and indeed the perception is, provided all things or factors are in a healthy condition, always true. What makes a true sensation false, is not the sensation in its intrinsic nature, but the wrong 'intent' that we predicate of it. This wrong 'intent' is affirmed of it because of previous experiences having gone along with similar sensations of such objects, and which are recalled through spontaneous memory (*smṛti*).

Thus the doctrine which affirms that all that is perceived is true or true existence or really existing, is correct. But it may be asked whether this 'intent' or dynamical possibility of the object sensed is not something that is perceived along with the object? Obviously not, since the sense-organs relate themselves not to the inner dynamics of the object but only to the outer form and colour, and perhaps even location. The object, unless it is related to some interest on the part of the individual, will remain opaque, so to speak, to the individual.

But if it be an object related to some inner demand of the individual, for example, an instinct, then we find that the 'intention' of the object gets revealed in the reactions of the individual to it. But this 'intention' need not always be awaiting the need of the individual, and is certainly not dependent on it. For it is found that though it is exhibited to the individual only when it is presented to him, it is sought for and attained by the individual, and as such remains extrinsic to the individual, though more surely intrinsic to the object sensed. The materialist's claim, then, that satisfaction or fulfilment of a demand is truth, is true not in respect of himself as he would like to have it, but in respect of the object.¹

The difficulty in respect of the pure *Yathārtha-khyāti* theory is, that it holds that whatever is perceived is true not merely in the sense of actually existing as perceived as the *sat-khyāti* view that Jainism holds, but also in respect of substantial existence; that is to say, in the case of nacre and silver, the 'silverness' is said to be actually present in the nacre, but only in lesser *quantity* so as to be almost useless for the purpose of transaction in the monetary sense. The presence of snake in the rope is real in a substantial sense. This view is not likely to be acceptable except to those who bank on the metaphysical theory of the Upaniṣads of *Pañcīkaraṇa*, quintuplication of primary elements, wherein the gross elements are, each one of them, said to have all the other elements in them, but only in lesser degrees. Thus the *Yathārtha-khyāti* explains the illusion by saying that there is no illusion at all, but only wrong desire or some such mental factor which makes the percept 'intend' something it cannot fulfil. Thus the criterion in the *Yathārtha-khyāti-vāda* is the efficacy in actual experience—*vyavahāra*. *Yathāvastita Vyavahārānugūṇa-jñānam pramā*. "All knowledge is true in a sense that it has an object always corresponding to it or what has been precisely described by Anantāchārya that all cognitive

1. Cf. Criticism of Pragmatist Theory of Perception: *Guide of Philosophy*: C. E. M. Joad, p. 448 ff.

characters (illusory or otherwise) universally refer to real objective entities as object of knowledge."¹ The general maxim is that the idea which corresponds to any particular kind of behaviour is to be regarded as a true representation of the object experienced in behaviour—

यथार्थव्यवहारानुगुणा या धीः सा । *Naya-Dyu-Mani*²

Thus the correspondence between the object 'intended' and the actual realization of that intention or causal efficacy, which, by the way, is to be recognized always, as the Buddhists will put it, as *ekārtha-kriyā-kāritva*, cannot but be accepted as clear. This correspondence is not in any sense equivalent to the representationalistic theory which is impossible to sustain in the Sautrāntika system of the Buddhists and in the theories of Locke and Des Cartes.

Whether pragmatism of this kind is something to be refuted is an important point. It is, in the excellent words of Prof. A. N. Whitehead 'an appeal to the wide self-evidence', "Pragmatism is simply an appeal to that self-evidence which sustains itself in civilized experience".³ It is not an extraneous test except that it is extraneous to the senses, or rather this relevance or correspondence is of the practical order arising from the theoretical impression. In experience such a divorce between the practical and the theoretical cannot be sustained, for all knowledge is purposive; and action in turn, as even erroneous perception and erroneous action reveal, makes knowledge rich and effective. Such action is subordinate to knowledge, and therefore enriches it and becomes effective in conduct.

Truth is dynamic, because reality is dynamic, and the *Yathārtha-khyāti* only reveals the inner necessity to accept the reality of all experience, so that we could disentangle the mis-relationships that happen due to a variety of causes, mainly pertaining to wrong intentions.

1. *History of Indian Philosophy* : S. N. Dasgupta, Vol. III, p. 246.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 244.

3. *Modes of Thought* : pp. 144-5.

APPENDIX II

A STUDY OF DREAMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚRĪ RĀMAṆUJA.¹

Dream in the Veda.

i

It has been said that much of what passes for Indian Psychology is speculative and mystical and not experimental; that it is, more often than not, primitive and anthropomorphic and superstitious. It is certainly true to say that more speculation in psychology, as in everything else, is false. The question is whether there could be any speculation apart from experience; though it is true to say that the experience that we start with should be first tested and carefully studied. The facts alone are the final arbiters of any theory, and no theory that does not stand the test of experience can be considered to be true at all. The experience that is the test of all truth, the *vyavahāra* that is the final arbiter of any knowledge, is not the uneducated statement but statement that has been made after due understanding of experience, carefully sifted and analysed and synthesized. Scientific observation, thus, is the essence of any theory. Indian Psychologies of Dream are prompted by the question regarding the autonomy of the psychical life. What is the special characteristic of dream-life? A question similar to this was addressed by Prof. Hollingworth to his study of the *Psychology of Thought* from the stand-point of dream-life. This question is very significant, since it seeks to discover the special characteristic of dream-life. There are several views, and no one formula seems to fit in with facts. In this paper, at the very start, let me dispel the illusion of one formula or explanation underlying most theories.

The Indian Psychology of Dreams naturally takes its start from the Vedic period. The first view that we glean regarding

1. J. S. V. O. I. Vol. I. 1940.

dreams is from the Ṛg-veda. The dreams are manifestations of evil spirits, and they are said to be removed by the activity of spirits that dispense justice, of spirits of magic. The earnest devotee prays to Lord Varuṇa to protect him from the activities of evil spirits.¹

This is not the only view however. Dreams are said to be due to the manifold activities of the mind itself. "Avaunt, thou master of mind, depart and vanish far away. Look on destruction far from hence. The live man's mind is manifold."² (Ṛgveda X. 164.) The suggestion that mind has manifold functions that it executes in all states, is valuable psychological insight. But there is the fear of being under the influence of dreams. However pleasant in parts, they were deemed to be placing the individual under the influence of external forces. "Even if, O child of Heaven, it makes a garland or chain of gold, the whole bad dream, whatever it be, to Trita Āptya, we consign." (Ṛgveda VIII. 47. 15). There is as yet not the consciousness that they are dream-creations of one's own making. It is just possible that such an idea did not find a place in their psychology. But that these dreams were held to be, in some sense, results of their own bad actions is clear, since the appeal is to the Lord of *Ṛta*, the Law-giver, and they also prayed to Him to transfer their evil dreams to those who deserve it, namely, the evil-doers.

This view finds full expression in the incantations of the Atharva-veda. Dreams are fashioned in sleep. Sleep thus becomes the embryo of dreams. It is the source, the *Yoni* of all dreams. In other words, it is during the period of sleep, when all the senses are lulled, and when one is alone with one's psychic being, the *buddhi* or *antaḥkarana*, there happens the influences of other psychic forces. It is the influence of psychic forces that leads to dream-consciousness or dream-

1. Yo me rājan yujyo vā sakṣā vā, svapne bhayam bhīrave mahyamāha!
Steno vā yo dipsati no vṛko vā, tvam tasmād varuṇa pāhyasmān !!
(Ṛgveda II. 28. 10)

2. Apohi manasaspate'pa krāma paraścara !
Pāro nirṛtyā ā cakṣva bahudhā jīvato manaḥ !!

experience. As the Atharva-veda says, it is then that there happens within the individual stimulations of the vital forces, the lair of the *asuras*, as the expressive phrase runs.

1. " Out of Yama's world hast thou come hither ; with mirth (?) dost thou, wise, make use of mortals; knowing, thou goest in alliance with the solitary one, fashioning sleep in the lair (yoni) of the Asura.
2. The all-vigorous bond saw thee in the beginning, in the one day before the birth of night ; from thence, O sleep, didst thou come hither, hiding thy form from the physicians.
3. He of great kine (?) turned unto the gods away from the Asuras, seeking greatness; to that sleep the three-and-thirty ones, having attained the sky, imparted over-lordship.
4. Not the Fathers, and not the gods, know it, whose murmur goes about within here ; in Trita Āptya did the men, the Adityas taught by Varuṇa, set sleep.
5. Of whom the evil-doers shared the cruelty, the well-doers, by non-sleep, (shared) the pure (punya) life-time,—thou revelest in the sky with the highest relative; thou wast born out of the mind of the practising fervour.
6. We know all thine attendants (?) in front ; we know, O sleep, who is thine over-ruler here ; protect us here with the glory of the glorious one ; go thou away far off with poisons " (A. V. XIX. 56. trans. Whitney).

One fact that has to be noted is that the word *Svapna* meant two things, the state of sleep as well as what it contains, the dreams. Therefore in the whole Hymn above quoted, we have to understand sleep in its two-fold connotations.

The first verse tells us that sleep which simulates death, is a creation of Yama, the lord of death, and fashions sleep in the places of action, that is, creates rest and stoppage of action.

The second verse shows that the nature of sleep and dream could not be discovered by the physicians, and though outer symptoms are lacking, yet there is full activity of the mind in dream-sleep.

The third verse takes us further into the nature of the dream-sleep. He, who is possessed of powers instead of using the exteriorly turned waking forces and sense-organs, now began to use the Gods, the creative energies within, seeking greatness, being more than these. The power that made these dream-creations is something over and above the psychic powers or forces interior to the individual.

The fourth verse describes the nature of the inward action of that Power that seeks greatness through them, about whom neither the fathers, nor the gods, know. It is in the Trita Āptya, the men taught by Varuṇa, the lord of *Rta*, set sleep. This is indeed very abstruse since the *āditayas* as the shining ones taught by Varuṇa, are said to have placed sleep in Trita Āptya. The symbolism implicit in this species of Gods needs further elucidation. They belong to the level of the highest inner state of deep sleep, of *susupti*. The other term referring to the gods called Dvita is related to the Trita gods in some as yet un-understood symbolic manner.

The fifth verse is indeed very significant. The evil-doers were created to enjoy cruelty, and the well-doers the non-dream, and they reached the plane of consciousness which rightly belongs to the Highest. Such a highest state has occurred as a consequence of pure deeds and self-control—practising fervour means such self-control and a life-time of *punya*.

The last verse clearly reveals that the over-ruler here is the Glorious one, the one who sought out the gods leaving the *asuras*, in order to manifest his Greatness.

The next hymn where there is reference to the dreams is a magician's incantation to make dreams trouble the mind of the God-reviler, the mocker, of one who is not of us that is to say who is our foe. Therein Sleep is described as the

“embryo of the wives of the gods, instrument of Yama”! the excellent dreams being the progeny of the creative forces, namely, the gods. The evil dream is cast out and sent to those who are foes.

“Embryo of the wives of the gods, instrument of Yama, excellent dream ; evil (dream) that is mine, that do we send forth to him that hates us.” (A.V.XIX. 57.3).

The next verse that follows this is admittedly a difficult one for which Prof. Whitney does not stand surety for correctness. His translation runs after amendations made by him thus:—

4. “Thee that are ‘harsh’ by name, mouth of the black-bird (śakuni)—thee, O sleep, we thus know completely; do thou, O sleep, as a horse a halter, as a horse a girth, scatter him who is not of us, the God-reviler, the mocker.”

The important part is ‘the mouth of the black-bird *kṛṣṇa-śakuni*’. The inner meaning of the black-bird is that it is a sign of omens too. The word *śakunam* indeed proves that the art of prediction took its cue from the signs of birds. The dark omen predicted by the dreams is a favourable interpretation of the passage. Further, sleep, like a horse that throws off its halter and releases itself from its girth, scatters the evil dreams. There is thus freedom granted to the dreamer to shake himself off from the limitations of his evil dreams and to enjoy good ones.

The fifth verse prays that the God-reviler, the mocker, one who is not of us, may wear the evil dreams, as if it were a necklace.

The last verse is again very abstruse and is a magical formula.

Our tentative study of the Vedic concept of sleep-dream shows that the distinctions between light sleep and deep sleep was made by the seers, and whilst deep sleep was almost like death, light sleep was the period of enjoyment of good and bad

dreams. The creative power that works in dreams is the God's power, which seeks His greatness after abandoning the powers of *Prāṇa* or *asura*, and takes up the task of creating god-like creations in sleep. The magical formula in the fifty-seventh hymn of the Atharva-veda is the statement of the principle that *Mantra* can make the dreams pass over to others. But the power that must be made to do this is undoubtedly the Supreme Lord of *Ṛta*. He could be appealed to only through prayer and *māntric* incantation.

The human being is constantly under the control of the powers, external to him, internal to him and above him. External experiences of objects as well as internal experiences of the powers of the shining beings. *ādityas*, gods, manifested in dreams, are prophetic or pleasant, fear-striking and terrific and evil according to the Law of Varuṇa, who is the Moral Dispenser of Justice.

The psychological theory of dream gets an ethical justification here. There is realization of ends or the results of such desires as have been made in the waking-state under the moral dispensation of the Lord. Moral causality thus is in the forefront. Secondly, the power of dream-creation is relegated to the psychic powers independent of the individual. We are here in the land of theocracy. The reason is not far to seek. It is because these thinkers found themselves helpless. They could not get their own wills to create what they wished for. The dream refused to fall into their scheme of what is good, and man experiences both evil and good dreams, despite of himself. If he were to be the creator he would never dream a bad dream at all, as his own prayer to Lord Varuṇa reveals. That no physician can cure the evil dreams, is another fact that makes him conceive of dreams, good as well as bad, as creations of forces other than himself. He is however aware that they come to him because of his evil mind and action, and prays therefore that in return to his being good God would "scatter them to their foes, like the horse its halter, like the horse its girth."

The Dream-theory of Śrī Rāmānuja is almost similar to the view propounded above.

ii

Dream in the Upaniṣads.

The above theory is accepted by the *Upaniṣads*, though there is more elaboration. The question is whether it is the individual soul who creates or imagines, or God who creates through His greatness, *mahimā*, His splendour and His justice.

In the *Upaniṣads* we have many references to dreams. It is the stage known as the intermediate state. *Sāndhyam ṛtṛiyam svapṇanāsthānam*. (Bṛh. Up. IV. 3.) In this stage Yājñavalkya says there is self-projection.

“He projects for himself tanks, lotus-pools, streams, for he is the creator” (IV. 3. 10); “He makes many forms for himself” (13); “He goes wherever he pleases” (12); “It is his private pleasure-ground.” (14).

In the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, (VIII. 10. 1.) it is mentioned that

“He moves about happy in dream. He is the self. That is the Immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman.”

In the *Praśnopaniṣad*, IV. 5.) we have the statement that in dream or sleep God experiences greatness as we saw in Atharva-veda XIX. 56, 3.

“There in sleep that God experiences greatness. Whatever object has been seen, he sees again, has been heard, he hears again. That which has been severally experienced in different places and regions, he severally experiences again and again. Both what has been seen and what has not been seen, both what has been heard and what has not been heard, both what has been experienced and what has not been experienced, both the real (*sat*) and the unreal (*asat*) he sees all. He sees it himself being all.”

This passage is crucial in the explanation of the theory of self-projection and self-creativity. It promises to explain all dreams, as if they were representations or reproductions of objects of the waking-state in the state of sleep with such additions as will display its greatness. But the last sentence clinches the whole description with the sentence "He sees it, himself being all." This has more relevantly reference to the Supreme Being who is All, and not to one who imagines oneself to be god, and all. The explanation of the passage accordingly should be that though the imagery be those that have been once seen, heard and tasted and felt by the individual, their recurrences in his consciousness are not by any means due to the activity of himself but due to the Divine Being, who is the Inner Ruler Immortal. The reality of the dream as well as its prognosticating or prophetic nature (non-existent or *asat* nature) are due to the will of the Lord, who is the Master of all Reality and Power of creative *Māyā*. The *Kaivalyopaniṣad* says however that the good and evil enjoyment is due to the individual's creation only, of his own world : Svapne sa jīvaḥ sukhaduḥkhabhoktā svamāyayā kalpitaviśvaloke....." (Kaivalya Up. 13).

But how could the individual create for himself anything so hopelessly miserable as these dreams, and then seek to transcend these by annihilating all? It may be that dreams of fear and evil are creations of ignorance. With an ignorance coupled with a state of utter loss of consciousness when one is helpless, can any one create anything? Some thinkers deem it possible, because, following the general principle enunciated by the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, they refer the *Taijasa* activity of the second plane to the individual soul and not to the universal Self. But such a reference, whilst, at first look, right and flattering to the individual, is not seen to be correct. The creators of dream, even according to modern psychologists, are not the individual's imaginative wills but some force, described as Elan Vital, Unconscious, or some other deep and primitive force that seeks to make man regress into animal life in dreams. This is not the individual's nature taken

as such, but what in his biological adventure, he has gathered as the heritage of evolution, which it is his conscious aim to disgorge and transcend. Undoubtedly, this has its modern touch, the egoistic touch, but the explanations of the dreams, despite the fact that some dreams are explained by some recessive experiences or, by some deep and unexplained complexes and repressions, are on the whole as much speculative in their explanations as the ancient view that refers these to psychic forces or Force which is of the moral Lord-Self within the individual. Infinite capacity for a finite mind is the paradox that results from the theory which holds that dreams are individual self-creations.

The physiological aspect of dreams is dealt with in the minor *uṇiṣads*. The *Paṅgalopaniṣad* says that the *Svapna-state* is that in which the senses are at rest, and wherein there is manifestation of the knower and the known along with the affinities of (things enjoyed in) the waking-state: *Kāraṇoparame jāgrat-saṃskārārthaprabodhavad grāhya-grāhakarūpasphuraṇam svapnāvasthā bhavati*. (II. 12.)

This clearly supports the view that the *contents* of the dream-experiences are sensory, and are nothing new because already experienced. But non-experienced features or correlations or suggestions might crop up in the dreams. These must be conceived to be due to the power of the Inward Ruler Immortal, who dispenses moral deserts for each individual.

The *Śārīrakopaniṣad* lays stress on the fact that the senses, internal as well as external, are inactive, though the *antaḥkaraṇa* which consists of memory, affinities, selfness and *buddhi*, is active in dream-state:—*Antaḥkaraṇacatuṣṭayaireva samyuktaḥ svapnaḥ*. (14)

This does not conflict with the view already enunciated. Though the organism which is utilised in dream-experiences is identical with that used during waking-state, the spirit that uses it, is not the individual self but its Inner Lord, who is also the Lord of all souls, *sarvaniyaṃtā*.

The *Sarvasāropaniṣad* declares that in dream the *ātman* experiences subtly through the fourteen organs (the five organs of knowledge and the five motor organs and the four-fold *antahkaraṇa*) associated with the affinities of the waking condition, sound, and other objects which are of the form of affinities, created for the time being, even in the absence of (gross) sound and others: *Tadvāsanāśahitaiś caturdaśakaraṇaiḥ śabdādyaḥbhāve'pi vāsanāmayāñchadbādīn yadopalabhate tadātmanaḥ svapnam.* (4)

This view is clearly understandable as granting a physiological basis for the sensory reproduction of past experiences.

The *Varāhopaniṣad* (II. 61) declares that "The moving about of *buddhi* in the subtle *nāḍis* constitute the dreaming state. In me without the act of moving about, there is no dreaming.":

Sūkṣmanāḍiṣu sañcāro buddheḥ svapnaḥ prajāyate!

Sañcārarahite mayi svapno na vidyate !!

This is a description of dream, not as the state of utter inaction and fatigue or rest, but as a state of dynamic movement or exploratory activity of the self in its cognitive experience, namely, *buddhi* exclusively.

The *Hamsoḥpaniṣad* says that the dream occurs when the *jīva* moves on the pericarp of the heart-lotus, and when it enters the centre of the lotus, then there is deep sleep. This merely substantiates the view that it is during the period of the soul's moving out of its 'lair of deep sleep' that there happens dream. The intermediate state mentioned by the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is recapitulated in terms of mystic description of the heart-lotus as the place of *Īśvara*, as is spoken of in the *Bhagavadgītā*.

The *Maitryopaniṣad*¹ propounds the view that "In the three a quarter of Brahma moves, a three quarter in the last. For the sake of experiencing the true and the false, the great *Ātman* has a dual nature. Yea the great *Ātman* has dual nature."

1. Maitrī. Up. VII. 11, 8. cf. Rgvedic view, X. 90.

The *Māṇḍūkya*¹ affirms the greatness of Brahman in the *Svapna-state*. The state is entirely subjective, but it is not the individual subject who is the creator. That function indeed belongs to the Supreme. For in this dream-state there is duality of subject and object.

The *Kaṭhōpaniṣad*² states that "He who is awake in those who sleep.....That is the Bright, That is Brahman, That alone is Immortal. All worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond:"

Ya yeṣa supteṣu jāgarti kāmam kāmam puruṣo nirmimāṇaḥ!
Tadeva śukram tadbrahma tadevāmṛtamucyate!
Tasmin lokāḥ śritāḥ sarve tadu nātyeti kaścana! etadvai tat.

This clinches the issue about the discussion between the individual and the Supreme Being as to who the creator is. As for the physiological state of the organism during sleep and the psychic apparatus in action during sleep and dream, there is nothing that prevents the individual experiencing directly the psychic external forces, and certainly there is nothing that prevents the individual soul from experiencing any experiences granted to it by its own inner and yet transcendent Ruler.

iii

Dream in Śrī Rāmānuja's Philosophy

We shall see in the following pages that Śrī Rāmānuja holds the view that dream-state is a state intermediate, that it is the period of experiencing moral deserts, that the creations are by the Supreme Lord for the enjoyment of the individual soul as reward for such activities as are of minor importance, that it is that which leads to the deep sleep-state. The prophetic quality in dreams such as are mentioned in the *Chāṇḍogyaopaniṣad* is due to the characteristic activity of the Supreme.³

1. *Māṇḍūkya Up.* XV.

2. *Kaṭha Up.* II. ii. 8.

3. *Vedānta Sūtras*: III. ii. 1-6.

The intermediate states is described by the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (IV. iii. 1) thus

“There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horse and roads. There are no blessings, happiness, joys and so on. For he is the creator.”

To whom does this power to create belong? The second *sūtra* (III. ii. 2.) affirms that the individual soul is the creator. The third *sūtra* refutes it, and says that these dreams are due to *Māyā*, are created by the Lord through His *Māyā*. The supreme person, and not the individual soul, is the creator, for the individual is a creature and not a creator. He who is awake in those who sleep, He is the person who creates all. The dream is not illusory experience. It is a real experience. It has a meaning and an ethical purpose. The *Māyā* ‘transforms’ the experiences and makes them more or less pleasing to the individual. This transformation is not wrought by ignorance but by intelligence that is just and good. The theory of *Mahimā*, greatness, is identical with the theory propounded regarding *Māyā*.¹ It is the activity of the Supreme Lord through His creative power of great wonder and power. It is not an illusion-causing power, though such indeed may be the power of a blinding excellence and transcendent effect. It is a phrase that expresses wonder, *āścaryavācī*, conveying the sense of superior-power. It is true that the individual might experience this *Māyā* in a two-fold manner, one being an experience of wonder, and another of illusion.

Further the individual self being bound, cannot do anything. It is through his growing sense of intelligence that he could, in some measure, reach up to creativity, till finally, on release from his body as well as all material connection, he becomes, though not master of *Māyā*, at least capable of creating something by the grace of the Lord. *It is fundamental to all creativity that he who creates must have intelligence. The*

1. Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma holds this to be the comprehensive theory of dream in Upaniṣadic philosophy. in the *Jour. Orien. Research. Madras.*

Unconscious can create nothing, not even dreams. It is said that the slighted dream protests more vigorously than the objects of the waking-state, but at least in waking-state the individual is in exercise of his limited intelligence and consciousness, whereas in sleep he is unconscious. The dreams that occur to such an individual, according to Śrī Rāmānuja, could only be those that the Lord wills him to experience through his own psychic apparatus (of which also He is the Lord). The individual's capacity being utterly limited, and the dream-experiences being avowedly far beyond his awakened and waking capacities, it is necessary to affirm that the Supreme Lord alone can grant him such visions. Therefore dreams partake of the quality of visions and not of hallucinations. This is a very important difference. That some of these experiences might be such that have been reviewed by the individual, or so made to be reviewed by the Lord, is due to the important moral appeal and retributive nature of those dreams. But there are dreams of prophetic quality, dreams such as almost any Hindu knows, and about which there is sufficient literature in almost all religions, which are said to convey the commands of God. The whole literature of Ālvārs is full of such experiences. It is true that these dreams require careful study. But one thing is certain. *These dreams become true.* Individual's dreams can never have, despite intense *saṅkalpa* or volition or desire, this *realizing* quality. As a matter of fact individual creative imagination has a *de-realizing* quality. That deep volitions could invade dreams is not unlikely, but that they should get realization is not due to intensity or to overtaking things by storm, but because their sources are *adrṣta*, unknown, in the words of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. If we ask what this unknown principle is, we find that it is a cloak to hide ignorance. Rightly Śrī Rāmānuja says that the creator of reality being the Supreme Lord, the dream-creations are creations of the Lord, granting pre-pleasure and hopes of realization. It is not wish-fulfilment, for indeed the individual soul is a beggar who wishes to ride. "That which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality: and as ill-fortune

is not desired, the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence, the creation which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only" - (*Śrī-Bhāṣya* III. ii. 6.) Svapnādhyāyavidaśca svapnam śubhā-śubhayossūcakam ācakṣate. Sūcakatvam ca svasaṅkalpāyatasya nopapadyate; tathā cāsubhasyāniṣṭatvācchubhasya sūcakaṃeva śīṣṭvā paśyēt. Atah svapne śīṣṭir īśvareṇaiva kṛtā.

Thus the arguments for the dreams being creations of the individual being baseless, since much of what an individual deems to be his imaginations come to him with an objectivity and reality and transcendence not traceable to him, though they are expressed or presented in terms that he could personally more than any other understand, the creative activity of the Lord through His *Māyā* is clearly determined. Further, the state of his psychic life during dreams, precludes his creatorship since he is more a *receiver* of impressions than the *maker* of them. He might even be the *hero*, as he is intended to be, of his dreams, but that does not mean that he is the creator of himself. The dreams have the nature of being the fruits of the individual's actions; they are the results of his *karma* in his waking-state, the fruits that are daily dispensed, since they refer to minor deeds.

We can now sum up the Indian Dream psychology according to Śrī Rāmānuja.

1. A finite, unintelligent or ignorant being, and asleep, can *create* nothing not even self-delusions and illusions. An infinite Being, absolutely intelligent and eternally awake, alone can create *Reality* that is *Sat* because it is *cit* and *Ānanda*, the creative sign of Perfection and utter transcendence. (*Tait-Ānandavallī*.) Reality is made or created by *Īśvara* only. None else except those whose intelligence is informed by the Lord and who have got rid of their material natures and bodies can ever create anything.

2. In the universal function of creation as a whole there is no place for the individual. (*Śrī-Bhāṣya* I. 1. 2.) The

self-illusive power is one of ignorance. But it cannot be called creation or manifestation because its function is to hide, to veil, and not to manifest. The entire real creative activity, *jagadvyāhāra*, is of the Lord; as it is in *Prakṛti* or Nature, so it is in the case of dreams, which are creations within the individual.

3. All dreams are real, because they are not subjectively caused by oneself. They have prophetic character as well as ethical justification. They evoke feelings of joy and sorrow and ecstasy and pleasure. Good dreams leave after-results of bodily fitness, whilst evil dreams leave one physically weak.

4. In so far as the individual becomes self-controlled and participates in the life of the Divine and leads a moral life of self-consecration and self-surrender to the Divine, he would get himself freed from evil dreams. And if his moral life increases in its intensity, the dreams themselves lead to real experiences. That is to say, the true dreams, dreams that are bridges to reality, occur. Such a man's dreams become true. Mind becomes the bridge to the supreme consciousness. When the dream is said to happen at twilight, the *sandhyā*, between the waking and the deep sleep, between the *jāgrat* and the *susupti*, what is suggested is that it leads to the ultimate transcendence which is by way of making the consciousness in dream essentially receptive of the Divine Creative manifestation within oneself, a creative manifestation that is at once of joy and bliss, of reality, and prophetic of the future.

5. In the quiet *recipient* mind alone there happens, and can happen, true creation; it is then that it is the "pleasure-ground" of the Lord. In that, Bliss is the Master. Dreams are true and objective and are essentially moral deserts of minor actions, good and bad.

This is the conclusion that Śrī Rāmānuja arrives at.

Without taking into consideration the mainly theological explanation of the dream-state given by Śrī Rāmānuja and limiting our criticism to two fundamental postulates of the theory of dreams propounded by him, we find that:

(i) Not all dreams are of the prophetic type. It may be that the prophetic type of dream is the dream that would be really true and valuable for human conduct. It may be that we *ought to* demand of our dream-experience more and more conformity to this type. The fact that our normal experience *does not* conform to this one type is sufficient criticism against its complete acceptance.

(ii) The second type of dream is that of retributive nature. This retributive view might be held in one of two ways or even both, according to the intensity of conscience at work in dream-states.

Dreams might be reactions, terrific and explosive, of waking conscious behaviour, as in the case of Lady Macbeth, Richard III, or even as in so many cases of murderers, where sweet sleep refuses to come in to drown the impressions and leaves them in night-mares. The dream night-mares are sufficient punishments for misbehaviour.

That the reactions are certainly not the autonomous compensations of the nervous system or individual's conscience, is certain. Explanations are not wanting in referring this to the social 'super-ego', and other such mythical entities. The *Karma* theory of retributive justice wherein there is not only a code of penalties for transgressions but also rewards for conformities and good behaviour, is capable of explaining the principle of retributive dream. The only rub is that the *Dream-Penal Code* is not available any where. We feel in our hearts the presence of the law. We perhaps have sufficient belief in God's justice and Goodness to feel that right shall have its rewards and wrongs their punishments; but the law of retributive action is the law that is beyond our understanding in so far as actual connections between punishments and their causes are concerned. The theory that general happiness and of general deterioration of consciousness result from good or bad deeds is not acceptable at least in the sphere of dream-interpretation.

Further, the moral theory of dream as deserts for *minor* misdemeanours or good offices is quite welcome, only the language of recompense and retribution is speculative and appears to be unreal. It remains a mystery how Caraka was able to link up certain dreams with diseases of a particular kind and certain other dreams with successes and recovery. For that matter, the *Chāndogya's* interpretation of dream of woman as meaning success is also inexplicable. Perhaps the only truth behind these is that these theories are due to the 'consensus of opinion' at that date. *Varying cultural environments lead to varieties of interpretations.*

The eloquent tribute that Prof. C. G. Jung pays to Indian psychological insight bears reproduction here. "Our western air of superiority in the presence of Indian Understanding is a part of our essential barbarism, for which any true perception of the quite extraordinary depth of those ideas and their amazing psychological accuracy is still but a remote possibility." (*Psychological Types*, p. 262). Despite this, it is clear that the distinction between the inner creative power of the Divine and the individual is not clearly marked out by these thinkers. At any rate, we find that the symbolism underlying the several interpretations leaves much scope for future research. The general principle that no creation of the real experience ever happens without real power or creative power endowed with intelligence is absolutely correct. Illusions might be created by individuals, due to their individual defects of the organism, excitement, or due to really existing similarities in the objects enjoyed. The hallucinatory theory of dream is not warranted by facts of the normal order. To explain the normal by means of the abnormal is a modern hobby; but the normal is a more complex phenomenon than what the one-sided theories originating from the sphere of the abnormal make it out to be.

Even granting that some dreams are no better than illusions, we might say that the dreams are real, because they have real *causes*. Physical stimuli, psychological stimuli, moral causes, psychical influences in the receptive state of dream

are real and do actually produce results. Dreams possess causes and have certain definite ends: either to be defensive mechanisms, or to be the moral fields realizing happiness or sorrow for the individual. Anything that has a cause and a consequence or end is real. Dreams undoubtedly possess this characteristic. It may be contended that another criterion of reality might vitiate this view. But what else is the criterion of reality? It cannot be momentariness or non-eternity merely. Dreams are necessarily links between several planes of consciousness and possess diverse qualities or phenomena, namely, (1) facts of the presentative order, (2) of the representative order, (3) of the creative order and (4) of the physiological order. Therein lies the difficulty of giving a single interpretation for these phenomena. Śrī Rāmānuja's view in so far as it focusses attention on the moral and the prophetic views, which clinch the issue between the individual and the Divine creationisms, is a contribution to the study of further possibilities of a truly creative consciousness. It is not ruled out certainly for an eternally vigilant consciousness, in its periods of intensive manifestation, to create for itself dreams, but then such a state might well cease to be a dream-state. The dream-state thus gets abolished finally.

IV

DREAM IN INDIAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

So far I have shown that the theory of dreams of Śrī Rāmānuja is an enlargement of the Vedic view. I shall now show that the theories put forward by the Indian physiological and medical schools converge towards the theory propounded already and also that modern theories are not so very advanced as they at first sight appear to be.

The nature of dreams generally has been studied, not from the stand-point of view of psychology, but mostly from the stand-point of the theory of knowledge in the several schools.

The study of dreams, however, is necessarily a question not merely as to what they are as processes of the mind, but also as to what the contents of such experiences are.

The physiological and medical school of Indian thought, as found in the writings of Caraka, definitely studies dreams from the stand-point of how and why dreams occur.

The "learned know that dreams are of seven kinds, namely, seen, heard, felt, desired, imagined, prognosticating, and fault-born." says Caraka.¹

Thus the dreams are of sensory-kind, of volitional kind and of the imaginative kind, and in addition to these we have the pathological dreams.² There is the authority of Ribot³ that there are dreams wherein taste as well as smell predominate. We know from our own experience that there are dreams which clearly are of the gustatorial kind, as well as of the olfactory. This theory corresponds with the view that there are types of men whose perception is naturally of any one of the five or six kinds of sensations. That is, there are people who see songs, taste songs or smell songs, just as there are people who hear or taste or smell or feel a picture and so on. They are known as auditory, visual, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual types. Therefore it is, that some people have dreams wherein there are auditory or visual etc., images in prominence.⁴

The sensory, the volitional, and the imaginary are normal dreams. The abnormal are the pathological and the prophetic

1. *Indriyasthāna* V. 42. Cf. Conceptual Psychology of the Ancient Hindus: F. S. Hammet, *Psycho-Analytic Review*, p. 301.

2. W. Lutoslawski mentions another class of dreams in his *Pre-existence and Reincarnation* p. 60. "Short of complete reminiscence, certain dreams may imply forgotten lives.... Sometimes people and places known from dreams are met later on in the waking-state and recognized.

3. *Psychology of Emotions* p. 142.

4. It is also possible that people of any one of the above types might experience other types of imagery as compensations in dream-state. That is one of the reasons why dreams appear as uncommon and novel.

dreams. The pathological state might itself be capable of being the seat of prognosis. Prophetic dreams occur under peculiar physiological conditions not usually normal. The pathogenic types are due to dissociations of memory, and physiological diseases. The prophetic types of dreams are indeed the most significant part of dream-life. No theory of dream is acceptable unless it could in some definite manner explain the prophetic dreams. Pathological dreams could be explained perhaps as due to the "interference of the *nāḍīs* (nerves) that carry the impressions of the external objects to the sensorium or the mind by the three faults of wind, bile and phlegm" (Caraka). They may be due to the chief cause, as asserted by the modern thinkers and psycho-analysts who have revolutionized our ideas of dream-life, namely, dissociation of mental life. This dissociation is a common enough phenomenon as William Brown has affirmed in his *Science and Personality*, as could be seen in the very ordinary acts of classification and regulation of daily work. We dissociate as well as associate our experiences in order to establish order and efficiency in our life. Without some sort of planned grouping, it is impossible to be mentally or even physically efficient. To emphasize dissociation and not to take into account association is wrong. What exactly happens in dreams is that some tendencies which are fundamental to life, like self-preservation and self-perpetuation which in waking-consciousness appear as self and sex, have the power to attach themselves to their respective experiences of the waking-life and to appear always in that specific grouping. This is the association and the dissociation that happen in regard to specific interests. Thus attachment becomes more firm through exercise. Finally there is no life or being for the interest apart from its amplified experiences, nor for the experiences apart from the nucleus of interest. This is the meaning of *specificity* in William McDougall's phraseology, of instincts in animals, and of interests in human beings. This specificity is generally useful for the preservation of human life and action. Each one of our actions is individual, that is, the ends each seeks is different indeed from those of others.

But when is dissociation, or association its correlative, pathogenic? It is when there happens obstruction of a serious nature incapable of being faced by the individual that the dissociation which was helpful in organizing life, becomes a serious menace to the unity of the organism. The struggle for unity or for self it is that disjuncts interests, seeks reorganization of life's several experiences on the basis of new wants and for the sake of meeting new situations. Either we plan our life afresh or we perish. When, however, it is found that the individual is incapable of making this adjustment of his mental life, by breaking the groupings in order to bring about a new order, there happens what is called *mania* (monoideism), *melancholia* and depressive insanity, hallucination and other diseases. The source of this incapacity lies in the emotional life of the individual. Every instinct or interest has, as it were, a quantity of energy for its fulfilment. McDougall made this point rather clear when he said that every instinct has its specific emotion. When Professors James and Lange stated their much criticized, and perhaps even abandoned, theory of emotions,—that we run and then are afraid,—the truth which they attempted to establish was that fear is the psychological state of the body, whereas its counterpart was the motor act of running away, that they are one and the same thing viewed, of course, from two not mutually irreconcilable standpoints. So we find that the energy of performance when impeded, finds its dissociation (or association) emphasized in the mental sphere. But as has been pointed out by Prof. Hollingworth, in his *Psychology of Thought*,¹ this dissociation or association, which he calls 'redintegration', is not something exclusively of the dream-state. The very fact that such 'redintegrations' do normally occur even in the waking-state, where also the life-interests dominantly seek to play their roles and achieve or realize their goals, shows that the processes, said to be specially of the Unconscious, are not such. Of course, there is possible the explanation that what we knew of reality in the waking-state is just a segment, the central umbra

1. Studied *via* dream-experiences.

of consciousness, the others shading off into the subconscious and the unconscious. Such indeed is the explanation of most of our biological theories. Consciousness is the smallest fragment of the Unconscious that has become conscious due to life-interests finding no other way of meeting new situations. Consciousness, it has been said by one great writer, is a consequence of interference, or rather it is consciousness of interference.

We shall not be able to canvas the above theories in all their details at this place. Suffice it to say, that the theory is not specially of the dream-consciousness. Because dream-consciousness is also a state of unconsciousness or an 'intermediate' stage between deep sleep and the waking, the theory of the so-called Unconscious cannot be said to avail. Further the Unconscious is not such an unconscious, because we know something about it. Obviously, that is the reason why the Unconscious is said to be *dynamic* Unconscious, that is, an Unconscious that is seeking to become conscious, an unintelligent that is seeking to become or parade as conscious intelligence. Indian thinkers have already come across a theory like this. It is not a new discovery. It is the *prakṛti* of *Sāṅkhya*, the *Māyā* of *Vedānta* of *Śaṅkara*, the Ignorance of Buddhism.

The new point about this theory is that it speaks of the experiences of the past or the constellations of interests that have been in some manner relinquished in waking-life as undergoing 'transformation.' What is this transformation about? Into what does it transform itself? These two questions are important. The transformation occurs on account of two facts. Every sensory stimulus does get its reaction or response from the body. When the body is awake, or rather, when the sense-organs are alert, then there is correct reception of the outer stimulus. If on the other hand, the sense-organs are asleep, that is to say, when they are either closed or inattentive, as in the 'Intermediate State' or the twilight of consciousness, we have the reflex activity of the

sense-organs taken up by the brain-centres directly. There happens *confusion*,¹ *vikāra*, transformation, constellating or grouping of past similar experiences around it, and, thus, we have the primitive formations of symbols of new types, distinct indeed from the ordinary analogous substitutions of the waking-life.² As already said, symbols are the life and soul of all thinking, but in dream the symbols are not merely the life and soul, they are the stage also of their entire drama.

The principle of transformation is a well-understood fact in Indian Psychology. Objects of the waking consciousness recur in dream state; nothing that was not in the waking occurs in the dream-state. The presentative theory of dreams which holds that there is no dream without some outer or inner stimulus of the sensory kind which, so to say, starts the process of dreaming, is held by the *Nyāya* thinkers. This is said to be the reason for the *particularity* that is the characteristic of dreams. It is possible to *think* in general terms or in terms of generality, but it is impossible to *dream* in terms of generality. All impressions are particular and represent general ideas. That is the meaning of the word 'symbol', and however much these symbols might be made to stand for a class of objects or impressions of experiences, they are particular and refuse to be converted into general ideas. The function of these transformations or correlative references or symbolic substitutions is suggestion. And suggestion though it is importantly dealt with in Aesthetics under the concept of *dhvani*, is indeed all in the dream-land. A faint or sharp and intense gleam of light affecting the closed eye in sleep kindles, so to say, the images of Moon in the bright half of the month, and assumes colours and fantastic forms that dreams only can conjure up. A faint rustle or a whistle perhaps calls up the imaginary train, or of thoughts and impressions of the beloved, and so on, according to the predominant mood or state of mind that is

1. "Desire, confusion, anxiety and recollection of sense-objects, these are the four *kālas* that belong to the dreaming state." *Lalitā-sahasranāma*.

2. Cf. A. N. Whitehead : *Symbolism* and C. Spearman : *Creative Mind*.

anxious to catch at something to feed upon and enjoy or be afraid of and wild in terror. In this sense, the dream-state is very near artistic life. Whereas the control on the artist's mind is conscious and deliberate, possessed of the dominant idea which he seeks to paint or chistle or carve, the dream-state at least has not that conscious aim. Gonzalo R. Lafora says "Dreams, like artistic creations, are attempts of the Unconscious mind to dominate and to overcome the conscious, that is to say, they are attempts at returning to the the primitive life in which the individual satisfied his desires without regard to the interests of the species."¹

This view is not altogether warranted, since it speaks about the dream as if it were entirely an escape-phenomenon, an escape from our moral and cultural life to the primitive self-sufficient egotistic life of self-satisfaction. It is enough to call this position as not true to all facts. Animals are as much gregarious as ourselves; and as for primitive men, studies into primitive culture, do not reveal that egoistic thrust, at any rate, to the extent that Lafora claims for them. Studies of Frazer, of Bartlett and others clearly show that the social life of the primitives has certainly not an abnormal stress on the egoistic, and in spite of the system of taboos and totems which social life amongst them has enforced, they are not people who suffer from dreams to the same extent as modern men suffer from. Dreams in the primitive society are few. They are dreaded. They have made the dreamers be considered as equal to the witches. Dream is a deep disease and not a common ailment. The reason is not far to seek; the symbolic reintegration in the life of the primitive is undeveloped or under-developed, just as in the case of infants. Dreams involve high suggestibility, correlative 'frenzy' as it were, that makes them phenomena of a different order than what Psycho-analysis on the basis of any one fundamental instinct like sex (Freud), or superiority neurosis (Adler), or as actions of a racial or universal libido (Jung) can explain. The

1. *Don Juan and other Psychological Studies*, p. 173.

importance of dream-study lies in its showing its efficient and abnormal correlative synthesis. Psychic defects tend to exaggerate the neurosis set up by the suggestibility of correlations between experiences and objects that usually do not tend to be grouped or analogued.

The state of dream in which such frenzied correlations happen is not the deep sleep, despite Du Prel who holds that deep sleep alone can give us an intimate cue into the dream-life of the self.

Now, therefore, one conclusion at last emerges, that sensory stimuli undergo transformations in the dream-state when the outer reception through the sense-organs is not available. The nervous system responds as a whole in the reception of the stimuli, even though otherwise non-active.

The second question that we addressed ourselves to was into what does a stimulus transform itself? Certainly into images. The content of the dream-experiences is not different from the experiences of our waking state. That is, the images appear to be just what we have already experienced.¹ The visual, auditional, gustatory, and tactual impressions convert themselves into images, and all our experiences appear to be representations of our waking life. No new and unknown things, that is to say, images of things that we have not seen ever occur. In other words, as the representative view of dreams holds we do not get new knowledge through dreams. The past unrolls itself before us in our dreams. But this is not altogether true, since we know that we do perceive new correlations worked out by the active explorative symbolic action of the mind, and it is affirmed by very many investigators that they do get at new knowledge in dreams. Also dreams that are prophetic are new, and do not depend upon man's unconscious volitions. Man unfortunately can create nothing without knowledge; and the ability to create without knowledge is the basic principle of Unconscious activity. The view that Bergson upholds that there is no sleep-state at all,¹ that we only

1. *Yoga-Sūtras* I, 38: Svapna-nidrā-jñānālambanam vā.

get limited views of reality through the sieves of senses,¹ and that in dream we are nearer the core of the ubiquitous reality, and are, on the whole, in closer touch with the outer reality, is, assuming it to be true, incapable of being justified on the basis of the inner symbolic references and transformations that happen to reality in our dream-life. The senses are said to be externally active in the waking state, and interiorly active in the dream-state according to Udayana and writers of the *Nyāya* school, because the objects in the dream-state appear as if they are external to the individual just as in waking experiences. This position is utilised by certain other thinkers to say that the objectivity that we do find in dream is not real objectivity, but a subjective positing, a placing outside so to say, and as such unreal or subjective creations. This view it is that is upheld by the *Vijñānavādins*; and added to their theory of perpetual momentariness, it means that they have characteristic shiftings of correlations, and as such they are momentary, not merely in the sense that they cease on our waking up, but also in the sense that they are, even within dreams, not of any duration.

The upshot of the whole discussion is that in dreams we have sensory images, and the contents of the experiences do not go beyond what we know. Representations of past experiences happen, and no objects other than what we know appear, though there might happen new correlations. Bergson's view of dream is unacceptable, since the dream-state is a state of recieption. Though there is a type of activity that apparently is free from the limitations of the waking consciousness and the constraints of external objects, the dream-state suffers from limitations, indeed, more serious than the previous, in so far as it is not a conscious-state of life. That it possesses a rationality of its own, that the associative processes in the dream-state are governed by certain fundamental interests need not be gainsaid, but that that it reveals the creative activity of

1. Lecture at the 'Institute Psychologique' 1901 (cf. *Mind-Energy*: E. Tr. H. Wildon Carr)

the individual as such, is not substantiated. Therefore Mrs. Arnold Forster's view that in dreams there is reasoning or a rationale might well be accepted; we find that only when we retrace or carefully recollect the dream. The dream-poetry of Coleridge, the dream-novel writing of R. L. Stevenson, are recollective visions, and as Mrs. Arnold Forster herself affirms, there is an objectivity of the dream which it is difficult to refer to the individual's intelligent or creative action. The phenomena of induced drowsiness cannot be called dreams.

Further, "If it is sometimes hard to believe that the actors who took part in these dreams come, not from without but from within our own consciousness, the belief is even harder in the case of dreams which seem to give back to us for a little while the presence of those whom we have loved and who are parted from us. They come to us in 'clear and solemn vision'—we do not question how they come; their presence seems for the moment as real as the comfort that they bring."

The theory of two selves is interesting. She calls the other self, the guide, the infallible helper of her dreaming consciousness, once we accept him and take shelter under his wings. The status of *Antaryāmin* in Indian Dream Psychology comes readily to mind. The individual in sleep seeks rest in the heart-lotus, where dwells the Lord within. The Inner Ruler Immortal has His home in the heart of all creatures. As the *Hamsopaniṣad* says the soul moves in the pericarp of the heart-lotus in the intermediate state of dream, prior to sinking into the centre of the lotus. The function of experiencing, cognizing and enjoying is yet with the individual; deprived though he is from the volitional or active motor functions. The cognizing function continues yet in a very subdued state in the third state, but no longer does the individual experience his experiences, past or present. It is in the second state, as the *Māṇḍukyopaniṣad* says, the individual revels in emotional

1. *Studies in Dreams*: Mrs Arnold Forster. p. 178.

experiences. The *prāṇic* forces help actively perceiving experiences but without their motor concomitants. This state cannot be said to be comparable to the ideational state of exploratory imagination, the trying out of alternatives on paper or by diagrammatic representations, prior to action. Dream may be a child state of "the enchanted tower", but it is not the state of primitive regression, except in pathological cases of frustration or exaggerated self-egoism or shock.

We have said that there is a guide in the state of dream, the friend who helpfully takes us into the tower of wonders, the 'ivory tower' of poets to which they go for refuge from the bustle and hustle of active life. Of Moral life there is no evidence, but there is quiet and joy. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* said, it is a pleasure-house of toys, chariots, horses and what not. But there are also the evil dreams which we have to experience, since of such is our active life in the world made. Moral life makes dreams happy, immoral life brings about dreams that are of fear, terror and misery. Fear is at the root of most dreams that are unhappy. Fear is at the root of moral delinquency, and the conquest of fear it is that conquers dreams that are evil. In this conquest trust in the Lord, as in the case of Yoga which counsels *Īśvara-praṇidhāna*, is absolutely necessary. The sustaining hand of a guide in the distress of mere emotional outbursting of inner life at the mercy of outer forces, psychic and physical, as well as inner forces of habitual nature, it is that thwarts evil. What *citta-vṛtti-nirodha* achieves in Yoga, that is what is also sought to be achieved by devotion to the Divine Lord. The quiet resigned attitude of the individual finite soul towards the fruits of *karma* dispensed in waking-life as well as in dream-life of the form of joys in waking-life and pleasant recreations in dream-life, leads finally to the transcendence which grants utter felicity.

A higher consciousness that knows more and not less, a power within us that is superior to us, which whilst individually in each is transcendent in all, that alone can explain

the prophetic dream. Dream in its fullest significant sense can only be this, according to some thinkers. It is not the so-called dream that is not different from the day-dream, or the imaginations, but the prophetic, dream that makes the future *true*, that is significant of the dream life. Secondly, if wish-fulfilment is said to be that which is achieved in dreams, as compensations for failures or successes during the waking-state, more or less intense reflexions of waking experiences and their psychic retroactivities, then it is not true in regard to all experiences. Sometimes, or rather, more often than not, we find that we dream not at our will, but at the dictation of some other self.¹ No doubt the dictation might come from the pathological state moving in its own manner, or it might be from the physical or physiological condition at a particular moment. All the evidence that we have shows that dreams, even wish-fulfilments, are not to be had at our will; they are not made to order. Mrs. Arnold Forster though holding the view that dreams could be created by her, finally says that she even was not able to get dreams when she wanted them. In this case, dreams like mystic inspirations or inventions, as Prof. Montmasson has shown in his *Inventions and the Unconscious* do not wait on our will; rather we have to wait anxiously for their coming

Viśiṣṭādvaita as pointed out earlier holds that the Divine Lord in every individual does all. In dream-state He Who is awake when all are asleep, Who is the master of creation, never devoid of intelligence, and Who has fullest *Vikāsa*, grants such dreams as the individual can understand and appreciate in terms of his own experiences. This is the reason why the contents of all dream-experiences are within each individual. The intimations of new things also are possible because the Lord within is transcendent to all individuals. The experiences through having peripheral stimulations undergo transformations according to the deserts

1. Buddhism holds that dreams might be due to clairvoyant influences, *Compendium of Philosophy*. S, Z. Aung. p. 48.

of their actions. The moral view taken up by *Viśiṣṭādvaita* is in keeping with the Vedic view which says that Varuṇa knows all that happens in the secret places of the heart and dispenses justice. The power of projecting the subjective facts outside is impossible to the individual *antaḥkaraṇa*, *buddhi* or memory, since in the state of dream, despite their activity, they are *receptive* and *not self-active*.

The illusive power is not so much the power to illuse, as it is to grant the individual enjoyment that he could understand and wish to possess. It is the granting of what he wishes to have that gives pleasure; the deprivation of what he wishes to have causes misery. Frustration is the lot of all. But even to achieve for the good acts one does, however slight they might be, deserts that are pleasure-giving, is to enable the individual to strive to do more good. The impossible (?) theory of *karma* that posits that our present birth is a consequence of our past activities, wherein the nature of the relationship between the act and its desert is not clearly indicated as in the Penal Codes of our human making, is in some manner mitigated by the *karma-theory* of dreams wherein we get our pleasurable deserts in our sleep.

Caraka and other writers on *Svapna-śāstra* give us indications of a good dream and good life;¹ and there is a famous passage of the *Chāndogya* which says that if one sees a woman in dreams success he there may recognize (V. 2. 9), Confucianism posits that dreams of snakes forebode daughters, though it is found that this is not true. On the other hand, certain experiences show that they forebode abortion. The dream of Mahā-Viṣṇu for Śrī Kṛṣṇa-devarāya meant, according to certain of his astrologers and interpreters of dreams, "acquisition of more women"! (*Āmuktamālyada*. I-18). The interpretation of

1. *Caraka-saṁhitā* chapter XII *Indriyathāna*; cf *Rāmāyaṇa Sundara-kāṇḍa*: ch. xxviii. 9-24. Trijata's Dreams of success to Rāma and disaster to Rāvaṇa: The descriptions are identical lending colour to the view that Caraka copied from the *Rāmāyaṇa*.

dreams is as difficult as it could be. But the Psycho-analysis of Freud has not made the task easier. Here is another case of new mythology, but it does good in so far as we are forgetting old ones !

Our individual wills operate undoubtedly in dream in a negative manner, a purely biological manner, of keeping watch over the body. The entire physiological system though at rest is aware indeed of itself. We know that when an unknown danger occurs we are awakened at once. But this does not warrant a complete statement of absolute creative activity of the self in dream. The psychological truth is that we are aware of our sleep-state, that is, that we were asleep, and that we slept soundly. But no more.

Dreams thus form a very interesting study of our mental life, its receptivity to outer forces, psychic (that is even of other higher powers perhaps) and physical, though the normal dream is of the ethical type, due to the granting of pleasure or pain as deserts for our minor good activities by the Lord within. The more the dreamer becomes moral, receptive and capable of self-control, the more true would his dreams become, that is, they more and more conform to the prophetic type of communion with the Divine. One's dreams get realised in a truer sense than one's wishes are said to get realised in the doctrine of *Sankalpa-siddhi*

APPENDIX III

THE ILLUSION OF IDENTITY OF THE BODY AND THE SELF

IN VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA¹

Almost all the schools of Indian Thought hold the view that the primal mistake that man had committed and which has been the cause of his present migratory and ignorant existence was due to an original ignorance which is of the form of a perceptual illusion, known as *dehātma-bhrānti* or *bhrama*. The explanation as to how it ever happened has not been properly explained, and it is therefore necessary to investigate the causes of this original illusion or present persistent delusion. It would not be an answer to say that since we now raise the question that there is a body or mind apart from the other, and therefore are aware of their difference the illusion that the one is the other is now irrelevant. The philosophical schools excepting the *cārvākas* or Indian materialists who did not have this problem at all, since they did not distinguish between the body and the soul, but only held that the soul is itself a product of the activities of the body and perhaps their constellations with certain nuclei of the combinations of atoms of four kinds, have decided that there was this illusion, *bhrama* which can be resolved only by extricating the characteristics of the soul from the body with which it has been identified. Thus in Buddhism we have the need to discover the *atta*, the permanent² conscient or the real from the flux of congregates or aggregates (*skandhas*); in Jainism the soul has to be freed from the karma-matter that has infiltrated into it; and in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the soul has to be perceived as having other

1. Submitted to the xith Session All India Oriental Conference, Hyderabad, 1941.

2. The original doctrine of Buddhism was Vibhajya-vāda, which held the above view.

characteristics than those of the other categories ; in Sāmkhya the self, the passive witness consciousness, has to realise itself as the passive witness it is and not the active *buddhi* or *prakṛti* in which it finds itself mirrored (?); in Advaita Vedānta, the soul has to know itself as always free from the *avidyā* which has somehow enveloped it; and in Bhedābheda the soul has to be known as different from the *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts which limit its self-luminosity; and in Viśiṣṭādvaita, the soul must know itself as self-luminous in itself though its cognitive-functional-consciousness is contracted by karma and by the body subject to or product of karma. In every one of these cases, we have the problem of discovering how the soul deludes itself into believing that it is the body that is itself? The judgment 'I am stout' *sthūlo-'ham* is a statement about the physical body, and cannot be considered to be a judgment that reveals the *dehātma-bhrama*, whereas it may be considered to be *ātma-deha-bhrama*. And this will be the conclusion that will be forced on us as we proceed with the analysis of this problem. But before we try to investigate as to how that is even possible, we shall have to enquire further into this posing of the problem, which almost all thinkers have done.

How does it ever happen that the characteristics of the soul are perceived as belonging to matter or to the body? This is the main problem. To answer this question, we have to enquire into the nature of the soul. The difficulty is precisely here. If we knew the precise qualities which are exclusively that of the soul and not of any substance other than the soul, we should be able to state it more clearly. The soul, it is agreed, is a consciousness cum self-conscious entity having selfness (*prathaktva*) oneness (*ekatva*), and agreeableness (*anukūlatva*). The self-consciousness of the soul is of a luminous nature, which is its eternal characteristic. These three qualities are features of the *ahamārtha* 'I'. These characteristics or qualities are in respect of the soul like the 'silverness' of the silver.

In the illusion that the body is the *Ahamartha* or self, what we find is that the body possesses these characteristics of self-ness and oneness and agreeableness. At least these characteristics are found to be in the ensouled-body, even as is the case of 'silverness' in the nacre. If this were the case, the judgment that we make will have the form 'This is conscious', "This body is a unity", "This body is enjoyable", and therefore the body will seek to live and increase and enjoy. This is precisely what we do in our actions; we seek to hold on to the life in this body; we seek to increase and grow; and we cling on to the body as the most enjoyable thing in the universe.

These judgments are, it might be noted, not of the same kind as 'I am stout' 'I am starving' 'I am so and so'. The body in *dehātma-bhrama* is seen to have the attributes of the soul, by a kind of a transference of attributes belonging to the soul to the body. Thus nacre is mistaken for silver. What essentially belong to the one are considered to be essentially of the other. What are the causes of this transference? Is this transference of attributes of the one to the other due to perceptual defects or mental impositions or transference of previously experienced attributes to one that is similar to it in some manner? Is it a case of *akhyāti*, non-perception of the difference between perceptual content and the memory-content, or of *anyathā-khyāti*, the mistaken perception of the same order as rope-snake, or is it a case of *akhyāti* again of the form of crystal and rose, which gives the colour to the crystal as in the Sāmkhyan explanation?

Conjoint perception of body and the soul, is said to be the cause of this illusion. It is presupposed, perhaps, just like the conditioned-reflex theory that the presence of one factor alone will bring about the reaction specific to the other. This explanation is ingenious but it cannot alone solve the problem of transference. The conjoint experience of stoutness and selfness as in the *ātmadeha-bhrama*, and the conjoint experience of selfness and its attributes in its embodied state

as in the *dehātma-bhrama*, are less explanations of the phenomena than descriptions. For it is clear that in the case of nacre and silver, there is a perceiver extraneous to the body who experiences their togetherness and is conditioned in his responses, whereas in the case of the *dehātma-bhrama* the identification is by oneself of oneself with one's body which one utilises and experiences. There is thus no possibility of explaining the self-introspective activity implicit in the attribute of *prathaktva* as belonging to the body. It is difficult to experience the fact that the body is in itself self-conscious, even at the first look, which is precisely the locus of the illusion. Further the joint-apprehension of subject and object in consciousness or cognition is not the special characteristic of the illusory experience only, but of all experiences. Thus this cannot be an explanation of the *dehātma-bhrama*. A further difficulty in all perceptual explanations of this *dehātma bhrama* is that the terms here are not both of the perceptual order. The body is perceived by the senses and the soul is selfevidently experienced and not perceived by the senses. Thus the difficulty of even considering that this is a *bhrama*. More truly it can be called *bhrānti*—a hallucination, the projecting of one's thoughts into the perceptual field by innervation of consciousness. But this alternative seems to be unacceptable to all schools.

Further the main characteristic of an illusion is not a manufacture of new entities, but rather it is the accentuation of certain features of an object, which are superficial, to the level of importance and value. Thus the form of the snake, the reflective nature of the nacre, the penetrability of light-rays through transparent crystal are real facts. There are possibilities of similarity in objects belonging to one particular order, and that is why *illusions are paired*, that is to say, it is a rope that looks like a snake, it is nacre that looks like silver, it is crystal that looks coloured, and not all other objects. This pairing-phenomenon is of great value. This theory thus realizes that there are real factors in illusion; a thing is an illusion not because of absence of the factors

which make it look like another with which it is mistaken, but because such similarities are frankly useless for the purpose of action or realization when taken as the other. This is the *yathārtha-khyāti*-theory in a nutshell. But this view cannot be an explanation for the *dehātma-bhrama*, for it would be pleading for the real possibility of mistaking the body for the soul because of the actual but useless similarity between the two, soul and body. This indeed it cannot admit, for the metaphysical theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita upholds a radical distinction between soul and matter, the one being material, unconscious and the other conscient and self-luminous always, possessing the attributive consciousness-function (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*).

There is, however, here a possibility of holding that it may not be the *prathaktva* that makes the illusion nor the unity of characteristics but the *anukūlatva*, agreeableness, which is the cause. Thus in analysing the characteristic attributes of the soul which identifies itself with the body or rather which later finds its own characteristics in the body and thus considers it to be the self, or soul, we find that the illusion has its basis in *anukūlatva* rather than in conscientness. For the fact is that perception is always of the purposive and agreeable, and is decidedly, as in nacre, not *interested* in the *thing* but in the *silverness* which it mistakes for real silver. The personal *interest* for satisfaction of the physical demand and spiritual demand is thus clearly available in all activities that man does. The *anukūlatva* of the soul, agreeableness that it finds in itself, is reflected also in the body which subserves the pleasure-principle.¹ It is this perception of the agreeable and serviceable *anukūlatva*, that is the cause of the illusion. Both the soul and the material world and the body that one has, all are enjoyable things serviceable to the Lord, this is the common denominator in their qualities. This is the reason why the soul is capable of aligning itself with the body, and thus deluding itself into believing that there is no difference between the body and itself. The failure of the body

1. *Bṛh. Up.* IV 5. 6 ff.

will lead to the failure of the soul, and thus any illusion is based not only on the actual contactual relation in which the body and soul are found, but also because of the actual perception of qualities, special to the soul, being found to be available in the body itself. For instance the body has also *prathaktva* an individuality, differentiation, from the surrounding objects with which it may share materiality, but which are never interpreted by the same to be itself. Equally there is the unity, *ekatva*, the oneness which is in this case not mere oneness of conscient existence but the oneness of unity of diverse organs. Thus the actual illusion has sufficient reason to occur. Thus we find that illusion has a real ground and the illusion consists not in so far as there are not qualities or attributes the self has in it, but only in so far as those qualities are not particularly its, that is to say, *asādhāraṇa*-attributes, attributes which belong to it exclusively and not to others. It is this particular attributeness or *asādhāraṇatva* of these three attributes of *pratyaktva*, selfness, *ekatva* and *anukūlatva* that now have to be investigated. Of these *pratyaktva* is special to the self in a manner in which even *anukūlatva* is not.

Thus when we say that we perceive the self as the body, *dehātma bhrama*, is due to the fact that we perceive the attributes of the soul in the body and thus mistake it as the soul. But this position, whilst explaining the illusion and its possibility, does not really answer the metaphysical or epistemological proposition as to how the self, a cognizing entity, which is, according to all thinkers, a conscious and self-conscious entity, *svasmai svena sadā bhāsamān*—ever get this kind of delusion or illusion that it is the body which it occupies and controls. This is impossible. What is possible is that the body is perceived by the self itself as its own, its *prakāra*, as belonging to it and sharing its perpetuity, unity, selfness and serviceableness and agreeableness. The attribute, namely, the body, is perceived as the substrate, the ground, *viśeṣya*. Thus the original illusion must be due to this *ātma-deha-bhrama* rather

than due to *dehātma-bhrama*. This is precisely what makes it possible for us to understand the transference of self-characteristics to the attribute or *prakāra*. But it may be asked as to whether even this is possible, since the self-conscious entity can never be without its self-conscious being?

This is certainly an important question, and requires to be investigated. If the self-luminosity of the self is something having reference to the manifestation in its consciousness of the entire world of objects including its own body, then no illusion can possibly be at all. For everything will be perceived as the content of the subject's consciousness. The transference of its own attributes or specific qualities to the body will be impossible. Thus self-luminosity can only mean the perception of itself alone as a conscient being having the characteristic qualities of *prathaktva* and *ekatva* and *anukūlatva*, and not anything else. This will not even include the perception of the *asādhāraṇatva* of these qualities in relation to itself, for these qualities alone in their bare qualityness (*viśeṣaṇatva*) are perceived. If so how is it possible for it to know that these qualities are specific to itself and to nothing else? The self or soul in its selfness thus is cognizant only of its selfness and unity and agreeableness to itself, because it is not mere *nirviśeṣa-vastu* that it perceives, such perception or experience being impossible. For knowing that these qualities are specific to it alone, *asādhāraṇa*, comparison with other experiences or relations would have to be had, and this is achieved by it not as a self-luminous being but as a being having consciousness as an attribute, *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. This is the fundamental distinction between *dharmi-bhūta-jñāna* and the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*. Thus it is that *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* helps not only the understanding of the objects outside the individual, the perception of the body and its states, but finally it acts reflexively in so far as it reveals to the soul its own qualities as specially related to it. The illusions then are to be referred to the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*'s activities rather than to the *dharmi-bhūta-jñāna*. The *asādhāraṇatva* or specificity of these three attributes of selfness,

oneness and *anukūlatva* is the one thing that has to be discovered, and it is the one thing that is not perceived at once, and thus there occurs the illusion.

Thus we find that the true source of the illusion called *ātma-deha-bhrama* consists not in the veiling of the primeval *adhyāsa*, or ignorance, nor yet a beginningless karma, but in the two-fold limitation of the soul; (i) the privateness and exclusiveness and self-enjoying nature of the *dharmi-bhūta-jñāna*, which does not even apprehend its *aṇutva*, or *kartṛtva* attributes but only its *pratyaktva*, selfness, and *ekatva*, oneness, and *anukūlatva*, which makes it impossible for it to know that these attributes are exclusively its own rather than to the body it tenants, and (ii) the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* which due to limitation due to beginningless karma and its consequent *avidyā*, does not apprehend this specific exclusiveness of these attributes *pratyaktva*, *ekatva* and *anukūlatva* and *jñātṛtva* and others of the self, and thus causes the delusion or illusion that the body is the self or soul.

APPENDIX IV

Negation

The problem of negation is an important one since it has a bearing on the nature of truth itself. Negation involves firstly the denial of *something* and cannot be said to be mere denial. The denial of something involves the apprehension of something that is other than that which is denied, whose place it has taken, or it might be it is the denial of the existence of the something merely without any reference to any other thing's existence or presence. Secondly, it might mean the apprehension of the absence at some place and time of something already experienced, and as such it is definition or determination of non-correspondence with the past experience merely without a detailed investigation of the present experience. Negation taken as a judgment even does not and cannot escape the reference to the negative fact, so to speak, of the actual apprehension of a thing's absence. If we inspect this phase of negation, we shall see that absence as such is experienced to be the nature of the situation, and as such perception is the instrument of our cognition of absence. It may be said that perception can only give the 'given', the presented objects and cannot present non-absence of the objects, and as such we must have a different instrument of cognition such as non-cognition or non-perception, *anupalabdhi*, to prove non-existence (*abhāva*). But this is all right so long as we take this non-existence presented in the so-called non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), (for it is indeed an apprehender of the alleged *abhāva*)¹, to be a mere *abhāva*, an uncharacterised somewhat and not a positive entity of absence. Carefully inspected we find that the situation or position taken up by the Advaitin is similar to his position in regard to the *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*, a bare and uninspected or unimagined or integrated experience of absence, because of non-perception

1. *Vedānta Paribhāṣa*.

of anything determinate *over there*. There is an element of contra-definition or counter-correlative which is defined more or less clearly even in the most incipient perceptual experience of negative fact or absence, which precisely reveals the difference.

The Prābhākaras hold that non-existence has no reality apart from that as an existent thing.¹ The Naiyāyika view is that non-existence of a thing in a particular locus is not identical with the locus but adjectival to it, for we always say that the ground is characterized by the non-existence of a jar that was previously there. This involves the view that non-existence as such can become an adjective or *viśeṣaṇa* of the ground. This is so to speak nonsense, except when we hold that there is a negative predicate in judgment about the existence of a thing. The adjectival theory suffers from its incapacity to see that the loss or absence of a thing cannot be an adjective, for it is not a fact that *has* anything but a difference to the original locus. Nor should we say that *viśeṣaṇa* as particular difference is an adjective as something marking out a difference from the original experience that was characterized with the presence of a thing, say, a pot. Nor could a general theory which holds that the counter-correlative of negation of a pot is cloth and what determines its counter-correlateness is clothness as genus-differentium be right, for there are cases, individual to be sure, which may have both pot and cloth and bench or chair, but the absence of one thing does not *entail* the counter-correlateness of others. We should therefore see that whilst it may be perceptually right to say that A was B is at the same place and therefore B is the counter-correlate of A, it will not reveal the *necessity* of some one thing say B as the counter-correlate of A, so much so we may be able to affirm

1. Bhāvāntaram eva bhāvāntarapekṣayā abhāva iti vyavahṛyate : *Sapta-padārthi*, p. 76. Uddyotakara held that *abhāva* is apprehended by sense-organs *abhāvam indriyena grhyate*, and Kumārila Bhatta agrees with the above view. It is something additional to the ground wherein there is non-perception of pot : *adhiṣṭhānātiriktaṁ tattvam* cf. *Six Ways of Knowing* : D. M. Datta p. 159.

the inference in the form of a negative judgment or judgment of affirmation.

Śrī Rāmānuja's views on Negation are those closely related to the concept of non-knowledge or ignorance. The question between the Advaitic and his own standpoint was whether non-knowledge was a positive entity or otherwise, whether indeed it was perceived, whether also it was absence of knowledge and as such a vacuum, or whether it was positive power that illudes or veils knowledge or abolishes it. Rāmānuja points out that knowledge and non-knowledge are contradictory only in so far as they refer to one and the same object : *Jñānājñānayoṛ ekaviśayatvena hi virodhaḥ*.¹ He points out the importance of recognizing the content and locus of the negation, for it is in special respect of these that our ignorance (*avidyā*) has to be defined. A universal ignorance is not at all what is being affirmed when we say that 'I am not knowing'. Ignorance is not a positive entity, it is only absence—an absence that may hinder the action needed and in that sense positive. But this cannot be proved either by perception or by perception aided by reasoning or inference :—
"Ahamajñō mām anyam ca na janāmi 'ityātropapattisahitena kevalena ca pratyakṣena na bhāvarūpam ajñānam pratiyate yastu jñāna-prāgabdhāva-viśayatve virodha uktaḥ sa hi bhāvaru-pajñane' pi tulyaḥ".² Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent non-existence, in either case it come out as what the word indicates, namely, non-knowledge means either *absence* of knowledge or that which is *other than* knowledge or that which is *contradictory* to knowledge, and in any of these cases we have to admit that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge." *Bhāvarūpasyājñānasyāpi hyajñānam iti sidhyataḥ prāgabdhāvasiddhāviva sāpekṣatvam astyeva. Tathā hi ajñānam iti jñānābhāvas tadanyas tadvirodhī vā ? Trayāṇām api tat-svarūpājñānāpekṣā'vaśyāśrāyaṇiyā*.³

1. *Śrī Bhāṣya* : I, i. I. (Ananda Press ed. I. 74 p. Thib. tra. p. 104 S. B. E.)

2. *ibid*

p. 77

p. 110

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3. "

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Taking the first, it is not true to affirm that negations are all of the same kind. It is on the contrary correct to err on the side of pluralism by affirming that there are different kinds of negation. Negation can be of existence; negation can be of meaning; negation can be of context in time and place and relationship with other objects. It is this last type of negation that is usually mistaken for the former two. Obviously it cannot be correct to affirm that the negation of existence of a particular thing is also negation of its meaning unless this meaning is something that is involved in its existence. If idea involves existence, then the denial of the one can be the denial of the other also. If, on the other hand, existence is a predicate, if to mean a particular meaning is not identical with its actuality in time and place, then the negation of meaning need not be the negation of the existence, or the negation of existence the negation of the meaning as well.

Existence is characterised by the features of time and space and also of relationship with other objects. This relationship may be of the causal type as well as other kinds of relationships such as genus and particular, *jāti* and *vyakti*, and therefore there can be no existential occasion without the characteristics of space and time and causal nexus. Negation of existence means then the absence of existential predicates. Negation however is not absolute since it depends on these considerations of space and time and causal relationship even like existence itself. Thus to exist means to exist at a certain place, and time and causal relationship with its antecedent, lacking which, it must be presumed to have no existence then and there and under those conditions.

The main defect of most thinkers is due to the fact that unrealistically they tend to identify or subsume all negation under one omnibus negation which does not distinguish between previous non-existence, present non-existence and future non-existence; but all things are characterised by these three features of time. To affirm that they are characterised by these three features of reference to time is also to affirm that

whilst a thing is at one place it cannot at the same time be at another place also. Thus the negative judgment that 'A is not at a particular place' only negates A's existence at that place and at the time the judgment is being made, and not that at any future time A may not go over there at all. Thus the negative judgment is not definite except in relation to the time and place that it exhibits at that moment.¹

It is true that all things are not of the same temporal duration. And some of the entities may have a coevality with time itself, so as to be called timeless or eternal, like the souls (as in Vedānta), and like some other things which whilst undergoing transformation or becoming, their essential materiality may not be denied at any moment. The absolute negation of matter's existence, or rather the affirmation of ultimate non-existence leads to absurd consequences or compromises with existence. In these cases whilst change is predicated of things, what is negated in their contexts is not their materiality nor eternality as such, but only the particular state which they enjoyed at any prior moment. Change thus is relative to the previous state, even as destruction is relative to the previous state. Thus we find change and destruction to be mutually interchangeable terms, and these have reference to the permanent thing-in-itself, or to the previous states of things and their consequent states. The buddhist view that if there had been previous non-existence and if there is to be a consequent non-existence, there could never be a present existence sandwiched between the two,² is answered by the reference to the state of a thing rather than to the thing itself which is the fundamental reference and base or locus of all change and time and space. Thus non-existence instead of being a perpetual and anxious dragon awaiting the emergence of existence to gulp it up and leave nothing behind but the

1. It is a moot question whether negative-judgment (sic) is an inference based on the non-apprehension of an expected or sought for object at a particular place and time.

2. Māyāvāda considers such a sandwiched existence to be unreal or illusory.

Void, is a myth and unacceptable. The doctrine of momentariness or flux is relative to the subjective apprehension, and the moment is not to be treated as a mathematical moment having no duration at all. *Bergson's observation that nothing is not is appropriate.*

Mere or bare negation or non-existence as we have said has no locus and is neither dynamic nor fertile. Dynamic negation entails the concept of destruction, a thing which causes disintegration; and even to speak of a thing disrupting itself is possible only on basis of a real entity causing another to disintegrate. Do we find this concept of dynamic disintegration within the scheme of negation as represented to us by the schools of thought? It is true that the Buddhist schools speak of negation as *itaretara-bhāva* or *paraspara-apekṣatā*, which is intended to convey the relativity view. The concept of destruction of being by non-being so as to lead to the realization of Becoming or Change is not so clearly available in Indian Philosophy as it has been found in Hegelian dialectic. On the other hand, we find that negation as a category undoubtedly is said to involve the category of existence with which it is related and in relation to which alone it has any meaning. Negation means in the perceptual sense the perception of emptiness or otherness than what was exhibited at a previous moment and what was *anticipated* to exist at that place and at that time. The concept of *abhāva* non-existence,¹ is thus closely related with the doctrine of relative occupation or non-occupation by a thing and the sense of prior occupation and present non-occupation or future non-occupation. The feeling of vacancy is thus a positive index to the judgment of negation. The perception of black as the *absence* of white in psychology is equivalent to the

1. Whether *abhāva* can be equated with *anupalabdhi* is an important point. *Abhāva* as a category in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is an apprehended absence of things, and is a fact, undoubtedly dependent upon the apprehension of things prior or after, ideally anticipated or perceptually directly known. But to say *abhāva* is *anupalabdhi* will lead to the doctrine of solipsism : *esse ist percipi ; non ist non-percipi*.

perception of the vacancy-space or other-occupation of the identical space. To say thus as the Naiyāyikas say that Non-existence, *abhāva* is a perceptual fact is correct. Further that it is positively a contrast-experience can be proved. On entering into the house where previously children were playing and finding that no children are there we declare that none is there, though there might be elders. In the darkness loneliness is a positive experience or sensing of emptiness or absence. Thus negation can be both negative or passive and positive or aggressive, or painful or pleasant.

Thus the experience of *abhāva* does not mean that it is an entity, but that it is the experience of an absence of a previous entity.

Śrī Venkaṭanātha points out that negation is related to and defined by the conditions or limitations (*upādhis*) of time, place and causality.

The mention of causality involves reference to other objects that have been, with which it is related in a necessary manner as consequent. Thus the non-existence of a cause at the time when the consequent comes into existence is a necessary condition, just as much as its existence at the previous moment was necessary to bring the effect into being. Thus we find that though such existence appears to be undefined in so far as it is in itself incapable of being described as existence, since it is its absence, it is defined by limits or conditions. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that negation of A involves only the non-existence of A at a particular place, time, and as a cause or effect and not that no other thing is there, nor that it would not be there later, nor that it was not there previously.

Negation is thus distinct from destruction; things might be destroyed and suffer change. They need not on that account be considered to be unreal. The criterion that the momentary is unreal is not of the school of Buddhism which is realistic enough to affirm reality to be such. Nor is it that of the realist. Negation is a principle of contradiction

which makes it a logical weapon that limits and circumscribes a universal judgment.

So far we have been showing that the experience of absence itself is definitely of the relational type. For when we deny the existence of something or affirm its non-existence, though to affirm appears to give the case away, not because the very possibility of affirmation lends colour to the view that there is something over there clamant for affirmation, three questions arise. Where? When? and What? about that which is negated. Thus writes the author of the *Nyāya-Kulīśa* in his chapter on *Bhāvāntarābhāva-vāda*. Thus Negation may mean either mere absence of an object or entity which was looked out for or suggested by prior experience of the particular place, due to destruction of it or the passing away of it. In this case it merely intimates non-presence of that which was anticipated to exist. The reasons for its non-existence at the present moment or moment of apprehension of negation are not relevant as such. But this too was investigated by some later writers who have seen that negation is due to the perception of a special modified nature of the entity in which the negation is affirmed; *prati-yogi-buddhau vastu-viśeṣa-dhīr eva'peta nāsti'iti vyavahārahetuḥ* says Vātsyā (Nadāthūr Annāl'). Ātreya Rāmānuja holds that there is no need to posit negation as a separate entity, for indeed it is only the perception of difference between the previous and the present or the present and the future occasion. "Negation is that which is antagonistic to a positive entity and there is no way in which a negation can be conceived by itself without reference to a positive entity. *Abhāvasya tad-rūpam yad-bhāva-pratipakṣatā naivam adyā'py asau yasmād bhāvottirñena sādhitah*."² The difference between the positive entity from another is regarded as negation. The last view takes up the notion of *viśeṣa*, uniqueness of difference as the content of mutual exclusion. This is stated to be at the root of the

1. cf. *History of Indian Philosophy* : S. N. Das Gupta. Vol. III. p. 353.

2. *Journal Annamalai Uni.* vol. X pts. 2 & 3 *Prameyamālā*.

3. *Nyāya-Kulīśa*

concept of otherness. Thus we can see that there are three types of negation ; the later writers tended to reduce all types into one and made negation identical with otherness. Thus suppose we take the word *Avidyā*, it may mean Non-knowledge or contradictory to Knowledge according to Rāmānuja : whereas in the later systems non-knowledge is distinguished by an otherness to knowledge, whether absence or contradictory. Even in the case of Otherness, Rāmānuja was prepared to see in it not *general* 'otherness' as in the case of horse being other than a table, but rather a *special* 'otherness' that is, that which is relevant to the topic.

Thus the experience of *abhāva* is not that it is an entity so-called but that it is the experience of *another* entity different from this. Śrī Rāmānuja refuting in the context of Nyāya-refutation speaks that "non-existence (*abhāva*) is clearly conceived as special state of something actually existing : *Abhāvasya vidyamāna-padārthā-vasthāviśeṣatvopapādanāc.....*" (Śrī Bhāṣya II. ii. 23.) This means that *A-vidyā* when used in the context of *Upāya* to the realization of God will mean Action which is usually the other *upāya* than *vidyā*. Śrī Venkaṭanātha speaking on the notion of *Avidyā* as identical with Works under the mantra 11 in the *Īśāvāśyopaniṣad-bhāṣya*¹ writes :

Avidyayā vidyāṅgatayā coditakarmanā mṛtyum jñāna-saṅkocarūpa-mṛtyuhetum prāktana karma.....Iha tu avidyā-śabdah prakaraṇādaucityācca vidyāṅgakarmaviṣaya ityabhāṣi Bhāṣyakāraiḥ : 'Atrāvidyā śabdābhīhitam varṇāśramavihitam karma' iti 'mṛtyu-taranopāyatayā pratītā'vidyā vidyetarad-vihitam karmaiva' iti ca. Vidyām paryndasyannayamavidyā-śabdah kṣatriyādi-viṣayabrāhmaṇaśabdādivad āsanna - tadan-antara-vṛttir-aṅgakarmaviṣaya iti bhāvaḥ.

"The term '*avidyā*' which excludes knowledge, having to mean that which is proximate and next to it, like the words *a-brāhmaṇa* and others which denote kṣatriyas and others, refers to works which are intimately related (to knowledge)."

1. S. V. O. I. ed. p. 13.

Thus according to Śrī Rāmānuja no negation as such can be made without it at the same time intimating something about that negated something which because of the negation means that it is different from what was previously apprehended or what was expected to exist or else what was relevant to the need to make this negative assertion. Taken thus the negation is a definite enough statement so far as the modification of the situation goes, but is indefinite about what is affirmed to exist as different from that which is being denied. The transition from the negative to the determinate judgment of assertion of the other is preceded by the observation of the conditions of the otherness, and this Rāmānuja and Venkaṭanātha consider is easy enough to find when they limit it to proximateness, relevance and purpose of the negation and close relation of subsidiariness to it—*āsannatva*, *tad-anantaratavṛttitva* and *aṅgatva*.

The third type of negation referred to by Śrī Rāmānuja was that which was contradictory to the existence or contradictory to the emergence of a thing into existence. They may be designated as *prāgabdhāva* and *pradhvamsābhāva*; but the dynamic quality of the opposition is not brought out into clear relief. If the previous type of negation revealed the distinctive and subsidiariness (*aṅgatva*) of the negation expressed by such a phrase as *āvidyā* (that is karma), in this we have the actual conflict between the two: when the one exists the other cannot exist, just as there is conflict between Good and Evil; though to be sure we come across many persons who are good in some respects and evil in others, but certainly not good and evil in respect of same aspects. Equally the terms *Sambhūti* and *Asambhūti* mean birth and non-birth (*vināśa*). But taken in the context of their usage in the Upaniṣad (*Īśā*, 14) we find that *A-sambhūti* means the destruction of impediments to birth into Divine life. When we look at the philosophy of Hegel we come across the oppositional character of negation,¹ though

1. cf. *What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*: B. Croce, (trans. W. Carr.) p. 8-32.

this type of negation can only be reduced to the level of contradictory negation of one force by another or ruling out of one force by another.

There is still a kind of negation affirmed at the levels of mystic consciousness—the state of total transcendence. The Asat of the Upaniṣads and the Veda is quite a positive Existence but about that nothing is humanly measureable or knowledgeable. “Negation is that to which we come at the end of all the researches of reason and faith to a dark night, and enter there ‘to unite ourselves in wise ignorance with Him who dwells in the shadows’ says Gerald Venn writing about St. Thomas Aquinas’s central reaching on Negation. Is it also Buddha’s (though not the buddhist’s) Nirvāṇa ?

It is the description of the unknowable, but that too is a positive and most real experience of deity as mystics have continuously affirmed. This truly is the only place where the content is undefinable or indeterminable with the help *upādhis* or conditions : but its otherness, or even organic otherness with the experience of ours is definitely available. Thus the theory of Rāmānuja clearly points out the central truth of negation to lie in its determination of the ‘other existent’ which is proximate and near and organic to it, in respect of existence, or value or purpose.

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
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